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FIRST PART 
ECONOMIC TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 

I. MAIN TRENDS 
In 1991, the economic activity in Latin America 
and the Caribbean as a whole grew by 3.2%; as a 
result, per capita output registered its first 
improvement in four years. At the same time, 
inflation receded and hyperinflation was 
virtually eliminated. This moderate progress over 
previous years was achieved in spite of a 
relatively unfavourable international 
environment, which was reflected in the very 
slow growth of exports and a significant 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
However, the slackening of external demand 
was accompanied by a notable drop in 
international interest rates which not only 
provided some relief for external debt service but 
also helped to bring about a significantly greater 
inflow of capital, attracted in part by the higher 
yields in the countries of the region. As a result, 
Latin America and the Caribbean registered a 
positive transfer of financial resources for the 
first time in 10 years. This, in turn, strengthened 
the region's import capacity in spite of the 
stagnation of exports, and made possible a 
substantial expansion of imports in response not 
only to the requirements of moderate growth but 
also to the burgeoning demand for consumer and 
capital goods which was emerging as part of the 
processes of trade liberalization. 
In 1991 there was a significant increase in the 
number of countries which were able to increase 
their growth rates, and there was also a rise in the 
number of countries which attained, or were in 
the process of attaining, macroeconomicstability 
with varying degrees of consolidation. The 
countries displayed a great variety of situations 
depending on the stage they had reached in their 
stabilization programme. In some cases, the 
expansion process forged ahead after stabilizing 
adjustments (as in Chile and Mexico); in others 
the rate of growth slackened as a result of 
adjustments implemented in 1991 (as in 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay, for 
example), and in still others, output recovered as 
the economy emerged from a state of high 
inflation (as occurred in Argentina). 
If the above cases are supplemented with the 
countries which remained in a state of recession 
because of severe stabilization programmes 
(Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican Republic* 
among other, then .the regional picture, with only 
a very few exceptions, is essentially. one of 
generalized containment of inflationary 
pressures as part of stabilization processes in 
varying phases of consolidation. Thus, in the last 
few months of 1991, most of the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries registered average 
monthly rates of inflation between l%and 1.5%; 
price increases in Ecuador and Venezuela were 
running between 2% and 3.5% per month; prices 
in Peru and Uruguay (two countries with serious 
antÍTÍnflationary programmes) were still rising at 
a rate of between 4% and 5% per month, and only 
Brazil continued to register very high monthly 
rates of inflation, between 20% and 25%. 
In spite of the fragility still displayed by some 
stabilization processes, most economies of the 
region are now operating on new premises which 
generally are more export-oriented and also 
include trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, more 
prudent management of monetary policy and 
greater reluctance to resort to public regulation of 
economic activity. However, these new rules of 
public policy doubtless involve even greater 
inequality of income than in the past, a more 
precarious employment situation, tighter fiscal 
resources, and a lesser degree of freedom for the 
application of economic policy. All this means 
that there is less capacity to make transfers 
between economic sectors or social strata, but at 
the same time it does inspire greater confidence 
in the permanence of the rules guiding public 
policy. 
Generally speaking, the economies of the 
region are operating with more balanced public 
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budgets, since the leeway for indulging in 
imbalances without setting off inflationary 
spirals has been narrowed. Over the two-year 
period 1990-1991, many countries carried out 
massive fiscal adjustments, thanks to which their 
public sector financing needs have been reduced 
by between 2% and 1% of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Most of the remaining countries reduced 
their fiscal deficit by more than 1 % of GDP over 
the same period. 
The structural fragility of the fiscal balance is 
naturally greater in the countries whose 
restructuring processes were launched more 
recently and it diminishes proportionately with 
the degree to which new fiscal parameters are 
consolidated into permanent institutions. In 
many cases, the adjustment has been achieved 
through an extraordinarily severe compression of 
consumption and investment expenditure which 
will be difficult to sustain up in more normal 
circumstances, even with changes in public 
institutions to enhance their efficiency. At the 
same time, the interest due on the public external 
debt continues to represent such a heavy burden 
in fiscal budgets, that most of the countries of the 
region are in arrears despite their manifest desire 
to bring their debt servicing up to date. The 
inflow of hon-debt-related capital does not solve 
the problem, since it generally goes to the private 
sector. 
In the stabilization programmes under way, 
the countries have managed to balance public 
cash flows not only because of the favourable 
effects of controlling inflation and of economic 
recovery on tax receipts but also by taking 
extraordinary measures such as the deferral of 
debt service payments and/or the sale of assets 
through the privatization of public enterprises. In 
these latter cases, once stability has been 
achieved, the financial gap will have to be closed 
by generating resources of a permanent nature 
through regular fiscal institutions. 
Substantial non-debt-related private financial 
flows of different types, which to some extent 
represent repatriation of capital, are taking place 
both towards countries which have continued to 
maintain their macroeconomic stability and 
towards those which have only recently 
undertaken domestic adjustment. In some 
countries (such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Venezuela), these flows include foreign 
investment, at times connected with the 
privatization of public enterprises, although there 
have also been cases of substantial portfolio 
investments and even bond issues. In these and 
the majority of the other countries, however, 
considerable short-term financial investments 
are attracted by the differential between the real 
domestic dollar equivalent interest rates 
(including the reduced risk premium assigned to 
cover the possibility of abrupt changes in the 
exchange rate) and low international rates. 
In the countries where volume has been 
substantial, these capital inflows have had two 
immediate consequences. On the one hand, they 
have obliged the central banks to buy up the 
excess supply of foreign exchange and 
accumulate reserves. On the other, they have kept 
the real exchange rate below the levels which 
prevailed when the counterpart of the trade 
surplus was capital flight. 
The latter situation tends to erode the 
competitiveness of exports and stimulate 
imports, thus reducing the effective protection of 
domestic production. When this is combined 
with trade reforms which involve the rapid 
reduction of tariff protection, industrial 
production and employment tend to be adversely 
affected in the short term, that is, before any of 
the effects of greater openness on productivity 
occur. 
From the point of view of stabilization 
policies, these trends have opposing 
repercussions. The rise in the value of the 
national currency serves as an "anchor" for 
nominal prices, while at the same time it 
stimulates imports (which are also facilitated by 
the processes of greater trade liberalization), 
thereby favouring the stabilization of some 
domestic prices. However, the accumulation of 
reserves brings with it an unwanted expansion of 
the money supply which runs counter to the 
predominantly restrictive orientation of 
monetary policy; the absorption of this surplus 
calls not only for the expansion of demand for 
real monetary assets but also an equivalent fiscal 
surplus. In these circumstances, rapid and 
sustained growth of imports requires a 
continuous inflow of capital. 
Obviously, this type of balance is fragile, to 
the extent that part of the capital inflow may 
suddenly reverse itself. This is a possibility 
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which can never be ruled out in the case of 
investments in securities, financial operations 
made attractive by a higher interest rate 
differential than on the international market, and 
the repatriation of assets to replenish the working 
capital of enterprises which have been adversely 
affected by a domestic credit squeeze or by a 
recession. 
In so far as these capital inflows are due to 
conjunctural circumstances rather than to real 
confidence in medium-term growth, they are far 
from representing a structurally stable source of 
financing which can serve as a sound basis for 
development. In this respect, the apparently 
positive evolution of the external accounts of 
some countries must be viewed against persistent 
debt overhang, the structural consequences of 
which continue to compromise the degrees of 
freedom of economic policy and the prospects for 
growth. In order to bring about a permanent 
reversal of the net transfer of external resources, 
the inflow of private capital must be combined 
with the reduction of the burden of servicing the 
external public debt and a consolidation of a 
climate of confidence in economic policy and the 
prospects for development. 
In this respect, one can observe -at least in 
certain countries- growing confidence among 
agents with respect to the continuity, validity and 
effectiveness of economic policy, which in turn 
influence such policy in different ways, in a break 
with the past. This change in attitude and in the 
prevailing investment climate is probably related 
to the widespread acceptance of the new 
foundations for the functioning of the economies, 
both with regard to their potential benefits and 
their true costs. 
Given the underlying mistrust which 
prevailed before the consolidation of macro-
economic stability, over adjustment of economic 
policy instruments was usually called for: real 
exchange rates and interest rates had to remain 
high in order to avoid capital flight; adjustment 
of the fiscal deficit by an amount greater than that 
warranted by the objective effects on the money 
supply. This was needed in order to telegraph the 
political determination to eliminate the 
expansionary effects of the public sector. With 
the improvement in the climate of confidence on 
the part of the economic agents, economic policy 
variables can be managed within narrow 
margins. In other words, in a climate of growing 
confidence among the economic agents, the need 
to factor "risk premiums" into the exchange rate, 
interest rate, and the magnitude and speed of 
adjustment of the fiscal deficit disappeared 
somewhat. 
Nevertheless, there are also elements of risk 
with regard to the confidence of the economic 
agents. Quite apart from any reaction they may 
have to political events, the import boom itself 
-facilitated by trade liberalization and sustained 
by the inflow of capital- may reach a level at 
which it becomes vulnerable to changes in these 
capital flows; economic agents would then 
anticipate the need for the devaluation which 
would, in turn, lead to a turnaround in the 
situation. 
At a more fundamental level, underlying the 
still modest rates of expansion of economic 
activity and the ever-worrisome inflationary 
pressures, there are vigorous processes of change 
which have been consolidating in recent years -in 
some cases, with ups and downs- and which hold 
the seeds of progress, even though they also 
involve hardship for broad segments of the 
population. 
In short, the glooming picture of stagnation, 
recession and inflation which has characterized 
most of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in recent years showed signs of 
beginning to fade in 1991, although there are still 
some contradictory signs and in many cases the 
recovery is somewhat fragile. Furthermore, there 
are still considerable lags and shortcomings 
caused by the legacy of long-standing 
inequalities, now increased by the social cost of 
the adjustment. 
In 1991 the gross domestic product of the 
region as a whole grew by 3.2%, which 
represents a moderate degree of reactivation after 
three years of virtual stagnation. As a result, per 
capita output rose (by 1.3%) for the first time in 
four years, thus recovering its 1977 level. This 
modest increase in regional output was heavily 
influenced by the continued recession in Brazil, 
which continues to wrestle with high rates of 
inflation. The average growth rate for the 
remaining economies, taken as a whole, was 
around 4.3% -that is to say, higher than the 1990 
figure- in spite of the stagnation of exports due 
to the slackening growth of world trade. 
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In a considerable number of countries in the 
region, the economy grew at rates of between 3% 
and 6% per year, which were, equal to or higher 
than those registered in 1990, either because they 
continued expansion processes already under 
way (in El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico), or 
because they had reactivated their economies (in 
Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador, for example), or 
because the level of activity had picked up once 
high inflation was brought under control (as 
occurred in Argentina). The Uruguayan economy 
recovered (by 1.5%) after three years of virtual 
stagnation, while Peru registered comparable 
growth despite the recession from which it is 
suffering, because of the disinflation achieved in 
1991. Noteworthy cases were those of Panama 
and Venezuela, whose economies grew by 
slightly more than 9%, well above the already 
high rate achieved in 1990. In Colombia and 
Costa Rica, on the other hand, the growth rate 
slowed down to between 1% and 2%, 
comparable to the rates that Trinidad and Tobago 
continued to register. Jamaica's economy, in 
turn, stagnated after five years of expansion. The 
output of Brazil, whose economy is oscillating 
between recession and high inflation, posted an 
increase of slightly more than 1% over the 
previous year. Honduras, Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic continued to experience 
depressed levels of economic activity, in the 
midst of a battle against inflation, while Barbados 
and Haiti suffered fresh setbacks. Cuba saw a 
worsening of the contraction that had begun the 
year before, following the collapse of its 
economic relations with the Eastern European 
countries. 
Per capita output registered modest growth in 
most of the economies of the region, though there 
was stagnation or regression in this respect in 11 
countries. Belize, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Mexico and Uruguay registered growth rates of 
between 1% and 2%, while in Argentina, Chile, 
Guyana, Panama and Venezuela, per capita 
output rose by 3% or more. 
The stabilization policies put into effect the 
previous year have in most cases managed to 
reduce inflationary pressures. Thus, after having 
stood at levels of around 1 200% in both 1989 and 
1990, the weighted average increase in consumer 
prices in the region fell in 1991 to 200% per year 
and showed a strong downward trend. 
The most notable advances were registered in 
economies characterized by chronic high 
inflation. Following the hyperinflationary crises 
of 1989 and 1990, harsh adjustment programmes 
were implemented and in almost every case, 
helped to bring down the inflation rate 
significantly. The most spectacular results 
occurred in Argentina and Nicaragua, which, by 
the end of the year, had not only brought 
hyperinflation under control but were also 
consolidating a new price formation policy 
geared to moderate inflation. In Peru, there was 
a definite decline in the rate of price increases, 
but the inflation rate remained fairly high in a 
shaky macroeconomic context. Ift Brazil, on the 
other hand, although prices did not go up as much 
as they had the year before, monthly inflation was 
again higher than 20%, and the basic mechanisms 
of a highly inflationary economy remained in 
place. 
Progress was also achieved in controlled-
stability economies, characterized by rapidly 
increasing prices without approaching 
hyperinflationary extremes. Results varied from 
country to country, however, and inflation rates 
remained relatively high. While in Uruguay, 
which has a long tradition of inflation, the rate of 
price rises was substantially reduced, and in 
Venezuela, too, there was a decline, albeit less of 
a decline, the rate of inflation in Ecuador 
remained unchanged from that of the previous 
year. Costa Rica, which can also be considered to 
have a controlled-stability economy (albeit with 
lower levels of inflation than in the other 
countries mentioned), was able to slow down the 
monthly rise in prices in the second half of the 
year. 
In all those countries where the economy had 
undergone structural adjustment and price 
increases were already moderate, inflation abated 
despite the fact that it had soared in 1990. At the 
end of 1991, in Chile and Mexico, the annual rate 
of inflation was less than 20%, and in Bolivia it 
was not even 15%, while in Colombia it had only 
decreased to 27%. 
Lastly, those economies which had 
experienced episodes of inflation in recent years 
consolidated their stabilization programmes in 
1991 and, in general, achieved positive results. 
Following sharp price increases in 1990, caused 
largely by the fiscal and external imbalance and 
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the rise in world oil prices, the economies of 
several Central American and Caribbean 
countries, in particular, once again experienced 
moderate rates of inflation. The steepest decline 
occurred in the Dominican Republic, which 
virtually achieved stabilization in 1991 (prices 
rose by only 4%), down from inflation of 101% 
in 1990. In Guatemala, the decline was striking, 
as the rate of price increases dropped from 60% 
in 1990 to 10% in 1991. In El Salvador, the 
downward inflationary trend gained tremendous 
momentum: from 24% in 1989 and 18% in 1990 
to 10% in 1991. In Honduras, the rate of inflation 
also went down, from 35% to 21 %, and dropped 
to a single digit in the final months of 1991. 
Paraguay also saw a sharp decline in price 
increases, from 44% to 12%. In Jamaica, on the 
other hand, the annual rate of inflation shot up 
from 30% to 80%. 
In 1991, despite in many cases the decline or 
stagnation of the value of exports there was a 
significant increase in the import capacity of 
most of the countries of the region, thanks to the 
reduction of their net payments of profits and 
interest and, above all, the increased inflow of 
capital. This fact, frequently combined with 
lower real exchange rates and trade liberalization 
designed to open up the economy, gave rise to a 
substantial increase in imports which was much 
greater than the requirements for recovery or the 
increase in economic activity. 
As a result, the substantial trade surplus which 
the region as a whole had maintained since the 
beginning of the crisis was reduced to one third 
the levels of the previous two years. 
In 1991 the terms of trade of the region 
suffered a further setback, this time of nearly 6%, 
thereby accentuating the almost uninterrupted 
deterioration registered since 1985. On this 
occasion, the decline was concentrated in the 
oil-exporting countries but a fair number of the 
non-oil-exporting countries were also affected. 
As a result, the purchasing power of the region's 
exports decreased by nearly 2%. 
The value of Latin American and Caribbean 
exports of goods remained unchanged at around 
US$121 billion, after having grown at a rate of 
almost 10% per annum in the previous two years. 
This was due to the deterioration in the unit value 
of exports, since the volumes exported continued 
to grow by slightly more than 4%. 
The stagnation of exports of goods was 
observed both in the oil-exporting and the 
non-oil-exporting countries. In the former group, 
it was primarily due to the drop in the average 
prices of hydrocarbons following the Persian 
Gulf conflict, a development which most of the 
countries compensated for by increasing the 
volume of their exports. Even so, the 
considerable inflows of capital and -to a lesser 
extent- the reduction in net payments of profits 
and interest expanded the capacity of this group 
of countries to increase their imports or 
accumulate reserves by US$17 billion -that is to 
say, by 37% of the value of their imports in 1990. 
Among the non-oil-exporting South 
American countries, only Chile, and, to a much 
lesser extent Brazil, expanded their exports, 
while Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay suffered 
significant declines. In turn, the exports of most 
of the Central American and Caribbean countries 
stagnated or declined, with the exception of 
Panama, and to a lesser degree, Costa Rica, which 
were able to increase their sales abroad. The 
increased import capacity of this group of 
countries was due essentially to the reduction of 
nearly US$5 billion in their net payments of 
profits and interest, since the increased net 
inflows of capital registered in Argentina, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and most of the Central 
American countries were offset by the net 
reductions of these inflows in Brazil and Chile. 
The value of Latin American and Caribbean 
imports amounted to US$112 billion: an increase 
of 19% over the previous year and a further 
acceleration of the upward trend for the second 
year running. The increase was quite widespread, 
but the bulk of the variation in the regional total 
was concentrated in Mexico (an increase of 
US$7.9 billion), Venezuela (US$3.6 billion) and 
Argentina (US$3.7 billion). 
As a result, the merchandise trade surplus fell 
from slightly over US$27 billion in the previous 
two years to less than US$10 billion in 1991. 
Thus, despite a reduction in the amount of profits 
and interest due, the trade balance was equivalent 
to 32% of these latter outlays, compared with 
80% of the year before. 
The net flow of profits and interest due went 
down for the second year running, this time to 
nearly US$31 billion, mainly because of the 
decline in international interest rates. The 
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balance-of-payments current account deficit, 
however, which had been falling in recent years, 
rose to slightly more than US$20 billion because 
of the smaller trade surplus. 
This bigger current account deficit was amply 
covered by an inflow of US$41 billion of capital 
into the region, doubling the net inflow for the 
second consecutive year. Although the increase 
in net inflows of capital was fairly generalized, 
most of the rise in the regional total is attributable 
to only a few countries. In first place came 
Mexico, whose capital inflow increased 
spectacularly, for the second time in two years, 
to almost US$22 billion. Argentina also 
registered a big increase (US$3.4 biUion) in its 
net inflow of capital, which amounted to over 
US$5 billion in 1991. In Venezuela, the negative 
balance of US$4.9 billion registered the year 
before was turned into a net positive inflow of 
about US$2.2 billion. Inflows into Peru went up 
from US$1.9 billion in 1990 to US$3.8 billion in 
1991. Net capital inflows also increased in 
Bolivia, Paraguay and four of the six Central 
American countries. In contrast, however, there 
were marked reductions in the net capital inflows 
in Brazil (down to US$5.7 billion) and Chile 
(because of the reduction of the external debt and 
a policy that acted as a disincentive to the inflow 
of short-term capital). 
The inflows of capital registered in 1991, 
which came essentially from private sources, 
were of various types. In Argentina, Mexico, 
Venezuela and Chile these inflows included 
substantial amounts of foreign investment, partly 
connected -in the case of the first three 
countries- with the privatization of public 
enterprises. Mexico and, to a lesser extent, 
Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, were 
additionally able to sell bonds abroad. At the 
same time, in these and other countries, there 
were considerable short-term financial inflows, 
motivated by the differential between domestic 
and international yields, as well as repatriation of 
assets to provide working capital for enterprises. 
Finally, in the majority of the countries of the 
region, arrears in debt service continued to be a 
major source of financing. 
As the capital inflow was more than double 
the current account deficit, the international 
reserves of the countries continued to recover for 
the third consecutive year, and in 1991 the 
increase in reserves came to nearly 
US$20 billion. Moreover, this increase was quite 
widespread: only two countries registered a 
decline. 
The big increase in the net capital inflow 
-further heightened by the reduction in 
remittances of profits and accrued interest- gave 
rise to a posijtive net transfer of financial 
resources to the region for the first time since 
1981: the net outward transfer of US$15 billion 
registered in 1990 was converted into a net inflow 
of nearly US$10 billion. However, this 
turnaround was essentially due to changes in the 
capital accounts of just a few countries. More 
than half of the positive balance reflects the 
increased flow received by Mexico, another 29% 
corresponds to renewed inflows into Venezuela, 
and another 16% is accounted for by the decline 
in the net outflow of resources from Argentina. 
Unlike the year before, when the reduction in the 
net transfers abroad was due to arrears on debt 
service, in 1991 the improvement in most of the 
countries was the result of larger voluntary 
capital flows, predominantly of a non-debt-
related nature. 
There was practically no change in the 
external debt of the region (excluding the 
English-speaking Caribbean countries), which 
remained at around US$440 billion. Among the 
factors responsible for this were the national and 
international debt reduction programmes. 
Particularly noteworthy was the United States 
Government's forgiveness of the bilateral 
obligations of seven countries. In contrast, there 
was no major progress under the Brady Plan, 
since new agreements failed to emerge in 1991. 
Other elements which helped to reduce the 
outstanding dollar debt were the revaluation of 
the United States currency over 12 months 
vis-à-vis European currencies and the access of 
many countries to extensive non-debt-related 
financing of various kinds. On the other hand, the 
main expansionary influences were the 
borrowing by some countries on the international 
bond markets and the accrual of debt service 
arrears by most of the debtor countries. 
As in 1990, for the region as a whole, the 
debt/exports ratio remained unchanged from its 
high level of nearly 280% for the third year 
running. Nevertheless, in 1991 six countries had 
a ratio of less than 200%, compared with only one 
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in 1987. The accrued interest/exports ratio for the 
region went down for the fifth consecutive year, 
this time to 22%. The decline in the coefficient 
-which is still excessively high- was due solely 
to the reduction of gross accrued interest 
payments, mainly because of the drop in 
international interest rates and, to a lesser degree, 
the reduction of bank debt and some official 
obligations. 
Despite the substantial progress made with 
regard to the external debt, its servicing continues 
to be one of the most serious structural problems 
of the region; this is reflected in the continuing 
high debt/exports ratios of most of the countries 
and the external public debt (which account for 
80% or more of total debt) in government 
budgets. The lower interest/exports coefficients, 
for their part, have a strong conjunctural 
component, to the extent that international 
interest rates are unusually low. Moreover, 
although it is true that debt servicing arrears have 
provided important temporary relief in terms of 
cash flow, they create uncertainty and undermine 
the management and effectiveness of economic 
policy. It therefore continues to be urgent to 








I I I S 
S Gross domestic product 



























I ¡I II II I i 





1 0 I 1 1 1 1 i_ - i i • • ' * • • • 
1976 19B1 1986 1991 
16 
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Table I-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991c 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Urban unemployment rate ' 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Consumer prices 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and 
services) 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Balance-of-payments position 
Total disbursed external debt 
Indexes (1980=100) 
99.4 102.7 106.6 109.9 110.9 112.4 112.7 116.4 
94.1 97.1 99.7 103.2 103.7 105.1 106.0 109.5 
378.1 386.4 394.8 403.2 411.7 420.3 428.9 437.6 
90.9 91.9 93.3 94.3 93.1 92.5 90.9 91.9 
86.0 86.8 87.2 88.4 87.0 86.4 85.3 86.4 
Percentage ratios 
8.2 7.3 6.2 
Annual growth rates 
5.8 5.9 5.6 5.8 


































10.9 -4.6 -12.8 13.9 14.0 10.9 10.3 1.0 
3.4 -0.2 3.9 10.6 13.9 9.1 14.0 16.3 
4.7 -4.8 -10.5 -0.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 -3.7 










































Soure»: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* The figures given for the gross domestic product and the population correspond to the countries appearing in table II-l (except 
Cuba), while those given for consumer prices refer to the countries listed in table IV-1. The data concerning gross national income 
and the external sector correspond to the countries shown in table VTI-10. 
annual rate for 18 of the 25 largest cities in Latin America. 
Preliminary figures. 
December-to-December variation. 
' Weighted average 
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II. LEVEL OF ACTIVITY1 
After three years of virtual stagnation, the level 
of activity of Latin America and the Caribbean 
recovered to some extent (3.2%), raising per 
capita output for the first time since 1987. 
Nevertheless, under the persistent effects of the 
debt crisis and adjustment processes, regional 
output for 1991 was only 16% higher than that of 
pre-crisis 1980, while per capita output was 8% 
below its 1980 level and equal to that of 1977. 
The carryover of Brazil's recession, with its high 
inflation rates, had a considerable impact on 
regional growth, since that country's economy 
represents close to a third of the total output of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The other 
economies expanded at an average rate of 4.4%, 
and 2.2% in per capita terms, both increases that 
had not been seen since 1980. 
Growth was widespread but not 
homogeneous; the degree of change in the level 
of activity from country to country was 
significantly different, as were the factors 
influencing that change. Thus, output expanded 
considerably, by more than 9% in Panama and 
Venezuela; in Argentina, Chile and Guyana by 
between 5% and 6%; in six countries (Belize, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Mexico) the level of activity grew by between 3% 
and 4%; in four countries (Colombia, Paraguay, 
Peru and Trinidad and Tobago) the expansion 
was around 2%; in five other countries (Bahamas, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras and Uruguay) 
output increased by 1 % or more, and in Barbados, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua and the Dominican 
Republic, the level of activity either stagnated or 
declined. In Cuba, the collapse of economic 
relations with the eastern European countries 
furthered the decline in the level of activity that 
began the year before. Thus, 15 countries 
registered a higher level of activity than in 1990, 
while 10 others either had the same level or 
lower. The small countries of the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) maintained their 
growth rate of the last few years, an average of 
around 3%, which was a slow-down from the 
rates of previous years (see table II-l). 
Those differences in the rates of change in the 
level of activity are attributable to differences in 
conjunctural processes. The highest growth rates 
were related to diverse phases of economic 
recovery in countries like Argentina, Panama and 
Venezuela, or to a speed-up of growth, as in the 
case of Chile and to a lesser extent Bolivia, 
Ecuador and El Salvador. The sustained growth 
of Mexico and Guatemala should also be 
mentioned. Low growth rates (between 1% and 
2%) generally corresponded to phases of slower 
growth (Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay), 
but also include cases of prolonged stagnation 
(Uruguay) or persistent recessions (Brazil, 
Honduras and Peru). The continuation of 
recessions was also apparent in the decline of the 
level of activity in Barbados, Haiti, Nicaragua 
and the Dominican Republic. 
High demographic growth rates in several of 
the countries of the region turned the 
above-mentioned economic trends into lower or 
even negative values in per capita terms. In 11 
countries, this indicator of well-being either 
stagnated or declined. Of the remaining 14, only 
in Argentina, Chile, Guyana, Panama and 
Venezuela did it grow by more than 3%. Given 
these results and the poor performance of most of 
the region's economies during the 1980s, only a 
small number of countries had a higher per capita 
This section and the subsequent five sections deal only with the Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). The Caribbean countries other than those contained in that list are discussed 
in detail in chapter IX. 
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output in 1991 than in 1980: Belize (28%), 
Colombia (17%), Chile (17%), Bahamas (8%), 
Jamaica (2%) and Barbados (2%), and the OECS 
countries as a whole (55%). At the opposite 
extreme, the greatest declines in per capita 
output over that same period were recorded in 
Nicaragua (-38%), Trinidad and Tobago (-32%), 
Peru (-29%), Guyana (-28%), Haiti (-22%), 
Bolivia (-22%), Argentina (-20%), Guatemala 
(-18%), Venezuela (-16%), El Salvador (-12%), 
and Honduras (-12%) (see table II-2). 
Venezuela's economic recovery from its 
1989 recession solidified notably in 1991. 
Indeed, output grew by more than 9%, under the 
influence of both petroleum-related and 
non-petroleum-related activities. The petroleum 
sector continued to grow at a fast pace (10%), 
although more slowly than in 1990, due to an 
increase in exports, which remained throughout 
the year at the same high levels reached in 
mid-1990, at the outbreak of the Gulf conflict. 
Non-petroleum-related activities also 
expanded considerably. The construction 
industry, which tends to behave cyclically, at an 
especially intense rate. Driven by an increase in 
public investment, it grew at the extraordinary 
rate of 34%. Commerce grew by 10%, partially 
as a result of the significant rise in imports. 
Manufacturing also performed well (7%), under 
the impact of a sustained demand for durable 
consumer goods, including automobiles. 
From the viewpoint of aggregate demand, the 
turnaround in output was mostly influenced by 
the increase in public sector spending. 
Investment projects in the petroleum and 
petrochemical industries were key in this regard. 
The external sector, unlike the previous year 
when it was the driving force of total expenditure, 
was a contractionary element in 1991. This was 
largely due to the rapid growth of real imports of 
goods and services (48%). The volume of exports 
increased less than the year before, and was 
attributable only to higher oil sales, since 
non-petroleum exports declined. Private 
consumption climbed at a faster pace than the 
moderate rate of 1990 (see tables II-3 and II-4). 
Chile's economic activity bounced back 
considerably, growing by almost 6% after the 
slow-down of the previous year. This was the 
eighth year in a row of economic growth, pushing 
per capita output 17% above that of 1980. The 
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1991 expansion was grounded on the good 
performance of non-copper exports, the physical 
volume of which increased by more than 15%, 
and the reactivation of domestic demand. The 
most dynamic sector continued to be transport 
and communications, followed by fisheries, 
which recovered in spectacular fashion from the 
third quarter onward by turning around the 
conjunctural contraction of demand in the 
previous quarter brought about by the outbreak 
of cholera. Manufacturing grew at almost the 
same rate as that of total output, which was a 
considerable recovery after the stagnation of the 
previous year. Construction and mining 
expanded by nearly 5%, while agriculture grew 
at a much lower rate, since its level of activity 
behaved unfavourably during the second half of 
the year (see table II-3). 
In Argentina gross domestic product 
rebounded (growing by more than 5%) in a 
context of sweeping changes in the rules 
governing economic activity, which produced a 
substantially different situation. Thus, per capita 
output rose for the first time in four years. 
Expansion of the level of activity was led by 
domestic demand, and in particular by the 
consumption of durable goods and by 
investment. Although the coefficient of gross 
capital formation remained low, equipment 
purchases and construction made a strong 
recovery. The increase in domestic demand was 
driven by a sharp drop in the high inflation rate, 
as had happened on previous occasions, although 
this time with more intensity. The more 
favourable macroeconomic evolution was also 
reflected in a considerable recovery of demand 
for capital goods. The sudden downturn in the 
inflation rate had an immediate effect on the 
purchasing power of wage-earners, while the 
prospect of a more predictable macroeconomic 
climate broadened the horizon of 
decision-making and contributed to an expansion 
of credit. Liquidity constraints were relaxed for 
the public sector as well as for individuals and 
private enterprises. Even though high margins of 
intermediation kept the cost of credit up, the 
supply of funds and the diversity of financial 
instruments increased. The reappearance of 
access to credit by families was reflected in the 
sale of durable consumer goods and in the real 
estate market. However, a sizeable part of the 
expansion of domestic demand centred on 
imports, which were also encouraged by the trade 
liberalization process. Exports, on the other hand, 
were less buoyant than in recent periods of 
domestic recession and high real exchange rates. 
Given these conditions, construction began to 
recover from the depths to which it had sunk in 
recent years. The reactivation of industry 
produced a growth rate of 8%, while agriculture 
grew by less than 3% (see tables II-3 and II-4). 
Mexico's gross domestic product grew by 
somewhat more than 4%, raising per capita 
output for the third straight year. After the intense 
rate of expansion in the third and fourth quarters 
of 1990, in which several sectors attained yearly 
growth rates of more than 7%, the growth of 
output in almost all productive activities began to 
slow down, a decline especially noticeable 
during the second half of 1991. This phenomenon 
was due, on the one hand, to government efforts 
to balance finances, which led to a contraction of 
public expenditure, and on the other hand, to the 
effects of the recession in the United States and 
the adjustments of the productive apparatus 
motivated by trade liberalization and the 
privatization of some State enterprises. 
As in 1990, private investment and external 
demand stimulated the level of activity, although 
imports as a component of aggregate supply 
continued to rise. Even though its rate of 
expansion slowed down, the gross formation of 
fixed capital still grew at a respectable rate 
(8.5%), mostly in the private sector, where the 
rate of fixed investment increased by 14%. That 
growth was due to the private sector's efforts to 
expand and modernize plants, made possible by 
the ample inflow of capital that resulted from 
greater macroeconomic control and changes in 
the rules of the game in recent years, such as 
liberalization and deregulation of the economy 
and the privatization of some public enterprises. 
Thus, purchases of machinery and equipment 
increased at a persistently high rate, while 
construction slowed to a growth rate of less than 
3%. 
External demand rose somewhat faster than 
domestic demand, since it was based on the 
increase in the volumes of the exports of goods 
-petroleum as well as other kinds. The biggest 
rises were in the services sector, especially the 
in-bond assembly industry and basic services. On 
the other hand, manufacturing output declined, 
growing by less than 4% whereas in the previous 
two years it had reached 7% and 6%, 
respectively. This loss of buoyancy was mainly 
due to the relative appreciation of the exchange 
rate, which made imports more competitive, and 
the slow growth of the purchasing power of the 
lower-income strata. Agriculture barely grew, 
owing to bad weather and less access to credit in 
real terms, both of which had an unfavourable 
impact on the production of the main crops in the 
spring-summer season of 1991-1992. Mining 
remained stagnant, because of the weak external 
demand for industrial metals, which was offset 
by an increase in oil production (see tables II-3 
and II-4). 
Colombia's output rose by less than 2%, i.e., 
half as much as the year before, and per capita 
GDP stagnated. This trend contrasted with that 
observed throughout most of the 1980s, a period 
in which Colombia's economy experienced 
significant growth, except for the interval 
between 1982 and 1983. The volume of exports 
continued its expansionary trend (10%), which 
explains most of the increase in the level of 
activity. Consumption dropped by 2%, while 
investment declined by 3%, for the first time in 
several decades. This was a consequence of the 
sharp contraction of private investment, led by 
the uncertainty arising from the new direction in 
economic policy, which represented a drastic 
change from those that had prevailed over the 
past quarter of a century. Agriculture grew by 
5%, mostly owing to a rise in coffee sales, since 
the rest of the sector expanded at a much slower 
rate. The international price of coffee plummeted 
by nearly 30% over the last three years, but the 
domestic price declined by only 7% in real terms 
during that period, thanks to the National Coffee 
Fund's price support policy. Moreover, the drop 
in price was offset by a large increase in output, 
which went from 11 million sacks in 1989 to 14 
million in 1990 and 16 million in 1991. 
Therefore, the total value of the coffee harvest 
managed to stay the same in real terms during 
1991, which mitigated some of the recessionary 
pressures arising from the decline in real wages. 
Manufacturing fell slightly, owing to the 
contraction of domestic demand, which was 
compensated for by the buoyancy of 
manufactures for export. Mining, affected once 
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again in its petroleum sector by guerrilla activity, 
contracted by more than 1 %, after seven years of 
vigorous expansion. Construction, on the other 
hand, recovered (4%) from its downward slide of 
the previous two years, thanks to the reactivation 
of home building. 
Brazil's economy continued to be sluggish in 
the midst of still another speed-up of inflation. 
The level of activity, after sharply contracting in 
1990 (-4%), recorded a modest recovery of a bit 
more than 1%, but that was due to the temporary 
expansion of the economy during the first six 
months of the year. The expansionary trend 
dissipated during the second half of the year, and 
by the end of the year the economy had entered 
another period of recession, the third in less than 
two years. Recessions in Brazil have alternated 
with spells of partial recovery, which are 
becoming shorter and shorter. The sectors most 
affected by these cycles have been manufacturing 
and construction, mostly because of the 
behaviour of durable-goods consumption and 
investment. The slight recovery that lasted 
throughout the year was due to domestic demand, 
which grew by 2%, while the physical volume of 
exports dropped by almost 2%. The stagnation of 
productive activity was general, except for the 
basic-services sector, which increased by almost 
7%, and agriculture, which expanded by 2%. 
Two different phenomena were observed in 
agriculture. The level of activity of exports 
dropped, as a consequence of policies adopted 
the year before, such as the blocking of 
circulating capital and the cutting back of loans 
to the agricultural sector, together with the 
negative impact of the low real exchange rate in 
1990 and part of 1991. On the other hand, 
domestic consumer commodities, such as rice 
and beans, showed increases of more than 20%, 
although it was essentially a question of 
recovering from two poor harvests and 
responding to the increase in the relative prices 
of those products. 
Industrial output declined slightly in 1991, 
although it fluctuated widely over the course of 
the year. Combined with the drastic contraction 
in 1990, it reached a level of almost 10% below 
that of 1989. A key factor influencing the 
evolution of industrial output was the poor 
performance of capital goods and exports of 
manufactures, which undoubtedly declined 
because of the low level of the real exchange rate 
for part of the year and the increasingly manifest 
loss of international competitiveness in this 
sector, owing to a lack of investment in recent 
years. The growth in the production of durable 
consumer goods somewhat offset, however, the 
effect of the declines in the level of industrial 
activity. Construction remained virtually 
stagnant, after collapsing the year before. Public 
works, especially in smaller municipalities, and 
informal activities only partially offset the 
adverse conjunctural situation that had affected 
the sector over the last few years. The 
considerable expansion of basic services (7%) 
helped mitigate the sluggishness of the remaining 
sectors. Other services declined slightly (see 
tables n-3 and II-4). 
Bolivia's output grew more than it did the 
previous year (4%), and per capita output 
increased by 1 %, which was the biggest rise since 
1979. Agriculture was the most dynamic sector, 
especially in the eastern part of the country, 
which had an excellent year thanks to abundant 
rainfall, improved seeds and a more extensive 
irrigation system. Mining continued to expand 
significantly, despite the decline in the 
international prices of almost all minerals. The 
production of zinc, the mineral with the highest 
export value in recent years, grew the most 
(23%). Increased volumes of antimony, wolfram, 
tin and silver were also extracted while copper, 
lead and gold declined. Hydrocarbon extraction 
grew by more than 3%. Manufacturing, 
electricity and commerce bolstered the 
expansion, while construction again grew only 
modestly. Fixed investment bounced back 
significantly (11%), as projects were carried out 
in hydrocarbons and transport by the public 
sector, and in hydrocarbons, mining and 
agroindustry by the private sector. Private 
foreign investment projects and joint ventures 
with public enterprises were facilitated by new 
laws passed in 1990 governing investments and 
hydrocarbons. Large stocks were accumulated 
after several years of decline (see table II-4). 
Paraguay recorded a modest growth rate 
(slightly above 2%), which furthered the 
slow-down that began the year before. That was 
mostly due to a virtual stagnation in industry and 
setbacks in agriculture. Weather conditions 
favoured cotton production, while that of 
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soybeans declined significantly. The forestry 
sector grew by 4%, owing to the higher rate of 
extraction of lumber for construction and export. 
Construction, mostly of dwellings, increased by 
3%. Mining and services were the most dynamic 
sectors. Basic services grew by 7%, stimulated 
by the expansion of electric power, since the 
hydroelectric plant of Itaipu began to produce at 
full capacity and electrification networks were 
extended. Telecommunications also improved 
considerably both domestically and 
internationally. As in previous years, commercial 
services continued to expand, owing to the high 
levels of sales of imports to residents of 
neighbouring countries. The rise in investment 
and especially the expansion of consumption 
sustained the level of activity, even though 
exports were declining (see tables n-3 and II-4). 
Uruguay's growth rate improved (1.5%), 
compared to the virtual stagnation of the previous 
three years; this led to a 1 % increase in per capita 
output. Domestic demand expanded 
significantly, thereby recovering from three 
years of a downward slide, which helped the level 
of activity to grow modestly, but at the same time 
contributed to a considerable rise in imports, 
which expanded by 17% in physical volume. The 
productive services whose level of activity rose 
the most were electricity and commerce, 
restaurants and hotels, largely owing to sales to 
non-residents. The marketing of imports was also 
a significant factor. On the other hand, the 
production of goods declined again, with 
agriculture and manufacturing practically at a 
standstill. Harvests of im portant crops were poor, 
and manufacturing was affected by a 
considerable contraction of beef processing, 
owing to a decline in demand from Brazil and the 
European Economic Community. Construction 
again shrank, since the increase in private 
building was insufficient to compensate for the 
drop in public sector activity. 
Peru's output rose slightly (almost 2%) after 
three years of severe declines (-23%, 
cumulatively). Economic trends continued to 
reflect the tensions arising from drastic 
stabilization measures and radical structural 
adjustment policies adopted in August 1990 to 
slow down rampant inflation and to deal with the 
serious crisis affecting the country. During the 
course of the year, however, especially during the 
third quarter, economic activity recovered to 
some extent. Agricultural output in general began 
to recover from the low levels of the previous 
year, when a long drought damaged the main 
crops. Industrial production recovered 
significantly (6%), but continued to be far below 
(-26%) its 1987 level, and was even 13% below 
that of 1980. An especially significant factor in 
the recovery was the sharp reduction of the 
inflation rate (from 18% a month at the beginning 
of the year to an average of 4% in the last months 
of the year), which provided a more secure 
business climate. The production of some metals 
also increased, especially copper, largely 
because there were fewer labour problems. 
During the second half of the year, however, new 
difficulties arose in the form of trade-union 
organized strikes to protest against privatizations 
and the closing of certain mines, and a loss of 
competitiveness, as reflected in the low level of 
the real exchange rate. Oil production plummeted 
(-12%), owing to the financial problems of the 
Peruvian oil company (PETROPERU) that led to 
inadequate maintenance of equipment. The 
fisheries sector also dropped considerably 
(-11%), because of problems of domestic 
demand arising from the outbreak of cholera, 
which were only partially offset by a rise in the 
production of fish meal for export. Construction 
fell by 2%, owing to a decline in the level of 
public investment, which was constrained by the 
fiscal adjustment policy, and to a contraction of 
demand in the private sector. 
Output in Ecuador grew by more than 4%, 
and hence per capita GDP rose by more than 1.5%. 
This increase was made possible by strong 
growth in agricultural and fisheries exports, 
especially bananas and shrimps. Also, unlike in 
previous years, domestic demand showed 
positive signs. Gross fixed capital formation 
expanded by almost 8%, owing to an increase in 
public and private investment. Consumption, 
nevertheless, barely rose (1 %). A good part of the 
increase in domestic demand, however, filtered 
out of the country, since the physical volume of 
imports jumped by 19%. The most buoyant 
sectors were those of agriculture and of 
electricity, gas and water, with growth rates 
above 6%. Mining also performed well, growing 
by almost 5%, while the industrial sector attained 
a figure close to 4%. Construction, however, 
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declined for the second consecutive year, due to 
the sluggishness of public and private demand. 
The expansion of fixed investment was almost 
exclusively centred on machinery and equipment 
-virtually all imported goods- while that related 
to construction declined (see tables II-3 and II-4). 
The countries of the Central American 
Common Market (GACM) had modest growth 
rates, while their per capita rates either stagnated 
or increased slightly. Most of the Central 
American region suffered from a severe drought, 
which had a negative effect on agriculture and the 
generation of electric power, forcing several 
countries to ration the distribution of electricity 
during some months of the year (see tables II-1 
andII-2). 
In Costa Rica the recessive trends of the 
previous year worsened. Productive activity 
grew by only 1 %, whereas the average for the five 
previous years was 4.4%. That slow-down was 
caused by the adjustment programme adopted to 
correct macroeeonomic imbalances through 
fiscal measures and the application of a more 
restrictive monetary policy. Fiscal adjustment 
caused production costs to rise, in so far as it 
raised the price of fuels, placed a 10% surcharge 
on imports, raised taxes and advance deposits 
requirements for imports and established higher 
interest rates. These actions discouraged 
investment and production. Nevertheless, their 
adverse impact was attenuated by a recovery of 
non-traditional exports. The economy as a whole 
slowed down, but the sectors most affected were 
construction, with a sharp drop in the level of 
activity (-13%), and to a lesser extent, industry, 
in which the decline was only in its growth rate. 
Agriculture grew slightly less than the previous 
year, but in any case considerably more than the 
economy as a whole. The change in relative 
domestic prices produced by liberalization 
provided an incentive for agricultural output. 
Guatemala saw modest growth (slightly 
more than 3%), practically the same as the year 
before, attaining growth rates of more than 3% 
for the fifth year in a row. Construction showed 
a strong recovery, especially for residential and 
commercial building, after a sharp drop in 1990. 
Services maintained the same growth rate as they 
had in previous years, especially transport, 
storage and communications, a sector which 
expanded by more than 6%. Agricultural growth 
was satisfactory, despite the drought that mainly 
affected the production of basic grains; this was 
made possible by an increase in the production of 
export crops, such as sugar, cotton, coffee and 
bananas, owing to an increase in area planted and 
better yields. Industrial output, however, showed 
modest growth (less than 2%), due to a decline in 
real wages and the continuation of the policy of 
trade liberalization. This policy was put into 
practice so rapidly that it caused problems for 
some traditional, domestically oriented 
enterprises, which had to adapt to external 
competition. The drought also affected the 
generation of electricity, forcingrationing during 
September and part of October, which had a 
negative impact on virtually all sectors. The 
in-bond assembly industry for clothing and 
textiles continued the same vigorous expansion it 
displayed during the last five years, becoming an 
important source of foreign exchange and 
employment. 
El Salvador's level of economic activity grew 
by more than 3% in 1991, a rate similar to that of 
the previous year but far above the average rate 
for the 1980s. Moreover, this was achieved in the 
restrictive context defined by the stabilization 
policy and adverse short-tèrm factors, both 
domestic and external. One such domestic factor 
was the persistence of the armed conflict, since 
military operations continued despite progress in 
negotiations. The drought also affected 
agriculture and hydroelectric power supply, 
making it necessary to ration electricity 
consumption from August to December, which 
had a negative effect on the activity of most 
productive sectors and made it necessary to 
generate thermal energy at higher costs. 
Especially important among the external adverse 
factors was the new drop in the price of coffee. 
However, with the exception of the agricultural 
sector, which virtually stagnated* other sectors 
had higher growth rates, driven by the 
reactivation of investment. The production of 
non-tradeable goods strengthened considerably, 
especially construction, which displayed its 
buoyancy by growing by more than 10%. 
Industry was also stimulated by a healthy flow of 
investment and exports to the Central American 
Common Market. The 18% increase in gross 
fixed capital formation was a sign of greater 
confidence on the part of the business sector, 
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based on the economic reforms initiated towards 
the end of 1989; the favourable performance of 
the real estate market; the implementation of the 
government investment programme and the 
inflow of external resources, and the perception 
that domestic peace could be achieved soon. 
The level of economic activity in Honduras 
grew by somewhat more than 1%, continuing the 
recessive situation of the previous year. Per 
capita GDP fell once again, reaching a level 12% 
below that of 1980. That unfavourable result was 
especially affected by the adjustment process in 
effect since 1990 to offset macroeconomic 
imbalances and the surge of inflation, which 
brought on a sharp contraction in government 
consumption and kept exports stagnant. The 
recessive trends produced by those factors were 
only offset by a recovery of private investment. 
Agriculture reactivated somewhat, thanks to the 
creditable performance in stock-raising and 
fisheries, and in growing crops for the domestic 
market, while the output of export crops declined, 
especially bananas and coffee. Manufacturing 
remained stagnant. Higher costs for inputs owing 
to devaluation, contraction of demand and lower 
duties on imports all affected to different degrees 
the performance of industrial branches. The 
in-bond assembly industry, however, intensified 
its activity over the course of the year, with value 
added increasing by more than 50%. After 
declining the year before, construction showed 
moderate growth, due to the reactivation of 
public investment, since private investment 
remained depressed. Electric power generation 
declined by 2%, since the drought that affected 
the country prevented electricity sales from being 
made to other countries during the second half of 
the year. 
Nicaragua's level of economic activity 
declined slightly (-0.4%), continuing the 
downslide of per capita GDP observed throughout 
the 1980s. Sweeping changes took place in 1991 
in the econom ic and institutional structures of the 
country, introduced by the new Government that 
came to power after the elections of February 
1990 and as a consequence of the end of the long 
civil conflict. The economic recession, however, 
could not be turned around, in so far as exports 
plummeted sharply (-16%) and public 
expenditures were cut back drastically. The main 
export commodities were affected by depressed 
external markets and adverse weather conditions. 
Restrictive policies governing public 
expenditures, money supply and credit offset the 
expansionary effects of the inflow of foreign 
exchange and tax reductions to stimulate 
production and sales. The country wound up with 
a decapitalized economic base, severe 
technological gaps, deteriorated human 
resources and a degree of instability 
characteristic of a change process involving 
property and adjustments on the part of economic 
agents. These difficulties affected agriculture, the 
country's most important activity. The sharp drop 
in agricultural output (-5%) and the reduction of 
the Government's sphere of action -including 
military action- were counteracted by growth in 
manufacturing for the first time in years. The 
recovery of industrial output (10%), even though 
with diverse performances among the different 
industrial branches, was due to an improvement 
in facilities for importing, and a better supply of 
inputs, which had been severely restricted for 
several years. However, government reform 
paralyzed the activities of public enterprises in 
the process of being privatized. Construction 
once again contracted considerably, owing to 
constraints on public expenditures. Lack of 
sufficient electricity also became a serious 
obstacle to the smooth functioning of productive 
activity. The insufficient generation of 
hydroelectricity was amply compensated for by 
the generation of electricity by geothermal means 
and steam, but the sorry state of the infrastructure 
led to huge transmission losses, making it 
necessary to resort to even further rationing of 
consumption. 
Panama, for the second year in a row, 
continued to recover economically from the 
severe political and external conflicts that had led 
to a deep depression in its level of activity. 
Growth rose to more than 9%, and even though 
it was higher than the year before, it was still 
insufficient to return to the levels of activity of 
1987. Expansion was based on all the 
components of aggregate demand, but especially 
the remarkable rise in investment (53%) and the 
sustained expansion of exports. Given greater 
access to bank credit, both consumption and 
private investment -especially in construction-
showed solid recovery, while public investment 
reacted after four consecutive years of sharp 
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drops. At the sectoral level, construction doubled 
its activity, while commerce and manufacturing 
grew by more than 10%, surpassing pre-crisis 
levels; basic and financial services grew more 
modestly. Agriculture increased by 5%, due to an 
expansion of stock-raising, which offset the 
slight decline in crop-raising, affected by adverse 
climatic conditions in some exportable goods 
(see tables II-3 and II-4). 
The level of activity in the Dominican 
Republic continued to be affected by the 
adjustment programme put into effect to control 
the outbreak of inflation in 1990; the monetary 
and fiscal measures applied during the second 
half of that year generated a sharp contraction in 
aggregate expenditure. Gross domestic product 
declined slightly, adding to the larger drop in 
1990. Thus, in the last biennium per capita output 
accumulated a contraction of close to 10%, 
reaching values attained in the mid-1970s. 
Activity plummeted in construction and mining, 
and virtually stagnated in manufacturing. 
Agriculture and services, on the other hand, 
recovered slightly. Construction plummeted 
owing to the continued decline in public 
investment in real terms, added to a reduction of 
private construction derived from the high cost of 
credit. Mining continued its downward slide of 
recent years, marked by lower output in gold and 
silver, because of exhausted mines, and 
stagnation in ferronickel, due to a decline in 
external demand. Manufacturing was affected by 
a drop in the purchasing power of the general 
population. The favourable performance of sugar 
mills stimulated the expansion of the food sector, 
which was followed by the processing of other 
agricultural goods. Beverages and tobacco, on 
the other hand, dropped decisively, and other 
branches of the sector also declined, but to a 
lesser extent. 
Cuba's economy felt the full impact in 1991 
of the effects of the collapse of its economic 
relations with the former Soviet Union and the 
end of trade with the countries of eastern Europe. 
Although official data are not available, it is 
estimated that the global social product dropped 
by around 15%, solely due to the effect of the 
contraction of trade with the countries belonging 
to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON). This compounded the impact of a 
decline of between 3% and 4% in output the 
previous year. The break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the spectacular events in the eastern 
European countries meant that the main sources 
of the Cuban economy's external supply were no 
longer available. In only two years, the end of 
trade with those countries reduced Cuba's 
purchasing power abroad by half. One of the 
clearest signs of those problems was the notable 
drop in the price of sugar sold in 1991 to the 
Soviet Union. The negative effect was 
particularly intense in the industrial sector, where 
numerous plants were semi-paralyzed. On the 
one hand, that paralyzation was partly due to 
operational and input-supply problems, and on 
the other, to the disarray of the markets to which 
Cuba exported a considerable volume of its 
manufactures. Moreover, the abnormal supply of 
fuel and spare parts and other inputs for the sugar 
mills, together with the effects of the intense rains 
that interrupted work during the month of April, 
limited the sugar cane harvest to 7,600,000 
metric tons, 6.5% lower than that of the year 
before. The transport sector, both freight and 
passenger service, was very much affected, 
causing new problems for the national economy 
in transporting goods from and to the country. 
In 1991, Haiti's economy intensified the 
recessive trends that began to be seen after the 
1987 suspension of the main economic aid 
programmes. Gross domestic product declined 
by 1.6% in 1991, leading to a drop in per capita 
output of 3.4%, the worst in the last 10 years. 
Stagnation in agriculture went hand in hand with 
declines in manufacturing and construction. The 
accumulation of long-standing disequilibria and 
the social and political disturbances during the 
election and transition to a new government had 
an impact on the poor performance of the 
country's economy. The new administration 
launched a reform programme during the second 
half of the year designed to reactivate the 
economy, but the measures adopted were unable 
to turn around the depressive trends, since they 
were interrupted by the fall of the constitutional 
Government at the end of September after only 
eight months in effect. That plunged the country 
into tremendous political and economic 
uncertainty, and affected trade and financial 
relations with the rest of the world, owing to the 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary figures. 
States. 
Excludes Cuba. Refers to total social product. OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
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Table II-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY BRANCHES OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 
(Annual growth rates) 
Agriculture 
1990 
Latin America and 














































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary figures. Includes mining and quarrying. 
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Table II-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN THE COMPONENTS OF 
AGGREGATE DEMAND 
(Annual rates of variation) 







































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary figures. Nineteen countries; figures relating to consumption and investment include estimates in the case 
of some countries for which data were lacking. c Government consumption is included under private consumption. 
Variation in stocks is included under private consumption. 
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III. TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
1. 
In 1991, the overall economy of Latin America 
and the Caribbean recovered slightly after three 
years of virtual stagnation. This was reflected in 
upturns in activity level, total supply and 
domestic availability of goods and services, in 
response to a revival of private investment 
(which in many cases had been at a very 
precarious level) and, to a lesser extent, to the 
expansion of exports. However, the effects of the 
severe economic crisis which has eroded levels 
of well-being in the region since the early 1980s 
are still far from being overcome. 
Total supply rose 4.6%, reaching its highest 
level since 1981 and reversing the downward 
trend caused by four consecutive years of 
deceleration (see table III-l). The volume of 
regional imports grew at the rate of 15%, which, 
being higher than those recorded in previous 
years, surpassed the 1981 level for the first time. 
This phenomenon was especially influenced by 
the notable increases in import volume observed 
in Argentina (76%), Venezuela (48%), Panama 
(27%), Mexico (19%), Ecuador (19%), Bolivia 
(18%), Paraguay (18%), Uruguay (17%), 
Nicaragua (14%), Peru (10%) and, to a lesser 
extent, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala. Only four 
countries recorded a drop in import volume, the 
most notable of which were Colombia and Costa 
Rica, where imports declined about 10%. On the 
contrary, the volume of exports grew only about 
4%, accentuating the deceleration of recent years. 
The largest increase was recorded in Panama 
(19%), while the expansion in Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Ecuador was between 8% and 
10%, and in the Dominican Republic, Mexico 
and Venezuela, between 5% and 6%. In contrast, 
sharp decreases were recorded in Haiti and 
Including the variation in stocks. 
trends 
Nicaragua (-13% and -17% respectively), while 
exports from Brazil and Paraguay declined 
between 2% and 3%. 
As a result of the disparity between real 
expansion rates of imports and exports, the trade 
surplus in goods and services contracted 
significantly (-25%), while the domestic 
availability of goods showed an appreciable 
increase (5%). This increase brought the level to 
7% above that reached in 1980, although, in per 
capita terms, it remained 17% below the 1980 
level (see table III-l). 
Domestic demand expanded, owing to the 
vigorous recovery of gross capital formation and, 
to a lesser extent, of consumption. Fixed 
investment increased by over 7%, reversing the 
contractionary trend observed since 1988 and 
bringing investment in the region to its highest 
level since 1983, although it remained 18% 
below the 1980 level. Consumption also showed 
greater dynamism than in previous years, 
growing by over 4%* after having remained 
nearly stagnant since 1987, and reaching a level 
14% higher than that of 1980, although this was 
still much lower than demographic growth in the 
region (see table III-l). 
Net factor payments to the rest of the world 
once again plummeted (-12%), counteracting the 
adverse effect of the terms of trade. In this way, 
gross national income grew slightly more than 
GDP and showed a slight per capita increase, 
which contrasted with the decreases of the 
previous three years. Even so, per capita national 
income was 8% lower than the 1980 figure as a 
result of an increase in external factor payments 
and the deterioration of terms of trade recorded 
since the early 1980s (see table III-l). 
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2. Behaviour of demand 
Regional output increased in 1991 owing to the 
dynamism of domestic demand, whose effect on 
the level of activity was partially offset by the net 
negative influence of external trade. The volume 
of exports expanded moderately, contributing to 
an increase in total supply equal to slightly less 
than 1% of GDP. However, this phenomenon was 
largely offset by a demand-driven increase 
-equivalent to over 2% of regional output- in 
imports, which was reflected in a smaller trade 
surplus and a negative contribution to GDP, a 
phenomenon which had already occurred, though 
with lesser intensity, in 1990. Nevertheless, in 
1991, domestic demand expanded to a degree 
unprecedented in the decade. Consumption 
(essentially, private consumption) rose at a higher 
rate than in previous years, contributing 3.5% of 
GDP to the increase of total demand; meanwhile, 
fixed investment contributed somewhat more than 
1% of GDP, reversing the negative trend of the 
previous decade (see table III-2). 
Trends at the regional level, characterized by 
more dynamic private consumption, investment 
and imports, were shared by a good number of 
countries in the region, though with different 
magnitudes of change in the components of 
demand. Thus, domestic demand rose in 15 of the 
19 countries for which information was 
available. The most notable increases, expressed 
as percentages of GDP, were recorded in 
Venezuela (13%), Panama (12%), Argentina and 
Paraguay (10%), Nicaragua (8%) and Bolivia 
(7%). Domestic demand also grew significantly 
in Mexico and Uruguay (over 5% of GDP) and in 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru 
(about 4% of GDP). In a large group of countries, 
the increase in fixed investment contributed 
significantly to the expansion of demand. In 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, the growth in 
investment contributed between 20% and 33% to 
that expansion, and in Venezuela, 40%; in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Panama, between 50% 
and 100% of the increase in domestic demand 
was attributable to increased investment (see 
table III-2). 
In many cases, the growth of GDP was lower 
than that of domesticdemand because a good part 
of the latter's growth was diverted abroad by the 
considerable rise in imports and the relative 
stagnation of exports. Even so, the impetus given 
by domestic demand translated into substantial 
growth rates in Argentina, Bolivia, Panama and 
Venezuela. On the other hand, in Honduras, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, most of the 
increase in demand filtered abroad, while in 
Guatemala and Mexico, considerable increases 
in domestic demand were reflected in only a 
moderate growth of GDP owing to the decline in 
trade balances. In Nicaragua, trade declined 
sharply at a rate that was even somewhat higher 
than the significant increase in domestic demand, 
resulting in a contraction of output. However, 
more balanced developments in trade allowed 
GDP to grow at the same rate as domestic demand 
in Ecuador and El Salvador, while in Chile, the 
improvement in trade balances pushed the level 
of activity above that of domestic demand. In 
Brazil, a negative trend in external trade 
weakened the modest recovery in domestic 
demand, so that the growth of GDP was greatly 
reduced (see table III-2). 
Domesticdemand fell only in Costa Rica (-8% 
of GDP), the Dominican Republic (-3%), 
Colombia (-1.5%) and Haiti (slightly). In all of 
these countries except Haiti, the contraction of 
private consumption played a major role in 
reducing domesticdemand, although investment 
also dropped significantly in Costa Rica (by 
almost 3% of GDP). However, the improvement 
in trade balances in these countries -generated by 
decreased deficits or increased surpluses-
attenuated the deterioration of the level of 
activity in the Dominican Republic, and led to a 
certain amount of growth in output in Colombia 
and Costa Rica (see table III-2). 
In a number of countries, nevertheless, 
exports continued to form the basis of the spurt 
This analysis of the contributions of the components of demand to growth of GDP does not incorporate the effect of variations 
in the terms of trade, since it is based on the accounting of real flows. For the same reason, the variations in each of the components 
of domestic demand also do not reflect the real effect of changes in relative prices, which have acquired importance in the current 
phase of adjustment processes. 
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in the level of activity. In Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Panama (mainly re-exports in 
Panama's case), this expansion contributed a 
number of percentage points of GDP, while in the 
Dominican Republic, Mexico and Venezuela, it 
Adjustment triggered significant changes in the 
structure of demand in the region in the 1980s, 
with external demand increasing by almost 6% of 
GDP and gross capital formation recording an 
equivalent downturn. The coefficient of exports 
of goods and services, which had stood at an 
average of 16% of GDP during the 1970s, 
increased slowly throughout the 1980s, reaching 
21.8% in 1991. The cutback and substitution of 
imports in the first half of the 1980s, however, 
reduced the import ratio from 16.8% in 1981 to 
10.7% in 1985. Subsequently, a modest recovery 
began, which intensified considerably from 1990 
onwards and brought the coefficient up to 15.3% 
in 1991 (see table ffl-3). 
The increase in the export ratio was very 
widespread, rising in 13 of the 19 countries for 
which information was available, including the 
three largest economies of the region, between 
1979-1981 and 1989-1991. The largest increases 
were recorded in Costa Rica and Paraguay 
(somewhat more than 17% of GDP), while 
increases in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and 
Mexico were equivalent to about 10% of GDP. In 
Panama and Uruguay, the export ratio rose by 
between 6% and 7% of GDP, while in Colombia 
and Venezuela the increase was between 4% and 
5%. It also rose 4% in Brazil, although the 
average ratio for that country in the period 
1989-1991 was somewhat less than 14%, by far 
the lowest in the region. Export ratios in the 
Dominican Republic and Guatemala remained 
virtually stagnant during the decade, and dropped 
significantly (between 6% and 12% of GDP) in the 
rest of Central America and the Caribbean. Of the 
South American countries, however, only Peru's 
ratio fell (see figure III-l). 
Imports as a proportion of output were 
reduced during the same period in 14 of the 19 
countries. The largest declines were recorded in 
Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras and Venezuela, 
with reductions of between 7 and 12 percentage 
reached over 1%. However, all of this activity 
represented a less widespread upswing in imports 
than that of 1990, when 15 countries had 
benefited from this contribution to growth (see 
table III-2). 
points of GDP. Brazil's import coefficient 
dropped from 11.5% to less than 7% of GDP 
between 1980 and 1985, but recovered to reach 
9% in 1991 —still a low level (see figure III-l). 
In Mexico, the import ratio rose from 14% to 
17% between 1979-1981 and 1989-1991; it also 
expanded notably (12%) in Paraguay. These 
increases, however, were attributable to different 
causes. In Mexico's case, the import ratio 
declined by 8% in 1982 and 1983, the period 
when the debt crisis broke out. It then recovered 
slowly, returning to its 1980 level only in 1989 
and surpassing it comfortably in 1991, thanks to 
trade liberalization, the overvalued exchange rate 
of the last few years and the substantial easing of 
external constraints. Paraguay's import 
coefficient also recorded significant decreases at 
the beginning of the decade but then rose rapidly, 
attaining about 29% between 1986 and 1988 and 
43% in 1991, owing to improved coverage in the 
recording of imports on the one hand, and to the 
growing importance of sales of imports to visitors 
from neighbouring countries on the other. 
The performance of exports and imports 
substantially changed the trade balances of the 
Latin American countries. The region as a whole 
went from a deficit of just over 1% of GDP in 
1980-1981 to a surplus of 8% in the period 
1988-1990, which declined slightly in 1991 to 
somewhat less than 7%. However, this excess 
was almost entirely absorbed by the deterioration 
in the terms of trade between 1981 and 1991. Net 
factor payments to the rest of the world, despite 
their decline in recent years, remained at slightly 
over 3% of the regional product. This means that 
Latin America and the Caribbean transferred 
current resources at 1980 prices equivalent to 9% 
of GDP as a result of the deterioration of the terms 
of trade and factor payments (mostly interest) to 
the rest of the world, lowering real gross national 
income in 1991 to 9% less than real GDP (see 
table III-3). 
3. Liberalization, transfers abroad and changes 
in the structure of demand 
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The huge transfer of current resources abroad 
in the last decade was financed mainly by 
reducing gross capital formation, whose share of 
GDP fell from somewhat more than 22% in the 
1970s to 16% in 1984, and subsequently 
remained at that level, on average, until 1990. It 
recovered slightly in 1991, but continued to be 
much lower than in the past. The share of 
consumption, in turn, declined by more than 1% 
of GDP between 1981 and 1991, thus contributing 
a lower proportion than investment to the transfer 
of resources. Nevertheless, per capita 
consumption -which grew by 2.4% in 1991-
remained 10% below the 1980 level, owing to 
reductions recorded primarily during the first half 
of the 1980s (see table 111-3). 
Per capita private consumption expanded 
notably in Nicaragua (23%) and Argentina (12%) 
in 1991; it grew almost 8% in Paraguay, and 
between 2% and 4% in Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Uruguay. Five countries recorded 
either slight advances or virtual stagnation in per 
capita private consumption, while seven others 
recorded reductions, which were between 4% 
and 5% in the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic. Per capita consumption 
The recovery of investment in 1991 helped to 
raise the regional coefficient of gross capital 
formation to more than 16% of GDP, although that 
figure remained much lower than the level 
recorded up to 1981 because of a steep decline 
beginning in 1982. The investment coefficient, in 
contrast to its behaviour the previous year, 
increased in most countries in the region. 
Particularly notable in this regard were the cases 
of Venezuela (from 14.5% to 18.1%), Argentina 
(from 7.5% to 9.3%), El Salvador (from 12.6% 
to 14.4%), Honduras (from 16.6% to 19%) and 
Panama (from 11.2% to 18.1%). The steepest 
decline in the gross capital formation coefficient 
was recorded in Costa Rica, where it dropped by 
3% of GDP, reversing the increases observed in 
the previous two years. In Chile and Nicaragua, 
the investment coefficient also dropped by more 
than 1% (see table III-4). 
Despite the increases in gross capital 
formation in 1991, the regional gross fixed 
investment coefficient for 1989-1991 amounted 
contracted in fewer than half the countries of the 
region, in contrast to the situation in the 1980s, 
when reductions in this indicator of well-being 
were widespread. However, recoveries in 1991 
slightly attenuated the contractions recorded 
between 1981 and 1990. Per capita private 
consumption in 1991 was higher than the 1981 
figure in only three of the 19 countries for which 
information was available (Chile, Colombia and 
Paraguay); however, the increase was very 
moderate in the first two cases, and in Paraguay's 
case, the aggregate known as final private 
consumption included sales to visitors from 
neighbouring countries, a market that has 
expanded enormously in recent years. The most 
pronounced accumulated declines were recorded 
in Nicaragua (-33%), Costa Rica (-30%), 
Argentina, Guatemala and Haiti (down more than 
20%), while per capita private consumption fell 
by between 10% and 20% in Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. In Brazil, the accumulated decline 
since 1981 amounted to about 7%, while in 
Mexico the contraction over the same period was 
only 4%, owing to the rebound recorded since 
1988 (see figure III-2). 
to only 16%, a figure considerably lower than that 
of 23% recorded in 1979-1981. The reduction 
was widespread, although its characteristics 
differed from country to country in the region. In 
the last three-year period, most countries showed 
average coefficients significantly below those 
recorded before the crisis, while a small group, 
after dropping sharply at the beginning of the 
period, rapidly recovered their investment rates. 
Thus, between these two periods, investment 
coefficients in Argentina, Panama, Uruguay and 
Venezuela plummeted by over 10% of GDP, while 
in Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru, the coefficient fell by between 4% and 
8% of GDP. In Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti, investment failed 
to recover the ratios recorded in 1979-1981. The 
only countries that did so were Chile, Nicaragua 
and the Dominican Republic, although all three 
suffered setbacks in 1991 (see figure III-3). 
Domestic savings dropped somewhat in 
relation to the year before, but remained above 
4. Investment and its financing 
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Figure 111-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
(Cumulative percentage variation 1981-1991) 
Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 
- 4 0 
y. Paraguay 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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Figure 111-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT a 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Countries are listed in the order of their investment coefficients for the 
period 1979-1981. 
37 
23% of GDP in 1991 -after reaching 25% in 
1987-1988; still, the figure continued to be high, 
recording seven percentage points of GDP above 
the investment rate. National savings also 
decreased, to somewhat less than 15% of the 
regional product. External savings, which had 
accounted for less than 1% of GDP in the previous 
two years, grew considerably (over 2%), 
contributing slightly more than 12% to the 
financing of investment (see table III-5). 
The enormous difference between the rate of 
domestic savings and the small investment 
coefficient was attributable to the loss of income 
resulting from the gradual deterioration of the 
terms of trade since 1980 (which worsened in 
1991), to net factor payments (mostly interest on 
the external debt) and to the small amount of net 
flows of external savings, which, despite their 
spectacular growth in 1991, were equivalent to 
half the amount recorded in 1980i The worsening 
of the terms of trade compared to 1980, which 
represented 6% of real GDP, absorbed one fourth 
of domestic savings in real terms. Moreover, 
flows of interest and profit remittances abroad 
continued to take up another 14% of gross 
domestic savings, despite a decline in 1991. 
Since nearly 40% of domestic saving is usually 
channelled abroad and foreign capital in the 
region is still scarce, investment levels were 
inevitably reduced. Thus, the crisis and its 
consequences, which are still affecting most of 
the countries of the region, have not only lowered 
standards of living but have also jeopardized 
future growth. 
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Table III -1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL SUPPLY, 
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME3 
(Indexes and growth rates) 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 
2. Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
3. Imports of goods and 
services 
4. Exports of goods 
and services 
5. Domestic availability 
of goods and services 
(2 + 3 - 4) = domestic 
demand (6 + 7) 
6. Final consumer expenditure c 
7. Gross fixed capital formation 
8. Net factor payments 
to rest of world 
9. Real gross national 
income (2-8)d 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 





1989 1990 1991b 
108.9 110.3 115.4 3.4 
112.6 113.0 116.6 3.2 
86.5 94.2 108.3 5.4 
159.2 166.3 172.2 9.0 
101.7 102.2 107.2 2.3 
108.9 109.7 114.5 2.3 
77.2 76.6 82.4 2.6 
178.2 157.7 139.2 -9.4 
110.8 111.7 116.0 3.8 
Cumulative 
988 1989 1990 1991b v a r i a t i o n 
1981-1991b 
1.7 1.7 1.2 4.6 15.4 
0.9 1.3 0.3 3.2 16.6 
9.2 4.3 8.8 15.0 8.3 
7.8 5.1 4.5 3.6 72.2 
0.5 0.9 0.5 4.9 7.2 
0.8 1.6 0.8 4.4 14.5 
•0.9 -2.2 -0.7 7.5 -17.6 
3.3 4.9 -11.5 -11.7 39.2 
0.8 1.2 0.8 3.8 16.0 
Table III - 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Includes variation in stocks. Government consumption was estimated on the basis of incomplete information. 
c Government consumption and variation in stocks were estimated on the basis of incomplete information. 
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Table III - 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RELATIVE SHARES OF COMPONENTS 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND OF GROSS NATIONAL 
INCOME, AT MARKET PRICES a 










































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Nineteen countries. Includes variation in stocks. c Preliminary figures. 
Table III - 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INVESTMENT COEFFICIENTS 
(Gross fixed investment as a percentage of gross domestic product) 







































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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Table III - 5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING 
OF GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION a 
1071 h 
J ^ ç 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Coefficients in respect of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic savings 23.9 23.0 23.1 23.7 24.7 23.7 24.9 25.0 24.4 23.9 23.4 
2. Net external factor 
payments 2.1 2.7 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.7 4.1 4.2 4.3¡ 3.8 3.2 
3. Unrequited private 
external transfer payments 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
4. Terms-of -trade effect -2.5 - -3.1 -2.6 -3.2 -4.7 -5.0 -5.2 -5.3 -5.4 -6.0 
5. Gross national savings 
( 1 - 2 + 3 + 4) 19.4 20.4 14.9 15.8 16.6 14.6 16.1 15.9 15.3 15.3 14.8 
6. External savings 3.2 4.4 1.0 0.1 0.5 2.5 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.5 2.0 
7. Gross capital formation 
(5 + 6) 22.6 24.7 15.9 15.9 17.1 17.0 17.5 17.3 16.0 15.7 16.8 
Other coefficients 
Domesti c sa vi ngs/gross 
capital formation 105.7 93.0 145.1 148.8 144.7 139.2 142.6 145.0 152.6 151.9 139.0 
Terms-of-trade effect/ 
domestic savings -10.4 - -13.2 -10.9 -13.1 -19.9 -20.1 -20.8 -21.5 -22.4 -25.5 
Net external factor 
payments/domestic savings -8.7 -11.9 -22.6 -23.2 -20.4 -19.7 -16.4 -16.7 -17.7 -15.9 -13.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Nineteen countries. Preliminary figures. 
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IV. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND INFLATION 
Inflation rates plummeted in the region in 1991. 
After three years of turbulent domestic price 
fluctuations in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the widespread adoption or 
intensification of stabilization programmes and, 
in particular, the shock tactics put into effect in 
economies suffering from more acute inflation 
brought about a rapid reduction of price 
variations. In fact, average price increases for the 
region, weighted by population, fell from 
1,200% in 1989 and 1990 to around 200% in 
1991; although this rate is still high, the dramatic 
improvement and the downward trend observed 
throughout the year are promising signs (see 
table IV-1). The rates of inflation recorded in the 
various economies towards the end of 1991 
suggest even greater progress. The annualized 
rate of consumer price variation in 19 countries 
for the last quarter of the year shows that 
inflation was under 20% in 12 of them, and 
fluctuated between 30% and 50% a year in three 
others. Only four countries had higher rates, 
three of which were between 55% and 80%, and 
only one of which exceeded these levels at the 
end of 1991. 
Countries with chronically high inflation 
drastically reduced their domestic price 
increases. Following the bouts of 
hyperinflation recorded in almost all of them, 
the shock tactics adopted in 1990 and 1991 
-which included radical exchange-rate, 
monetary and financial reforms- slashed 
inflation from 1,350% to 84% in Argentina, 
from 1,600% to 480% in Brazil, from 13,500% 
to 780% in Nicaragua and from 7,650% to 
140% in Peru. Prices stabilized notably 
towards the end of the year in Argentina and 
Nicaragua, whose monthly rates were in the 
neighbourhood of 1% to 2%, and in Peru, 
whose monthly average was 4%. The case of 
Brazil stood in sharp contrast to the others; 
although the country adopted measures at the 
beginning of the year to make the 1990 
stabilization programme even more restrictive, 
and succeeded in reducing the rate of inflation 
in the second quarter of 1991, the trend 
subsequently reversed itself and, in the last 
quarter, led to a price increase of about 25% per 
month. Uruguay, which is also plagued with 
chronic inflation, though never as severely as in 
the aforementioned cases, managed to cut its 
annual rate from 130% in 1990 to 80% in 1991. 
Economies which a few years ago 
experienced high rates of inflation have kept their 
stabilization programmes in force, with varying 
results. In the Dominican Republic, inflation 
plunged to 4% after having reached 100% the 
preceding year. Mexico also made notable 
progress by reducing its rate of domestic price 
variation to 20% (from 30% in 1990). 
Venezuela's progress, however, was more 
modest (from 37% in 1990 to 31% in 1991), and 
Ecuador's rate was virtually unchanged from its 
1990 level (almost 50%). Consumer prices in 
Guatemala, after increasing considerably in 
1990, went up another 10% in 1991. 
Economies with moderate inflation also 
underwent varying developments. Some of them 
were able to neutralize, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the inflationary upsurges of the previous 
year: Chile reduced its rate from 27% to 19%; 
Paraguay, from 44% to 12%; El Salvador, from 
19% to 10%; Honduras, from 35% to 22%; and 
Haiti, from 26% to 7%. Others faced strong 
resistance that allowed price movements to 
decrease only slightly, as in Colombia (from 
32% to 27%), Bolivia (from 18% to 15%) and 
Costa Rica (from 27% to 25%). Meanwhile, 
Panama maintained its low rate of inflation of 
about 1%. 
In the English-speaking Caribbean, Jamaica's 
rate of inflation rose from 30% in 1990 to 80% in 
1991, and that of Barbados, from somewhat more 
than 3% to 8%. Trinidad and Tobago reduced its 
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annual price increases, which had bordered on 
10% in recent years, to only 2%} 
Two fundamentally important circumstances, 
which strongly influenced inflationary processes, 
characterized economic policy in most of the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: a 
marked tendency to reduce public-sector 
financial imbalances, and a widespread trend 
towards the shrinkage of real exchange rates in 
the context of a considerable inflow of foreign 
capital. 
Following the severe fiscal adjustments made 
in the previous biennium, which significantly 
reduced the public sector's financial needs, in 
1991 most of the countries of the region 
intensified their quest for fiscal balance. 
Economies whose public sector had been 
restructured more recently showed greater 
fragility in budget management than did those 
whose restructuring processes had been under 
way for some time. In most cases, financial 
balance was achieved through extraordinary cuts 
in spending, on both consumption and 
investment, which even included postponing 
foreign debt service payments; in other cases, 
countries resorted to sales of fixed assets, 
including the privatization of public enterprises, 
which provided the capital inflows needed to 
balance public accounts. In these economies, the 
success of stabilization programmes based on 
fiscal adjustment will depend on whether 
circumstantial revenues can be replaced by 
permanent fiscal resources and, moreover, 
whether spending cuts translate into a definitive 
restructuring of different services. If this does not 
occur, unfavourable expectations may arise 
concerning the durability of the public sector's 
financial equilibrium; this could alter 
private-sector projections and introduce ah 
uncertainty factor that would undermine the 
progress achieved to date in the fight against 
inflation. 
Another phenomenon which has arisen with 
particular intensity and frequency has been the 
tendency for real exchange rates to fall, although 
in many cases from a high level (see table IV-1). 
A considerable inflow of external resources, 
consisting largely of short-term private capital 
and repatriated capital attracted by the existing 
differential between declining international 
interest rates and the interest offered on local 
currency in a context of falling nominal exchange 
rates, expanded the supply of foreign exchange, 
while demand contracted with the reduction of 
uncertainty regarding exchange rates. This 
generated pressure which lowered the real 
exchange rate. Although this effect supported 
stabilization programmes, it also introduced a 
negative factor for international competitiveness 
by increasing domestic costs in dollars. Faced 
with this economic policy dilemma, 
Governments resorted to various strategies. The 
central banks of a number of countries opted to 
intervene in the exchange market, increasing 
demand in order to counter the deterioration of 
the real exchange rate. These operations, which 
increased official international reserves, 
expanded the money supply by the equivalent 
value in local currency, which translated into 
greater liquidity than necessary to meet the goals 
of stabilization programmes. In other cases, 
priority was given to the objective of lowering 
inflation, and greater autonomy was maintained 
in monetary policy, which caused a considerable 
drop in the real exchange rate. 
In addition, the trade liberalization and 
tariff-reduction programmes being implemented 
in many countries of the region have helped to 
reduce inflation by promoting price reductions 
and an increase in aggregate supply. 
1. Stabilization in chronically high-inflation countries 
Following the outbreaks of hyperinflation in 
1989 and 1990, countries with chronically high 
rates of inflation applied rigorous adjustment 
programmes, which in almost all cases helped to 
lower inflation significantly. The most 
spectacular results were recorded in Argentina 
and Nicaragua, which, by the end of the year, had 
not only conquered hyperinflation but were also 
on the way to consolidating a new pricing system 
compatible with moderate inflation. In Peru, 
More detailed information on these countries is given in chapter IX. 
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price increases slowed down appreciably, but 
inflation remained at a fairly high level in a 
fragile macroeconomic context. In contrast, 
while price increases in Brazil were lower than in 
the previous year, monthly inflation was over 
20% and the basic mechanisms of high inflation 
were still in place (see figure IV-1). 
The drop in inflation reached extraordinary 
proportions in Argentina, where the rate fell 
steeply in the second half of 1991. After price 
hikes of over 1,300% in 1990, inflation plunged 
to 84% in 1991 (the lowest figure recorded since 
1986); at year's end, prices were rising at the rate 
of only about 1 % per month. New economic rules 
drawn up in 1991 substantially modified the 
previous regime. In the area of external trade, the 
number of tariff categories applied to imports 
was reduced, with the exception of certain goods 
that received special treatment, and the 
maximum tariff was lowered to 22%; moreover, 
quantitative restrictions and specific duties levied 
on certain products were eliminated. Efforts to 
transfer activities to the private sector continued; 
the largest operations took place in the oil and 
railway sectors. A timetable of privatizations for 
1992 was unveiled, which mainly concerned 
industrial and energy-producing enterprises. 
Reforms of the hiring system were introduced, 
and a wide-ranging decree eliminated regulations 
applicable to a number of activities. The law on 
convertibility, in turn, established a strict 
monetary system based on a fixed exchange rate 
against the dollar. 
In the first part of the year, the 
macroeconomic scenario was characterized by 
the rupture of the restrictive monetary scheme 
which had been applied since the year before, 
involving the dirty float of foreign exchange. 
Although this programme had reduced inflation 
to around 6% a month in the fourth quarter of 
1990, the steep drop in the real exchange rate and 
the perception that fiscal adjustment was beset 
by obstacles generated unfavourable 
expectations. Early 1991 saw an upsurge in the 
demand for foreign exchange, which could not 
be contained through sales by the Central Bank; 
the result was a marked increase in the exchange 
rate, which climbed over 80% in the first two 
months. Domestic prices showed similar 
tendencies, but to a lesser degree: the variation 
in the consumer price index reached 27% in 
February. In response to this situation, the 
Government established an exchange-rate 
spread with a ceiling of 10,000 australes to the 
dollar, a value somewhat higher than that 
already reached in the market. It also decided to 
increase public rates and charges and announced 
measures to boost tax revenues and restrain the 
expansion ofdomesticcredit granted through the 
official banking system. Although these policies 
did not completely dissipate expectations of 
inflation, they alleviated the pressure on the 
foreign exchange market and brought about a 
slowdown in price increases, which amounted to 
11% in March. At the end of that month, the 
authorities announced a new programme which 
centred on an exchange rate fixed by law at 
10,000 australes to the dollar, and which was 
legally committed to unrestricted convertibility 
of the currency at that fixed rate, which could 
only be changed by parliamentary vote. It was 
also decided that the Central Bank's 
international reserves should at all times cover 
the full value of the monetary base and that these 
backup assets could not be put to any other use. 
The announcement of the new monetary 
regulations sparked a strong reaction in financial 
markets; the sudden drop in the interest rate and 
the abundant supply of foreign exchange 
indicated that the anchoring of the exchange rate 
had effectively countered expectations of 
devaluation. Moreover, the Government signed 
sectoral agreements that included price 
reductions which, in some cases, were offset by 
tax breaks. The initial reaction of the consumer 
price index (CPi) was limited; however, in April 
its growth dropped to 5.5%, and continued to 
slow down in succeeding months. 
Apart from the specific provisions of the law, 
the general idea of convertibility -in both official 
statements and popular interpretation- was 
clearly associated with the establishment of a 
fixed-exchange-rate system, under which the 
supply of reserves would be closely related to the 
balance of payments. The harshness of these 
conditions imposed stringent requirements on 
public finances and the pricing system, so that 
convertibility in this sense would become a 
permanent regime; as a counterpart to this 
rigidity, uncertainty about the drift of policies -in 
particular, about one of their most important 
variables, the exchange rate- was put to rest for 
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Figure IV—1 
MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES OF 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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the short term, and a definite orientation was 
given to fiscal management. 
In this last area, the programme was based on 
a number of recent changes. The obligatory 
conversion of bank deposits into external bonds 
at the beginning of 1990 -known as the "Bonex 
plan"- had eliminated interest-bearing reserves; 
previously, the maturity date of various public 
securities had been postponed. This did not cause 
the domestic public debt to disappear, but did 
make the Government much less vulnerable 
financially to fluctuations in domestic interest 
rates or to possible "crises of confidence" that 
could reduce demand for its securities. Moreover, 
the privatization of public enterprises and other 
entities had created a new source of financing 
with the potential to contribute a considerable 
volume of resources, and won confidence among 
influential groups. Moreover, despite some ups 
and downs, the Treasury recorded successive 
operating surpluses and had, for some time, been 
adjusting outlays to the availability of cash. This 
had been accomplished through painful 
belt-tightening, since revenues continued to be 
low, and no permanent basis had as yet been 
given to a budget plan under which the public 
sector could meet its obligations. In the 
convertibility plan, priority was given to 
increasing tax revenues through a recovery in 
activity level, to be achieved through the 
normalization of the economy and, especially, 
through structural and administrative reforms of 
the tax system. 
The drop in inflation had immediate positive 
effects on tax receipts and the purchasing power 
of wages. In addition, the inflow of private capital 
prompted a reduction in the interest rate and 
expanded the demand for financial and real 
assets. As in the past, though perhaps with greater 
intensity, the slowdown in inflation was 
accompanied by a spurt in the level of activity. 
This reaction was one factor that influenced the 
increase in tax revenues; at the same time, efforts 
to improve tax management began to bear fruit. 
The central Government continued to cut back its 
expenditures: there were no more across-the-
board wage hikes after April, the number of 
personnel was reduced (though this necessitated 
immediate outlays in the form of compensation) 
and there was no increase in investment 
expenditure, which had dropped to a low level. 
Nevertheless, the contraction of the deficit did 
not obviate the need for financing, which was met 
in part through recourse to credit but also, to a 
significant extent, through the sale of assets. 
Thus, fiscal management did not exert pressure 
on monetary policy and, despite the widespread 
perception that this financing scheme could not 
be used indefinitely, expectations in financial 
markets were no longer based on the very 
short-term situation of public-sector cash flow. 
With some vicissitudes attributable to 
adjustments of the prices of services and 
commodities, the rate of inflation took a 
downward turn. Towards the end of the year, the 
variation in CPI had fallen to about 1 % per month, 
a very low percentage in light of Argentina's 
experience in recent decades. The economy was 
not re-indexed, in part because of policy 
decisions to prohibit the inclusion of automatic 
adjustment clauses in contracts and the granting 
of wage increases on the basis of past inflation, 
but also because inflationary expectations had 
softened considerably. A significant drop (-27%) 
was observed in the real exchange rate calculated 
according to the variation in CPI, which does not 
appear if wholesale prices are used as a reference 
variable. This demonstrates the greater volatility 
of prices for services, which represent a higher 
proportion of the consumer price basket. The 
reduction of taxes on exports compensated in part 
for the drop in the real exchange rate (see figure 
IV-1). 
Nicaragua achieved outstanding results in its 
adjustment and stabilization programme, which 
enabled it to end hyperinflation in 1991. During 
the year, intensive economic and institutional 
reforms were introduced and the third stage of the 
economic stabilization policy was initiated, 
which drastically curbed the hyperinflation of 
recent years. The notable progress represented by 
the reduction of inflation from 13,500% in 1990 
to 775% in 1991 appears even more impressive 
in light of the fact that overall price levels fell 
between May and August and rose very 
moderately in the final four months. In March 
1991 a series of economic policy measures were 
adopted to strengthen the stabilization and 
structural adjustment programmes launched the 
year before. These included devaluing the gold 
córdoba from one to five per dollar, eliminating 
the Central Bank's granting of net credit to the 
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Government, limiting that institution's credit to 
commercial banks and keeping the fiscal deficit 
at levels consistent with external borrowing 
capacity. These measures brought about a 
corrective rate of inflation of 260% in March. 
However, the stabilization of the exchange rate, 
fiscal austerity and a rigid monetary policy, 
which included high real interest rates, helped to 
quickly curb consumer price increases. 
Consumer prices rose 838% in the first four 
months and then fell between April and August, 
to rise again by 8% between August and 
November and decline slightly in December (see 
figure IV-1). 
The marked devaluation of the gold córdoba 
stabilized the current market value of the dollar 
and substantially reduced the difference between 
its official and free rates, at a time when increased 
family remittances had boosted the supply of 
foreign exchange. The support of the United 
States and the rest of the international financial 
community for the country's stabilization and 
structural adjustment programmes yielded a 
greater abundance of foreign exchange, which 
served to finance the negative balance on current 
account of the balance of payments and initiated 
a recovery of international reserves. Draconian 
austerity in the management of public finances, 
including an intensive programme to reduce 
Government employment that entailed a 
considerable cut in the number of army 
personnel, and a real increase in tax receipts, 
particularly from indirect taxes, led to an 
improvement in the fiscal situation. In addition, 
though the deficit reached high levels (on the 
order of 7% of GDP), it was financed exclusively 
by official unrequited transfer payments and 
external credit, which, in a remarkable recovery 
from previous levels, exceeded the central 
Government's financing needs by 2.6% of GDP. 
Inflation also declined sharply in Peru. 
Following the exaggerated levels recorded in 
previous years, the reduction of the fiscal deficit 
and the application of a restrictive monetary 
policy cut consumer price variations to 139% in 
1991. Prices decelerated notably throughout the 
year, but showed marked fluctuations; after 
rising some 17% in January, owing to the delayed 
effect of an increase in public rates and charges, 
they slowed their pace until May, when inflation 
surged again owing to the delayed effect of 
devaluation and of another increase in public 
rates and charges, especially for fuels. Inflation 
declined again starting in July, and the downward 
trend became more evident in the last quarter, 
when a rate of 3.7% per month was recorded -the 
equivalent of less than 60% annually. Although 
this monthly rate was well below those recorded 
in 1990, it was still high owing to a number of 
factors. On the one hand, the fiscal balance was 
largely based on successive increases in public 
rates and charges, particularly for gasoline, 
which influenced the increase in CPI. In fact, the 
rise in those rates was more pronounced than the 
increase in overall price levels, ranging from 
176% a year for health services to 365% for fuels 
and electricity. The sharp rise in the nominal 
exchange rate in the second quarter (50%), which 
included a significant speculative component, 
had the same effect. In general, the economy's 
high degree of dollarization has made price 
variations very sensitive to movements in the 
exchange rate. The Central Bank countered this 
situation by ceasing to acquire foreign 
exchange on the market. The cost of the dollar 
stabilized in the third quarter, but rose 14% in 
October when the monetary authority once 
again began to acquire dollars in a market in 
which the local currency was regarded as being 
greatly overvalued. Lastly, high domestic 
interest rates, the considerable impact of fixed 
costs owing to excess capacity and delays in the 
distribution of the effects of trade liberalization 
also helped to keep inflation at a higher level 
than expected. 
Both fiscal and monetary policy had 
contractionary effects. The central Government's 
deficit fell from 6.7% of GDP in 1990 to 1.6% in 
1991; moreover, in contrast to previous cases, the 
deficit was financed with external resources. The 
rest of the non-financial public sector managed 
to virtually balance its budget. Meanwhile, the 
restrictive orientation of the monetary policy 
made it one of the pillars of the stabilization 
process in 1991. While this policy helped to 
control inflation, it also caused an upsurge in 
domestic interest rates, which stimulated the 
inflow of short-term foreign capital. Monetary 
expansion also contracted dramatically (from 
almost 5,000% in 1990 to 133% in 1991), to 
remain more or less stable at 1.6% of GDP. TO 
discourage dollar deposits and to counter the 
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monetary expansion caused by the Central 
Bank's acquisition of foreign exchange, the 
marginal reserve requirements were increased for 
both deposits in foreign currency (from 30% to 
60%) and deposits in local currency (from 15% 
to 40%) at about the m iddle of the year. Generally 
speaking, the Peruvian economy remained highly 
dollarized (in December, dollar deposits 
represented 60% of total liquidity), while the 
tight monetary policy helped to maintain a low 
real exchange rate (the rate fell by 26% in 1991, 
bringing the cumulative reduction to nearly 70% 
since 1985) and high interest rates in local 
currency, which in real terms averaged 11% over 
the first 10 months of the year. Moreover, the 
stabilization programme continued to be 
accompanied by structural reforms. In March, 
tariffs were reduced to a maximum of 25%, 
which caused the average tariff to fall from 26% 
to 17%. Foreign exchange controls were 
eliminated, the State petroleum monopoly was 
abolished and a liberal foreign investment regime 
was adopted. In addition, the Government 
proposed a set of over 100 laws designed to 
liberalize the economy. 
Stabilization attempts in Brazil, on the other 
hand, faced serious difficulties. While inflation 
in 1991 (480%) was only one fourth the rate 
recorded in 1990, the economic situation was 
once again highly turbulent, to the point where 
the monthly price variation climbed to about 25% 
at year's end. Following the initial impact of the 
stabilization plan adopted in early 1990, which 
included the freezing of 75% of financial assets 
and a fiscal adjustment on the order of 8% of GDP, 
inflation again picked up speed in the final 
months of that year and reached nearly 20% in 
January 1991. Given this situation, the 
Government adopted a new and heterodox 
stabilization programme that included 
wide-ranging price controls, a wage freeze 
following an initial adjustment and a new 
financial reform which turned overnight bank 
deposits into Financial Application Funds (FAF) 
for the purchase of public securities or for certain 
investments. At the same time, taxes on 
short-term financial assets were raised, indexing 
mechanisms based on prior inflation were 
eliminated and a reference interest rate was 
established to serve as an indicator of predicted 
inflation. The main fiscal policy measure 
consisted of limiting central government 
spending to the amount of available resources. 
In the first months of the new programme's 
execution, inflation plummeted after topping 
21% in February. This "respite" from inflation 
boosted purchasing power and encouraged the 
commerce sector to build up stocks, thus 
reversing the economy's slide towards recession. 
However, the de-indexing measures, price 
controls and government spending limits 
generated strong pressures that led to the 
replacement of the economic team in May 1991. 
The new authorities reoriented economic policy 
to gradually decontrol prices, resorting for this 
purpose to "sectoral councils" where the 
Government and representatives of production 
chains sought to establish price readjustment 
indexes. Moreover, beginning in September, and 
for a 12-month period, the financial claims frozen 
under the Collor Plan of March 1990 were 
scheduled to be released, for a total amount 
equivalent to 6% of GDP. The recovery of 
domestic demand and the decontrol of prices, 
together with the expectations generated by the 
imminent unfreezing of financial claims and the 
reappearance of the public sector's operating 
deficit, gave inflation another boost, pushing it 
up to a monthly rate of 15% in August. 
Given this highly volatile situation, the new 
economic team introduced changes in monetary 
policy beginning in August, and took steps to 
reform fiscal policy as well. In the monetary 
sphere, mechanisms were implemented to 
sterilize liberated cruzados novos, which began 
to be called in in August, one month in advance 
of the original date; for this purpose, special 
tax-free deposits adjusted daily were established, 
with a higher real interest rate (8%) than savings 
deposits. Moreover, the acceleration of inflation 
accentuated the population's preference for 
financial claims over money. The consequent 
reduction of credit brought about an increase in 
the lending interest rate. Although the borrowing 
rate did not follow suit, in part because of a lag 
in the reference rate, the cruzados novos were 
successfully diverted away from consumption 
expenditures, since over half of them ended up in 
the special deposits. In the fiscal sphere, the 
executive branch submitted to the Congress a set 
of constitutional amendments concerning state 
and municipal financing, entitlements of public 
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employees, the creation of new taxes and the 
privatization of State services. In addition, it 
sought approval for an increase in federal taxes, 
particularly income taxes, beginning in 1991. 
The Congress postponed the constitutional 
amendments until Í992, and the fiscal adjustment 
is still under discussion. 
International reserves dwindled by nearly a 
fourth between June and September owing to 
fluctuations in the inflow of external capital and 
the attempt to maintain the nominal exchange 
rate. In view of these circumstances, at the end of 
September an abrupt additional devaluation of 
16% was introduced. The drain on reserves could 
not be controlled until October, when the Central 
Bank stopped its intervention in the parallel 
foreign exchange market through gold 
transactions. To keep these foreign exchange 
measures consistent, the Central Bank raised the 
real interest rate considerably, so that it reached 
nearly 4% a month in November. The additional 
devaluation, the termination of rent freezes and 
expectations concerning the adoption of a new 
programme spurred inflation markedly in 
October, when consumer prices rose 25%. The 
authorities toughened monetary constraints, 
raising the real interest rate while keeping a tight 
rein on federal expenditure and establishing a 
policy for regulating public rates and charges 
based on the evolution of the cost of the goods 
The rate of inflation remained relatively high in 
this group of countries, which in recent years 
have operated under a regime of controlled 
instability marked by prices that increase rapidly, 
but without approaching hyperinflation. 
Nevertheless, the results achieved have varied 
from one country to another. While Uruguay, a 
country with a long tradition of inflation, 
substantially slowed price increases and 
Venezuela did the same, though to a lesser 
degree, Ecuador maintained its rate of inflation 
at the 1990 level. Costa Rica, whose economy is 
also considered to operate under a controlled-
instability regime (although with lower rates of 
inflation than the other countries mentioned), 
managed to reduce the monthly rate of price 
increases in the second half of the year. 
and services produced. The monetary policy's 
powerful impact set off a new recessionary cycle 
in domestic production. This climate of 
economic depression, together with the 
maintenance of high real interest rates and the 
National Treasury's balanced reserves, mitigated 
the inflationary acceleration recorded since 
October and, in particular, reversed expectations 
of price hikes of over 30% a month in the last 
quarter. Even so, prices again rose by about 25% 
monthly in November, then slackened their pace 
slightly (to 23%) in December, despite the fact 
that most prices had been deregulated. 
The real drop in public revenues (15%) gave 
rise to an operating deficit in the non-financial 
public sector of about 1% of GDP, compared to a 
surplus of 1.2% in 1990. 
To enhance their programme's credibility, the 
economic authorities decided to use only classic 
tools of fiscal and monetary policy, instead of 
resorting to unconventional mechanisms. Also 
helpful in this regard was the continuation of the 
structural reforms announced in March 1990 
when the current Government took office. As part 
of the privatization process, beginning in 
September 1991 four State-owned enterprises 
were sold for nearly US$2 billion. Furthermore, 
despite problems related to foreign exchange, the 
liberalization of import policy continued on 
schedule. 
The 1991 rate of inflation in Uruguay, though 
still high (81%), represented a drop from the 
preceding year's high level of 129%. Fiscal 
adjustment remained the principal component of 
economic policy, since it was assumed that a 
reduction of the fiscal deficit would lower 
government demand for credit from the banking 
system and, in turn, would relieve inflationary 
pressures stemming from the corresponding 
monetary expansion. The new adjustment 
resulted in a financial balance in the consolidated 
public sector, which had recorded a deficit of 
2.5% of GDP in 1990 and 6.5% in 1989. Over half 
of this reduction was attributable to the lower 
interest paid by the Central Bank, while the 
increase in the Government's current revenues 
(equivalent to 1.5% of GDP) was another 
2. Persistently high inflation in countries 
with controlled instability 
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important contributing factor. Interest paid by the 
Central Bank decreased because of a 
simultaneous reduction in interest rates and in the 
Bank's indebtedness. The debt with international 
banks diminished as a result of the agreement 
signed in 1990 under the Brady Plan, while the 
real value of the Monetary Regulation Notes in 
circulation also contracted. Accrued interest on 
foreign debts fell because of thé decline in 
international rates, and on local debts because of 
reduced demand by the monetary authorities for 
financing on the local market. This brought the 
Central Bank's quasi-fiscal deficit down to just 
over 2% of GDP. Public enterprises, for their part, 
maintained a financial surplus of somewhat less 
than 1% of GDP. 
Although the improvement in fiscal 
management caused a contraction in net credit 
from the Central Bank to the non-financial public 
sector, the high degree of indexation attached to 
domestic price formation and the purchase of 
foreign exchange by the Central Bank translated 
into a monetary expansion on the order of 100% 
a year and continued private-sector expectations 
of, inter alia, a rate of price variation higher than 
that projected by the Government. Exchange-rate 
policy was strongly oriented towards keeping the 
rate of devaluation at about 60% a year, which 
was hinted at during the first half of the year and 
became more obvious during the second half, 
when the exchange rate showed a monthly rate of 
variation very close to 4%. An abundant supply 
of foreign exchange owing to increased 
purchases by Argentine tourists and to the inflow 
of private capital meant that the monetary 
authorities acquired a considerable volume of 
international reserves, causing an increase in the 
monetary base, which contributed to a rate of 
inflation higher than that officially projected. 
Thus, the "inflation tax" served to finance the 
acquisition of international reserves which, in 
practice, brought down the public sector's net 
indebtedness. Wage adjustments in the private 
sector (usually made every four months) 
continued to be calculated on the basis of past 
inflation, so that expectations of price variation 
in the neighbourhood of 5% a month were 
maintained. As a result, even though inflation 
slowed, it continued to exceed the Government's 
objectives. Moreover, the divergence between 
devaluation and domestic prices eroded the real 
exchange rate, whose average level fell 15% (see 
figure rV-3). 
Inflation remained highly intractable in 
Ecuador, where the 49% increase in CPI was 
comparable to the annual rates for the previous 
two years. The ineffectuality of the anti-inflation 
policy is attributable to the public sector's 
relatively high deficit (both fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal), financed with domestic credit, and 
to the exchange-rate policy, which sought to 
maintain a high, stable exchange rate and thus 
necessitated the monetization of the private 
sector's external surplus and, under these 
circumstances, became a mechanism for 
propagating inflationary pressures. The nominal 
exchange rate underwent minimum weekly 
adjustments of 3.50 sucres and three special 
devaluations (6% in January, 4% in June and 10% 
in July), which kept the real exchange rate stable. 
Fiscal policy faced serious problems, largely 
because of the decline in oil revenues throughout 
the year, which ultimately translated into a 
non-financial public sector deficit of 1.2% of GDP 
in 1991, compared to a surplus of 0.6% in 1990. 
Moreover, the Central Bank's quasi-fiscal deficit 
in 1991 (caused by external debt servicing, 
subsidized credits, monetary stabilization bonds 
and net purchases of foreign exchange) hovered 
at around 2.5% of GDP. Thus, the consolidated 
public sector deficit grew by about 2% of GDP, 
amounting to slightly less than 4%. The high 
deficit prompted the authorities to adopt austerity 
measures. Accordingly, current government 
expenditure (except wages) was cut by 15% 
midway through the year. In September, 
domestic fuel prices were raised and the system 
of monthly price adjustments was reintroduced 
as a means both of augmenting revenues and of 
curbing contraband trade in petroleum products 
with neighbouring countries. Steps were also 
taken to reduce the expenditures of public 
enterprises. Monetary policy also faced serious 
problems because, in addition to having to 
finance a higher fiscal deficit, Ecuador had to 
assimilate an increase of US$160 million in 
international reserves. The main monetary 
control measures were the management of cash 
holdings, open-market operations and increases 
in interest rates, which became mildly positive in 
real terms beginning in August. These measures 
made monetary policy somewhat more 
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Figure IV-2 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
54 
Figure IV -3 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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Figure IV -4 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE 
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restrictive than in the preceding year, since the 
money supply, whose expansion in 1990 had 
outdistanced price increases, grew at a rate 
slightly less than the rate of inflation. Lastly, the 
tariff-reduction programme was continued, and 
in November 1991 entered its second phase with 
the lowering of the maximum tariff to 35% 
(except for automobiles) and the abolition of 
surcharges. These measures supported the 
anti-inflation policy in terms of costs. 
Venezuela was able to lower its inflation by 
no more than a limited amount, as the 31% 
increase in CPI for 1991 was not much lower than 
the rate of slightly over 36% recorded as of the 
end of 1990. Strong domestic demand and the 
rapid growth of monetary aggregates (especially 
during the first half of the year), together with the 
continued process of price adjustments for 
public-sector goods and services, were the main 
factors that neutralized, to some degree, 
inflation's tendency to decline. The expansion of 
imports -partly as a consequence of the country's 
comfortable external accounts position and the 
reduction of the maximum tariff from 50% to 
40% under the trade liberalization programme-
exerted an opposing influence by reducing the 
pressure of domestic demand. A slowing of the 
rate of devaluation contributed to an increase in 
imports (the real exchange rate calculated 
according to CPI dropped by around 7%) and, at 
the same time, helped relieve the pressure on 
domestic prices. 
Broad money continued to expand very 
swiftly during the first half of the year, marking 
up an increase of 66% for the 12-month period 
ending in June. This sharp rise may have partially 
been a reflection of the replenishment of real 
money balances following a substantial decrease, 
as well as the greater demand for financing 
generated by the boom in economic activity. In 
any event, the pivotal factor was the increase in 
the expenditures of the central Government and 
the State petroleum company, which put strong 
pressure on the monetary base. In order to 
alleviate the pressure on prices and the exchange 
rate, during the first few months of the year the 
Central Bank continued to offer its own 
short-term instruments on the open market. These 
operations began to lose their effectiveness, 
however, as the liquidity of the securities in 
circulation mounted. Accordingly, the 
authorities decided to raise the minimum reserve 
requirement in order to soak up some of the 
excess liquidity in the economy. Between May 
and July, the reserve requirement on 
public-sector deposits and obligations in the 
financial system was increased from 15% to 80%. 
Then, between August and November the reserve 
requirement on private-sector deposits was raised 
to 25%, except in the case of deposits with 
mortgage banks. This package of measures 
succeeded in curbing the growth of monetary 
aggregates in the second half of the year, with the 
result that in December the cumulative annual 
increase amounted to 44%, which was 
substantially lower than the 12-month increases 
recorded in the first half of the year. The 
authorities' relatively tighter monetary policy 
was reflected in higher interest rates as the 
average commercial-bank lending rate, which 
had declined to an annual level of less than 30% 
in late 1990, climbed to 40% in the third quarter 
of 1991. Owing to the central Government's 
increased current and capital expenditures, the oil 
industry's sharply rising investment outlays and 
the reduction in public revenues from oil sales 
(the fall in world oil prices after the end of the 
Gulf war was only partly offset by a larger 
volume of exports), the consolidated public 
sector posted a deficit in the first half of the year. 
This deterioration in fiscal accounts prompted the 
authorities to take action designed to ease the 
demand pressures on the economy. Accordingly, 
during the second half of the year, cuts were made 
in the budgeted expenditures of the State 
petroleum company and the central Government. 
In addition, monthly increases in domestic oil 
prices -which had remained unchanged since 
early in the year- were reintroduced beginning in 
August. The public sector closed out its balance 
sheet with a surplus of somewhat over 1% of GDP 
(after closing it at equilibrium in 1990), thanks to 
the extra revenues from the sale of assets. 
Consumer prices in Costa Rica increased 
25%, which was only slightly lower than the rate 
recorded in 1990. However, in the course of the 
year the inflationary process slowed appreciably: 
the annualized rate of inflation in the fourth 
quarter of 1991 was 18%, whereas it had 
approached 37% in the fourth quarter of 1990. In 
late 1990 and the first half of 1991, price 
increases turned virulent as a result of the strong 
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monetary expansion caused by the concession 
of loans to the Government and the rise in oil 
prices. The rate of devaluation was accelerated 
in 1991 to improve the balance-of-payments 
situation, pushing the real exchange rate 
applied to imports up by 9%, an event which 
was a rare exception in the region. A series of 
measures adopted to correct the fiscal deficit, 
such as the raising of the value-added tax from 
10% to 13%, the imposition of an extraordinary 
tariff of 10% and the readjustment of public 
rates and charges, along with spending cuts, 
eliminated the consolidated non-financial 
public sector deficit but also contributed to the 
high rates of inflation recorded early in the 
Inflation subsided in all of the countries whose 
economies had undergone structural adjustments 
and whose normally moderate rates of inflation 
had accelerated significantly the preceding year. 
By the end of 1991, inflation was below 20% a 
year in Chile and Mexico and below 15% in 
Bolivia, while Colombia was able to reduce its 
rate of inflation only to 27%. 
In Chile, a 19% consumer price increase 
represented a notable achievement in 
overcoming the bout of inflation which had 
brought the annual rate of increase to 27% in 
1990. A low rate of inflation during the first 
quarter was followed by increases equivalent to 
an annual pace of about 22% until the final two 
months of the year, when monthly rates of around 
1% were registered. Since the non-financial 
public sector was running a surplus, the 
Government relied chiefly on monetary, 
exchange-rate and tariff policies in its efforts to 
fight inflation. The fiscal year once again closed 
with a surplus; the tax reforms initiated in 1990, 
which entered into full force in 1991, and the 
higher level of economic activity helped to raise 
tax receipts by slightly more than 12% in real 
terms. However, since expenditure rose even 
more sharply, current government saving was 
somewhat lower than in 1990 (close to 2% of 
GDP). Even though the non-financial public 
sector was not exerting pressure on the domestic 
credit supply, the system of administered 
exchange rates under which their movements are 
year. After this readjustment of relative prices, 
inflation began to decline. Growing expectations 
of inflation and popular protests against the rise 
in the cost of living prompted the Government to 
freeze prices of regulated products (basic 
consumer goods and some services) and to slow 
down the rate of devaluation in August, thus 
reducing inflation in the final months of the year. 
That process was also influenced by a slowdown 
in economic activity, which brought the growth 
rate of GDP down to only 1 %, and a tighter 
monetary policy during the second half of the 
year; towards the end of 1991, prices were 
rising by about 1.5% a month -4he equivalent 
of 20% a year. 
determined by the monetary authorities on the 
basis of domestic and international inflation 
made monetary policy difficult to manage. The 
effort to maintain a stable, competitive real 
exchange rate in the presence of high domestic 
interest rates and an ample supply of foreign 
exchange obliged the Central Bank to buy up 
large amounts of foreign exchange on the market. 
Although some of the resulting monetary 
repercussions were neutralized through 
increased domestic borrowing on the open 
market, the 12-month rate of growth of the money 
supply consistently remained above 30%. The 
monetary authorities' cautious course of action 
was based on the belief that the large supply of 
foreign exchange was a temporary phenomenon 
brought about by higher-than-expected copper 
prices and falling international interest rates. 
Since, at the same time, the Central Bank kept 
domestic interest rates at high levels, the inflow 
of short-term external capital mounted. The 
policy of keeping the exchange rate stable, 
coupled with the expansion of the money supply 
stemming from the monetary authorities' 
purchases of foreign exchange, caused monthly 
price variations to exceed the Government's 
targeted inflation rate. Another contributing 
factor in this connection was the marked upturn 
in domestic demand, which made a quick 
recovery in the first quarter, following the 
adjustment made the year before. In view of this 
development, in mid-June the Government 
3. Control of outbreaks of inflation in 
structurally-adjusted economies 
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announced a 2% revaluation of the Chilean peso 
and a reduction of tariff rates from 15% to 11%. 
It also froze 20% of the loans obtained from 
foreign sources, which had a proportionally 
greater impact on the cost of short-term external 
credits, and levied a special tajupn the latter. To 
offset the drop in tax revenue caused by the tariff 
reduction, the gasoline tax was raised by 40%. 
This package of measures indicated that the 
authorities felt that the country's external 
accounts had undergone a structural change. A 
further decline in international interest rates 
prompted the Central Bank to lower the yield of 
its 90-day readjustable notes from 5.7% to 5.2% 
at the start of November. At the same time, it 
lowered the figure for international inflation 
which it used in determining the level of the 
exchange rate from an annual rate of 3.7% to 
2.4%. These measures, which were intended to 
increase the cost of external credit and to counter 
the peso's persistent tendency to rise in value, did 
not manage to pull the dollar up from the floor of 
the official currency band. 
Mexico also made great progress in its 
stabilization process by cutting back the 1991 
consumer price increase to 19%, compared to a 
30% increase the preceding year. This reduction 
in the rate of inflation was closely linked to the 
improvement in public finances, the decrease in 
the rate of devaluation and the extension of the 
period of validity of the price concertation 
mechanism. By strictly controlling expenditure, 
strengthening fiscal discipline and collecting 
extra revenues from the sale of State entities, the 
public sector achieved exceptional financial 
results: a consolidated surplus equivalent to 1.8% 
of GDP. Even excluding the additional revenues, 
the financial deficit declined considerably, 
amounting to only 1.5% of GDP after reaching 4% 
in 1990. To reduce indebtedness and the spending 
related to its servicing, resources from the 
Contingency Fund -created from 1990s windfall 
earnings from petroleum and some of the receipts 
from the sale of public enterprises- were used to 
reduce the domestic debt by 20 billion pesos, 
causing the public sector's total debt to fall to 
38% of GDP, with a corresponding reduction in 
outlays for its servicing. Furthermore, the 
copious inflow of external capital brought about 
a considerable expansion in liquidity, which was 
attenuated by the public sector's decreased 
demand for financing. The large increase in 
international reserves resulted in a greater monetary 
expansion than had been foreseen; the authorities 
therefore used open market operations as the main 
instrument of monetary absorption. In any case, the 
money supply grew 18% in real terms. 
The price stabilization policy was 
implemented under the fifth Pact for Stability and 
Economic Growth, adopted in November 1990 
and valid until November 1991, when the sixth 
version of the plan went into effect. One of the 
most notable actions agreed upon was a policy of 
stabilizing exchange rates, under which the daily 
increase in the nominal exchange rate was 
lowered from 80 to 40 centavos in November 
1990, and then from 40 to 20 centavos in 
November 1991. As another stabilizing measure, 
the minimum wage was increased at a lower rate 
than the average rate of inflation. These measures 
were supplemented by agreements with groups 
of producers on price reductions for certain 
products. Along with these actions, in late 1990 
and in 1991 prices of energy products, especially 
gasoline, were drastically adjusted to correct the 
price lags accumulated in previous years and to 
make the price structure more consistent with 
current prices in other countries. Both the 
correction of outdated prices and contractual 
wage adjustments above the minimum wage 
drove prices higher than had been expected. 
These factors were compounded by increases in 
freight transport charges owing to the recent 
deregulation of that sector and by increases in 
urban transport charges which exceeded the 
average rise in prices. These changes caused two 
surges of inflation, the first between November 
1990 and February 1991, and the second starting 
in November 1991, but in any case the 
accumulated rate over 12 months showed a 
declining trend throughout 1991. Exchange-rate 
policy was a key tool in the stabilization 
programme, as the price of the dollar rose only 
4% during the year. Thus, prices of tradeables 
moved less rapidly than those of non-tradeables, 
which meant that relative price movements 
continued to favour the latter. This caused the real 
exchange rate to erode during the year; its level 
in the fourth quarter was 11% lower than in the 
same period in 1990. 
In Bolivia the continued application of the 
stabilization programme initiated in 1985 
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succeeded in reducing the rate of inflation from 
18% in 1990 to 14.5% in 1991. Prices rose faster 
early in the year because of the domestic price 
hike for petroleum and petroleum products 
instituted in January. However, this spurt of 
inflation was quickly brought under control by 
means of a slower rate of devaluation, a restrictive 
monetary policy and more stringent fiscal 
discipline. The policy of avoiding additional rises 
in fuel prices for the rest of the year also helped 
control inflation. The high level attained by the 
country's international reserves facilitated the 
application of the exchange-rate policy, while 
bank deposits in foreign currency increased 
notably for the second year in a row. Consequently, 
expectations of a scarcity of foreign exchange were 
dispelled, and the phenomenon became, instead, 
one more stabilizing factor. The extremely prudent 
management of fiscal accounts also contributed 
to stability. The non-financial public sector's 
current revenues grew as a result of greater tax 
pressure and higher output, as well as increased 
petroleum revenues, while current expenditure 
remained unchanged in real terms; however, 
public enterprises showed a mounting deficit. 
Therefore, the consolidated non-financial 
public-sector deficit of 3.4% of GDP decreased 
only to 3%, although its monetary effect was 
considerably mitigated by the fact that it had been 
financed almost exclusively with external 
resources. 
In Colombia inflation decelerated slowly. 
Although the main economic policy objective 
was to reduce the rate of inflation, which had 
reached 32% in 1990, little progress was made in 
that direction, since prices rose by 27% in 1991. 
However, the monthly rate during the second half 
of the year was in the neighbourhood of 1.5% 
-equivalent to an annual rate of 20% and lower 
than in previous years. In 1991, the commercial 
liberalization of the economy was completed and 
the exchange-rate system was reformed, inter 
Economies which had experienced bouts of 
inflation in recent years consolidated their 
stabilization programmes in 1991, generally with 
positive results. In particular, following the 
significant price hikes recorded in a number of 
Central American and Caribbean countries in 
alia through the creation of a free foreign 
currency market. Anti-inflationary policy, in 
which a squeeze on credit played an important 
role, grew stronger after January with the 
adoption of a marginal reserve requirement of 
100% on new deposits, which drove interest rates 
up. At the same time, it was decided to reduce the 
rate of devaluation to 22% a year, the target rate 
of inflation for 1991. The differential between 
domestic interest rates (which were over 40% a 
year), the announced devaluation and 
international interest rates prompted a large 
inflow of short-term external capital. Foreign 
exchange purchases by the Bank of the Republic 
caused a sizeable monetary expansion, which in 
turn necessitated a considerable number of 
open-market operations, with the usual 
consequences in terms of fiscal cost. The system 
of certificates of exchange was therefore 
reinstated to defer the monetization of the foreign 
exchange entering the country, first for 90 days 
and then, in November, for one year. Another 
measure adopted in this connection was the 
decentralization of exchange-rate operations, 
which were transferred to the country's financial 
institutions, while the Bank of the Republic 
reserved the right to intervene as a last resort to 
regulate the prices quoted in the free market for 
certificates of exchange, which were not allowed 
to fall more than 12.5% lower than the official 
rate in order to protect exporters. During the year, 
the official exchange rate rose by nearly 26%; 
meanwhile, the price of the dollar on the free 
market was 4% lower than the official price. The 
monetary expansion stemming from the purchase 
of foreign exchange was partially offset by the 
credit squeeze, with the result that the means of 
payment grew by about 33%, far exceeding the 
price-increase goal established at the beginning 
of the year. The public sector, for its part, 
maintained the financial balance it had achieved 
the preceding year. 
1990, which were largely attributable to fiscal 
and external imbalances and the rise in world oil 
prices, inflation in these economies subsided to 
moderate levels. The steepest reduction took 
place in the Dominican Republic, which 
achieved virtual stabilization in 1991 (prices rose 
4. Stabilization of episodes of inflation 
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only 4%) after witnessing 101% inflation in 
1990. A marked reduction also occurred in 
Guatemala, where the rate of price increases 
fell from 60% in 1990 to 10% in 1991. In El 
Salvador, the decline in inflation picked up 
speed, falling from 24% in 1989 and 18% in 
1990 to 10% in 1991. Inflation also slowed in 
Honduras -from 35% to 2 1 % - to reach 
single-digit annualized rates in the final 
months of 1991. Likewise, Paraguay recorded 
a pronounced drop in inflation, from 44% to 
12%. 
Inflation fell precipitously in the Dominican 
Republic, from 100% in 1990 to 4% in 1991. In 
August 1990 the authorities initiated substantial 
economic policy reforms designed to remedy the 
economy's worsening instability, which had led 
to mounting expectations of devaluation and 
inflation, at a time of severe crisis in the country's 
external payments and in its supply of goods. The 
measures adopted consisted of relaxing the 
exchange-rate policy and reducing subsidies for 
public rates and charges -particularly for energy, 
in response to higher international oil prices-
and initiating a series of reforms aimed at 
controlling fiscal imbalance and liberalizing 
foreign trade. The adjustment had an immediate 
impact on prices (whose variations reached 
double-digit monthly rates) and depressed the 
level of activity. 
Against this backdrop, the authorities 
decided early in 1991 to strengthen these 
measures as a means of rapidly stabilizing prices. 
Consequently, they maintained the restrictions 
on the Central Bank's financing of the pubbc 
sector, further contracted the money supply, 
continued to decontrol prices and liberalized 
exchange-rate transactions. Amidst a severe 
recession, the rate of price increases fell steeply 
beginning in January; at the same time, 
expectations changed in the exchange-rate 
market and the gap between the official and 
parallel rates narrowed. These new 
circumstances received a boost in early March, 
when the Government set the official exchange 
rate at a level which remained constant, except 
for slight variations, for the rest of the year. 
Another contributing factor was an abundant 
inflow of foreign exchange, despite a gradual 
reduction of interest rates, whose real levels for 
borrowers remained fairly high. 
Inflation plummeted dramatically, falling 
from levels of about 10% a month in the second 
half of 1990 to an average of 0.7% a month in the 
first quarter of 1991; this phenomenon was 
accentuated in the second quarter, when a drop 
equivalent to 0.7% a month was recorded in the 
consumer price index (CPi). The fiscal and 
monetary measures applied in the second half of 
the year immediately affected prices by sharply 
contracting aggregate expenditure, at a time 
when the economy was operating without 
indexing mechanisms and with increased foreign 
competition in the area of consumer goods. With 
the maintenance of the fiscal measures and the 
exchange rate, overall price levels varied little in 
the second half of the year, averaging 
considerably less than 1% a month. 
Consumer prices in Guatemala rose only 9% 
in 1991, following a two-year period in which 
they had accelerated sharply, culminating in a 
60% increase in 1990. During most of 1991, in 
contrast, prices either fell or rose only 
moderately. This alleviation of inflationary 
pressures was possible despite the steep rise in 
electric service charges (47%), the 40% increase 
in the minimum wage and the drought which 
affected food production and the operating costs 
of the industrial sector, which had to reorganize 
work shifts and effect some outlays for the 
purchase of equipment and materials -including 
the import of diesel plants for electricity 
generation- in order to continue functioning 
during the power cuts caused by the drought. 
Economic policy focused on controlling 
inflation by means of a rigorous fiscal and 
monetary policy. Under the liberalized 
exchange-rate policy instituted the preceding 
year, a large inflow of foreign exchange 
(particularly short-term) flattened out the 
exchange rate following the considerable 
increase recorded in 1990, thus helping to keep 
domestic prices down. In addition, the drop in oil 
prices after the Gulf conflict moderated 
expectations concerning inflation and the 
external deficit. The increased flow of foreign 
capital was largely attributable to high domestic 
interest rates, especially during the first half of 
the year, when nominal yields averaged close to 
33% a year and the exchange rate was virtually 
constant, while domestic prices grew very 
slowly, with several months of negative 
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variation. In response to the abundant inflow of 
foreign exchange, interest rates declined 
markedly during the second half of the year, 
despite the use of open market operations to 
absorb the excess liquidity generated by the 
increase in international reserves. An 
improvement in public finance helped to 
strengthen the policy of monetary stringency. 
The large increase in the central Government's 
current revenues (over 1% of GDP) and 
significant spending cuts eliminated the fiscal 
deficit (of 2.3% in 1990) and yielded a modest 
surplus (of 0.4%). During 1991 the authorities 
pursued reforms designed to facilitate market 
operations, including the elimination of price 
ceilings, further liberalization of external trade 
and reduced subsidies. 
Inflation also declined notably in Paraguay, 
falling to 12% after reaching 44% in 1990. The 
policy of credit stringency put into effect in the 
second half of 1990 (in which the liberalization 
of interest rates played an important role), the 
moderation of public spending and the 
near-stability of the nominal exchange rate in an 
economy with a plentiful supply of foreign 
currency had already brought the variation in CPI 
down to a monthly rate of about 1% towards the 
end of 1990. Those same factors continued to 
operate throughout 1991. The public sector 
remained in surplus (1.5% of GDP), though to a 
lesser degree than in 1990, since its expenditures 
grew more rapidly than its revenues. Credit 
policy remained stringent; during the first half of 
the year, the preceding year's interest rates 
continued in effect and, given the drop in 
inflation, were highly positive in real terms. At 
mid-year the rediscount rate was reduced from 
30% to 20%, but even so, it remained positive in 
real terms. The reserve requirement on deposits 
in local currency also fell to 30%, with that on 
deposits in foreign currency rising to 25%. The 
dollar rate rose very slowly for a good part of the 
year, and accelerated somewhat in December, but 
exceeded the price quoted in December 1990 by 
only slightly more than 9%; thus, in the fourth 
quarter of 1991 the real exchange rate was some 
8% lower than it had been in the same period the 
preceding year. 
In El Salvador a large inflow of external 
resources helped to stabilize the exchange rate 
and bring the rate of inflation down from 18% in 
1990 to 10% in 1991, despite increases in food 
prices in July and August as a consequence of the 
severe drought. In the climate of relative 
optimism created by expectations that warfare 
would end with a negotiated solution, and with 
an abundant inflow of foreign exchange received 
primarily through unrequited official and private 
transfers totalling over US$600 million, the 
exchange rate was virtually stable in 1991. In this 
context, the consumer price variation followed a 
downward trend, dropping from the monthly rate 
of 1.5% recorded in 1990 to the situation of 
near-stability observed in the final quarter of 
1991. This price pattern was also influenced by 
falling oil prices throughout the year. Monetary 
policy remained circumspect, under the 
stabilization plan put into effect in late 1989, and 
succeeded in countering the pressures exerted by 
the fiscal imbalance created by a spending 
increase that exceeded the increase in the central 
Government's revenues and brought the deficit 
up from 3.5% of GDP in 1990 to about 5% in 1991. 
Prices rose 21% in Honduras in 1991, 
representing a slowdown in the preceding year's 
spurt of inflation. The substantial economic 
policy changes introduced in 1990, notably a 
considerable devaluation that pushed the real 
exchange rate up by over 70%, had contributed 
to a steep rise in inflation, which in the last 
quarter of 1990 had reached an annual rate of 
over 50%. The subsequent decrease in the rate 
of devaluation slowed the rate of price 
increases, which hovered around 10% annually 
in the second half of 1991. Moreover, 
adjustment policies enabled the central 
Government to reduce its financial deficit from 
more than 6% of GDP in 1990 to 3% in 1991. 
Monetary policy, in accordance with the 
stabilization policy, was stringent. The money 
supply grew 17%, owing to the influence of the 
external sector and to a significant recovery of 
international reserves. Credit rose only 4%, 
since loans to the public sector dropped 6%. To 
absorb excess bank liquidity, public securities 
were auctioned. 
Inflation also fell in Haiti, from 26% in 1990 
to slightly less than 7% in 1991. Lastly, Panama 
again recorded a small price increase of about 
1%, as it had the preceding year, in the context of 
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V. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
The moderate, if uneven, recovery of economic 
activity in the region as a whole in 1991, sparked 
modest growth in employment in formal 
activities and a slight decrease in unemployment, 
which still affects more than 5.5% of the 
workforce in the urban area. The differing rates 
of increase, however (in several countries, it was 
very slight and, in others, the level of activity 
even went down) were mirrored in the very 
heterogeneous development of formal 
employment, which rose satisfactorily in some 
countries while in others the downward trend of 
the 1980s continued. 
The average rate of open unemployment in 
Latin America's 20 largest cities has ranged from 
5.6% to 5.9% in recent years, down from more 
than 8% when the crisis of the 1980s was at its 
worst. In 1991, the rate of open unemployment 
went down in 9 of the 15 countries that were able 
to provide information, some of which registered 
a drop in the unemployment rate equivalent to 
one percentage point or more of the workforce 
(Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Panama, 
Paraguay and Peru). In two other countries 
(Brazil and Chile), the average rates were higher 
than those of the previous year, but the third and 
fourth quarters showed a downward trend. 
Moreover, only Costa Rica and Honduras 
registered significant increases in the 
unemployment rate (see tables V-l and V-2). 
It should be remembered, however, that in 
most countries of the region the degree of 
underemployment creates greater instability than 
the rate of open unemployment. The informal 
labour market expanded considerably in the 
1980s and, at the end of the decade, held steady 
at around 25% of the urban workforce. The 
absorption capacity of the informal sector 
prevented a significant rise in unemployment, 
See Regional Employment Programme for Latin America 
desafíos de los noven ta "(Urban employment: diagnostic study a; 
though at the expense of an increase in 
low-productivity jobs with no benefits. The 
expansion of the informal sector has varied from 
country to country. In Argentina and Mexico, 
informal employment reached its peak in the 
1990s. In Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile 
and Venezuela, the proportion of informal 
activities has decreased in recent years, 
compared to the all-time high attained in the past 
decade, but Chile is the only country in which the 
informal sector is smaller than it was 10 years 
ago.1 
As a result of the considerable economic 
expansion of Venezuela and Chile, formal 
employment in those countries rose significantly 
and, in Venezuela, unemployment went down. 
The recovery of the level of activity in Argentina 
and Panama, on the other hand, led to only 
modest growth in industrial jobs, although in both 
cases it had a positive impact on unemployment. 
In Mexico, despite steady economic growth, 
industrial employment dropped because of the 
slower growth of the inbond assembly industry 
and lower employment in the manufacturing 
sector. The slowdown in growth brought with it 
a decline in industrial employment after three 
years of expansion, and higher unemployment in 
Costa Rica. Such was not the case in Colombia, 
where formal employment went up slightly, 
compared to no increase in 1990, or in Paraguay, 
where unemployment went down. While 
Uruguay registered only modest growth, the 
employment situation improved slightly. On the 
other hand, the extended recession in Brazil, 
Nicaragua and Peru later translated into a 
reduction in formal employment. In view of the 
critical situation in Brazil, informal hiring 
increased, heightening the instability of the 
labour market, but also keeping the rates of open 
id the Ciribbean (PREALC), "El empleo urbano: diagnóstico y 
1 challenges in the 1990s), Informa, No. 29, April 1992. 
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unemployment from soaring. In Peru, economic 
reactivation combined with stabilization at least 
paved the way for a decline in the unemployment 
rate. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, the 
adjustment programme and institutional 
restructuring resulted in an abrupt drop in the 
employment level and a considerable increase in 
open unemployment (see tables V-l and V-3). 
In addition, the steep decline in the inflation 
rate in some economies (Argentina, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Uruguay) contributed to an increase in 
average real wages; this also occurred in some 
countries which had experienced steady growth 
(Chile and Mexico). On the other hand, real 
wages went down in the economies that 
continued to be plagued by high rates of inflation 
(Brazil and Venezuela), or that registered lower 
growth rates (Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Paraguay). 
As a result, in 1991 the unemployment rate in 
most countries was higher than it had been just 
before the crisis, except in Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Chile, Honduras, Mexico and Peru. On the other 
hand, the unemployment in industry remained 
below its 1980 level in a number of countries. In 
the 1980s, industrial unemployment had 
decreased or remained unchanged in many 
countries; only Cuba, Panama, Guatemala and 
Venezuela had registered upward trends. In 
Chile, employment in the manufacturing sector 
picked up steadily -after an abrupt drop (almost 
30%) in 1981-1982-, outstripping the 1980 level 
by 22% in 1991. In Brazil, on the other hand, the 
level of industrial unemployment was 19% lower 
in 1991 than it had been in 1980. In Peru, the 
number of persons employed in industry was 
23% below the 1980 figure, although the decline 
has occurred principally (20%) in the past four 
years. In Mexico, industrial employment was 3% 
higher than in 1980, owing to the creation of 
340,000 jobs in the inbond assembly industry 
since that time, which compensated for the 
decline in other industrial sectors (see table V-3). 
Moreover, in most countries of the region, 
average real wages in 1991 remained lower than 
they had been in 1980 as a result of the sharp 
downturn in the preceding decade. Only Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Panama and Paraguay 
surpassed their 1980 levels. In São Paulo, 
however, even with the decline (12%), the real 
wage level was well above what it had been in 
1980, whereas the decline (8%) in Venezuela 
brought average real wages down to less than half 
their 1980 level. In Costa Rica and Guatemala, 
wages decreased by around 5% in real terms, 
while in Colombia, they went down by 3%, but 
this still represented a 12% increase over the 
1980 level. In Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Uruguay, on the other hand, average 
wages increased and recovered their purchasing 
power in part although in some cases, very 
slightly. Chile was the only country where wages 
exceeded the level of 10 years ago by 5% in real 
terms, pushing the figure up 10% over the 
previous level (see table V-4). 
The minimum wage, a tool of both social 
policy and macroeconomic regulation, again 
decreased in real terms in most countries. Only 
in five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile and the Dominican Republic) did it 
increase compared to the previous year, although 
it remained well below the beginning figure for 
the decade. Of all the countries for which 
information was available, only three (Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Paraguay) have higher real 
minimum wages than in 1980 (see table V-5). 
In Argentina, as a result of a significant 
economic recovery in 1991, the average rate of 
open unemployment in urban areas went down 
from 7.5% to 6.5%, but the trend in the larger 
cities was uneven. While in Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba and Mendoza, the rate went down in 
comparison to 1990, in Rosario, it rose around 
two percentage points. It seems that employment 
in formal activities increased only modestly 
because businesses tended to accommodate 
increased demand by extending working hours 
rather than hiring more personnel. In May, 
industrial wages and minimum wages began to 
show signs of improving as a result of the 
economic turnaround and of bringing inflation 
under control. This increase in real terms, 
however, was not sufficient to offset the losses 
accumulated over the previous four years, and 
therefore the average industrial wage continued 
to be around 20% below the 1980 level, while the 
real minimum wage was little more than half the 
legal minimum in 1980 (see tables V-4 and V-5). 
In Brazil, in the context of a severe recession 
and a flare-up of inflation (monthly rates over 
20%) in the fourth quarter of 1991 and amidst a 
climate of growing uncertainty because of 
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repeated unsuccessful attempts at stabilization, 
there was a widespread drop in urban 
employment (around 4%), particularly formal 
employment in the manufacturing industry (7%) 
and in construction (6%). Some of the jobs 
eliminated, however, were absorbed by the 
informal market, which explains why the average 
rate of open unemployment does not fully reflect 
this change. Unemployment shot up in São Paulo 
and Porto Alegre, especially in the first half of the 
year, and went down slightly in the second half 
(see table V-2). 
For the second consecutive year, wages 
lagged behind prices, severely reducing 
purchasing power. Various factors explain this 
unfavourable development: the economic 
recession, the adoption of one stabilization 
programme after another, all alike in the sense 
that they aimed to achieve greater austerity in 
salary and wage readjustments and brought on 
persistent, high inflation. The wage policy 
implemented in 1991 is divided into two clear-cut 
phases. The first phase, which ran through 
August, began with the so-called Collor II Plan, 
aimed at de-indexing wages in order to control 
inertial inflation and thereby help to bring about 
stabilization. In that framework, a readjustment 
was declared in February in order to align real 
wages with the real average in the past 12 months. 
From March to August, a provisional 
readjustment mechanism was in place, limited to 
the issue of bonds denominated in fixed amounts. 
Beginning in September, permanent regulations 
came into force. The new law established a 
system of partial indexation though only for 
salaries and wages that were less than three times 
the minimum wage, staggered over time, fully 
adjustable every four months, with bimonthly 
advances on the order of 50% of the price 
increase. In general, however, major enterprises 
continued readjusting wages in line with schemes 
that made greater provisions for the impact of 
inflation. The Government was able to declare an 
exception to the civil service salary and wage 
policy ordinarily applied, whereby readjustments 
would be made according to the availability of 
resources, and a balanced budget would take 
precedence over everything else. As a result, 
public administration salaries were cut 
drastically. On the other hand, at the municipal 
and State levels, the same austerity was not 
practised, as wages were pegged to income, and 
therefore fared better than those paid by the 
federal Government. 
The minimum wage policy underwent a 
significant change, as Congress moved to 
augment the purchasing power of salaries and 
wages in order to protect the lower-income strata 
by reversing the long-standing trend of 
progressive deterioration in real terms. As a 
result, real minimum wages increased by 12% in 
1991, although they remained well below the 
level achieved in 1980 (see table V-5). 
In Colombia, the employment situation 
deteriorated in the first half of the year and then 
improved in the second half. In Bogotá and 
Barranquilla, the average unemployment rate 
was below the 1990 figure, and in Cali, it held 
steady, while in Medellin, it increased by almost 
two percentage points. Despite reduced inflation, 
real wages decreased in 1991, as the uncertainty 
surrounding the radical change in economic 
policy and the slowdown in economic activity 
effectively ruled out larger wage increases. In 
those circumstances, real wages in the 
manufacturing industry went down by 3%, while 
the minimum wage decrease in real terms was 
somewhat more significant. 
In Chile, the average urban unemployment 
rate was higher than that of 1990, although 
employment rebounded in the second half, 
reflecting a vigorous business expansion in 
certain sectors, including industry and 
construction, bringing the unemployment rate 
down to 5.5% in Greater Santiago and 5% at the 
national level in the fourth quarter. Average 
salaries and wages increased by 5%, chiefly as a 
result of greater productivity and lower inflation. 
The real minimum wage went up by 9.4%, owing 
-for the second consecutive year- to the tripartite 
agreement concluded between the Government 
and the major unions and business organizations. 
This increase brought the level close to the 1980 
average (see tables V-4 and V-5). 
In Mexico, the average rate of open 
unemployment remained unchanged generally 
speaking, although there was a decline in 
employment in the manufacturing industry, 
which suffered drastic cutbacks. Elsewhere, the 
number of persons employed in the inbond 
assembly industry increased by only 1.6%, to 
467,500, and the level of employment also 
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increased in trade and construction. Moreover, 
the informal sector of the economy continued to 
absorb a large percentage of the workforce for 
which there was no slot in the formal sector, 
representing around 30% of the economically 
active population. Pay scales in manufacturing 
went up by 6.5% in real terms in 1991 with 
increased productivity, but the purchasing power 
of the minimum wage remained on the decline 
(4.2%). 
Lower employment in the formal sector of 
industry, commerce and services for the fourth 
consecutive year left 78% of the workforce in 
Peru underemployed, while open unemployment 
decreased from 8% to 6%. As a result of the 
successful stabilization policy, salaries and 
wages recovered somewhat from the 
accumulated loss since 1988, and real wages of 
workers in the manufacturing sector rose by 8%. 
Both public-sector remunerations and minimum 
wages posted further declines (35% and 32%, 
respectively). 
Venezuela's vigorous economic expansion 
gave a major boost to employment, especially in 
the construction and manufacturing sectors. 
Indeed, the increase was greater in formal 
employment (8.3%) than in informal 
employment (3.3%). The open unemployment 
rate dropped from 11% to 10%. By mid-year, the 
Government of Venezuela had readjusted the 
nominal minimum wage which had remained 
unchanged since early 1989, by 50%. At the same 
time, pay increases for private-sector employees 
were declared, ranging between 17% and 21%, 
depending on the income level, and at the 
beginning of the year, there was a major increase 
in public-sector wages. None the less, these rises 
were not enough to prevent another drop in real 
terms, although less of one than in the previous 
three-year period. Minimum wages declined by 
7%, while average salaries and wages went down 
by more than 8% (see tables V-4 and V-5). 
In Bolivia, the employment situation 
improved along with increased output, and open 
unemployment went down by more than a 
percentage point. Moreover, in January, the 
minimum wage was readjusted by 100%, rising 
by 54% in real terms; none the less, owing to the 
accumulated effect of deterioration in the past 
10 years, the minimum wage is still equivalent in 
real terms to only 25% of its 1980 value. In 
Ecuador, there was another minimum wage 
decline, as only one readjustment was made in 
January on the assumption that inflation would 
tend to go down. Therefore, over the year, the 
minimum wage went down by 15.5% in real 
terms to one third of what it had been in 1980. In 
Paraguay, unemployment was lower in urban 
areas, largely because of the impetus of 
commerce, but rural employment was less stable 
because of a poor agricultural performance. 
Under the stabilization policy, salaries and wages 
were frozen in 1991, which brought the minimum 
wage down by 4.4% in real terms. The decrease 
in average salaries and wages, however, was not 
as great (1.2%) (see tables V-l, V-4 and V-5). 
In Uruguay, employment during the first six 
months remained low in industry and commerce, 
but later increased, bringing down unemployment 
figures in the second half of the year. The yearly 
unemployment average remained high (nearly 
9%), although it was lower than that of 1990 and 
most of the 1980s. None the less, real average 
wages increased by nearly 4%, recovering nearly 
half of the value lost in the preceding biennium. 
Salaries and wages in the private sector increased 
more rapidly than in the public sector, because 
different salary and wage adjustment scales were 
used: whereas, in the private sector, wages were 
readjusted on the basis of accumulated inflation 
in the preceding four-month period, in the public 
sector they were adjusted in line with the 
Government's fiscal targets. In a context of 
disinflation, therefore, private-sector salaries and 
wages went up by 6% in real terms, while in the 
public sector, the increase was only slight. 
Minimum wage purchasing power posted 
another decline (10%). 
In the Central American and Caribbean 
countries, the trend was not uniform. In Costa 
Rica, the adjustment programme curbed 
economic activity, a result which had direct 
repercussions on employment levels. The 
unemployment rate rose slightly to 6%. Although 
manufacturing output grew by 1%, employment 
in that sector registered a decline of 3.7%, largely 
attributable to cutbacks in labour-intensive 
sectors, such as textiles and furniture-making. 
Also affecting the deterioration in the 
employment situation, although less so than 
anticipated, was the job relocation plan 
implemented in October 1990 with the aim of 
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Figure V - 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
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reducing public-sector employment; however the 
objectives of the Plan were only partially 
achieved, since many of the dismissed workers 
filed suit and were reinstated in their jobs. 
Therefore, as of March, the Plan became a 
voluntary retirement programme with very 
attractive financial incentives. Wage policy was 
determined by the adjustment policy, and, 
average wages therefore went down by 4.6% in 
real terms; the real wage level in 1991 was 17% 
below what it had been in 1980. The minimum 
wage declined in real terms by 7.2% but remained 
12% above the 1980 level. 
The prospect of an imminent settlement of the 
conflict in El Salvador stimulated economic 
activity and helped to bring down inflation. In 
this context, the unemployment rate dipped from 
10% to 8%, and underemployment also 
decreased, which would confirm the trend 
towards greater formal employment. The 
minimum wage readjustment was not 
commensurate with inflation and it again 
declined in real terms (2%), prolonging the 
decade-long trend of the 1980s and reducing the 
minimum wage to one third of its 1980 level. 
In Guatemala, job creation was negligible, 
and thus open unemployment remained 
unchanged while underemployment worsened 
steadily. As a result of the 40% minimum wage 
increase and lower inflation, the minimum wage 
went up by 5% in real terms. Average salaries and 
wages went down by only 5%, because the higher 
inbond assembly wages served to push up the 
average. 
In Honduras, the national unemployment rate 
rose slightly as a result of a significant increase 
in unemployment in the capital city, for in the San 
Pedro Sula industrial zone, there was a decline of 
one percentage point. The fact is that the job 
situation is predominantly one of underemployment, 
since a large percentage of the population works in 
the informal sector. As a result of a "worker-
entrepreneur agreemenf'in Honduras, minimum 
wages were readjusted by a weighted average of 
30%. Since this increase was lower than the rise 
in prices, real wages decreased by more than 3%. 
The steep rise in unemployment in Nicaragua 
was one of the most disturbing aspects of the 
1991 economic picture. The newest members of 
a workforce that is growing by more than 4% 
annually, together with part of the armed forces 
and the demobilized fighters, the first returnees 
to the country and those who over the year had 
lost their jobs because of business failures or 
because of depressed business activity, were all 
job-hunting in a weak labour market. In short, 
underutilization of the labour force went up from 
45% in 1990 to 54% in 1991. Open unemployment 
stood at 13.6%. In the manufacturing sector, 
employment dipped by 20%. The drop in 
employment in the services sector was 
widespread, especially in public administration 
and the army, where 17,000 posts were 
eliminated as part of a job conversion plan in 
State institutions. Average wages increased by 
slightly more than 3% in real terms, although, 
severely eroded by hyperinflation, they are, even 
now, equal to only 15% of their 1980 level in real 
terms (see tables V-l and V-5). 
In Panama, the open unemployment figures 
were extremely high (19%), if on a slightly 
downward trend. Formal job creation rose by 
12%, but the figure had been so low to begin with 
that it did little to reduce unemployment. In 1991, 
personnel continued to be rehired at wages below 
what they had originally earned in the same jobs, 
a policy initiated in 1990 which was applied 
virtually across-the-board. This brought down 
real wages in the private sector and it may well 
be that only public-sector salaries increased (at 
the expense of dismissing 4,500 employees) and 
in the Canal zone. Moreover, minimum wages 
have not increased since February 1983; while 
inflation is down, this has brought on a loss in real 
value of six percentage points. 
In Haiti, a worsening economic crisis seems 
to have pushed open unemployment up to 30% 
of the economically active population in a 
context, moreover, of rampant underemployment. 
Real wages dropped by more than 5%, as the 
readjustment implemented was not enough to 
offset the impact of inflation. By contrast, 
significantly lower inflation in the Dominican 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Average annual rates) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990a 1991a 
Latin Americab 8.1 8.2 73 6.2 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.6 
Argentina0 4.6 4.6 6.1 5.2 5.9 6.3 7.8 7.5 6.5 
Bolivia0 8.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 7.2 11.6 10.2 9.5 8.1 
Brazile 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.3 4.5 4.8 
Colombiaf 11.8 13.5 14.1 13.8 11.8 11.2 9.9 10.3 10.2 
Costa Rica8 8.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 5.9 6.3 3.7 5.4 6.0 
Chileh , 18.9 18.5 17.2 13.1 11.9 10.2 7.2 6.5 7.3 
Ecuador' . 6.7 10.6 10.4 10.7 7.2 7.4 7.9 6.1 
ElSalvadorj ... ... ... ... ... 9.4 8.4 10.0 8.0 
Guatemalak 10.0 9.1 12.1 14.0 11.4 8.8 6.2 6.4 6.5 
Honduras1 9.5 10.7 11.7 12.1 11.4 8.7 7.2 6.9 7.6 
Mexico" 6.6 5.7 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.8 3.0 
Panama" 11.7 12.4 15.6 12.6 14.1 21.1 20.4 20.0 19.0 
Paraguay0 8.4 7.4 5.2 6.1 5.5 4.7 6.1 6.6 5.1 
Peru1" 9.0 8.9 10.1 5.4 4.8 ... 7.9 8.3 5.9 
Uruguayq 15.5 14.0 13.1 10.7 9.3 9.1 8.6 9.3 8.9 
Venezuela1" 11.2 14.3 14.3 12.1 9.9 7.9 9.7 11.0 10.1 
Source: Estimates by ECLAC and Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC), on the basis 
of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Weighted average for 20 of the 25 most populous cities in Latin America. c Nationwide urban 
rate, April-October average; 1986: October. Nationwide urban rate; estimates by the Economic Policies Unit (UDAPE). From 
1987 onward, Permanent household survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics. c Metropolitan areas of Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte , Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife: 12-month average. Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali and 
Medellfn: average for March, June, September and December; 1985: average for March, July, September and December; 1986: 
average for April, June, September and December. g Nationwide urban rate: average for March, July and November; 1984: 
average for March and November, 1986: average for March and July; from 1987 onward: July. National Institute of 
Statistics (INE), Santiago Metropolitan Region, four-quarter moving average. From August 1984 onward, figures' refer to the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region; from October 1985 onward, the figures are not entirely comparable to those for preceding periods 
due to changes in the design and size of the sample. . i Nationwide, according to official estimates; from 1986 onward, 
household surveys in Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca. ' Nationwide urban rate, 1988 and 1990: January to April; 1989: October 
1988 to February 1989. Nationwide, according to General Secretariat of the National Council for Economic Planning 
(SEGEPLAN) estimates. Nationwide, according to official estimates; from 1986 onward, Urban Labour Force Survey; 1987: 
March, central district. m Average for 16 cities. Four-quarter average. ° Metropolitan area, August of each year; 1990: 
estimates. ° Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré, and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo; 1983: average for 
September, October and November, 1984: average for August, September and October, 1985: average for November and 
December. p Metropolitan Lima. q Montevideo: four-quarter average. r Nationwide urban rate: average for the two 
halves of the year, 1986: second half of the year. 
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Table V-2 





































































































































































































































































































Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Weighted average for 20 of the 25 most populous cities in Latin America. c Figures for April and 
October. Twelve-month average. e Figures for March, June, September and December. Metropolitan area. 
Figures for March, July and November; 1988 and 1989: July. * Greater Santiago. Figures for March, June, September and 
December. , Quarterly averages. ' Includes Fernando de La Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San 
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Source: ECLAC on the basis of official figures. 
a Manual workers employed in manufacturing. Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE). 
c Manual workers employed in industry, except that of coffee hulling. Number of persons paying into the social security 
system. e Persons employed in manufacturing: does not include the inbond assembly industry. Persons employed in 
the inbond assembly industry (maquiladoras). g Employment in manufacturing activities according to household surveys. 
Persons employed in manufacturing in the Lima metropolitan area. ' Source: Industrial Survey conducted by the Central 
Statistics and Information Office (OCEI) (indexes 1981=100). 
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Table V-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL AVERAGE 
WAGES 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991a 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Rio de Janeiroc 













Average manual indexes (1980 = 100) 
127.1 107.8 109.5 103.0 97.3 83.3 78.7 


























































































































































































































































Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Average total monthly wages in the manufacturing industry. c Average wages in basic industry, 
deflated by the consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro. Average wages in the manufacturing industry in the State of 
São Paulo deflated by the cost-of-living index for São Paulo. ' Wages of manual workers in the manufacturing industry. 
Average wages of persons enrolled in the social security system. 8 Average remunerations of wage earners in non-agricultural 
. sectors. AveragewagesofpersonsenroIIedin the social security systetn. 'Average wages In the manufacturing Industry. 
' Average wages of persons enrolled in the social security system, deflated by the price index implicit in the gross domestic 
product. Average industrial wages in Panama City. Wage of manual workers in Asunción; average for June and 
December. m Wages of private-sector manual workers in Metropolitan Lima. ° Real average wage index. "Average 
income per urban worker, deflated by the variation in consumer prices in the Caracas Metropolitan area. p In comparison to 
the same period of the preceding year. 
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Table V-5 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. National minimum wage. c National minimum wage. Minimum wage for the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, deflated by the corresponding consumer price index. e Minimum wage for upper urban sectors. National 
minimum wage. g Minimum income. Minimum overall living wage, calculated on the basi s of the annual 
minimum living wage and legal supplementary benefits. ' Minimum wage for non-agricultural activities in San Salvador. 
' National minimum wage. Minimum daily wage paid in industries. Minimum wage in the manufacturing sector in the 
Central District and San Pedro Sula. m Minimum wage in Mexico City, deflated by the corresponding consumer price index. 
n Minimum wage for industrial workers in the Department of Managua. ° Minimum wage applying to all activities except 
construction and domestic service. p Minimum wage in Asunción and Ciudad del Este. ' Minimum wage in Metropolitan 
Lima for non-agricultural activities. ' National minimum wage. * National minimum wage for workers over 18 years of 
age. ' National minimum wage for non-agricultural activities deflated by the consumer price index corresponding to the 
lowest income quartile. " In comparison to the same period of the preceding year. 
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VI. PUBLIC FINANCES 
Public finances in Latin America reached a 
turning point at the end of 1991, owing to 
significant progress in the fiscal adjustment 
processes launched in previous years and the 
budget control measures taken in most of the 
countries of the region. The sale of 
government-owned enterprises and other assets 
also gained momentum during the year. 
Improved budgetary performance helped in most 
cases to reverse the trends observed throughout 
the 1980s. The marked imbalance in public 
finances was one of the most important 
components of the economic crisis that affected 
the region during that decade. The recession was 
most evident in the severe problems of 
public-sector financing, caused by large deficits 
-aggravated by the effects of declining revenues 
and the debt burden-, and the sharp drop in 
external financing. 
Policies to reduce or eliminate fiscal deficits 
play a key role in the current phase of the 
adjustment processes being undertaken by the 
economies of the region to face the debt crisis, 
and they are being given higher priority than they 
would normally have in macrpeconomic 
adjustment. Their importance during this 
reorientation phase of development in the 
countries of the region is due to the potential 
positive effect of the control of public finances 
By the end of the 1980s, most of the economies 
of the region faced serious problems in their fiscal 
accounts, which in many cases undoubtedly 
contributed to a speed-up of inflation during 
those years, leading to periods of hyperinflation 
in some countries and aggravating those same 
fiscal problems. The magnitude of those imbalances, 
a clear symptom of a lack of fiscal control, made it 
necessary to undertake drastic fiscal adjustment 
programmes to restore balance to public-sector 
on stabilization processes and the economic 
agents' confidence in economic policy and the 
economy, and the usefulness of budgetary 
restraint in reducing State entropy and facilitating 
public policy reform. Of course, eliminating the 
fiscal deficit or keeping it within margins that can 
be financed with non-inflationary resources is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for sustained 
strategies of changing production patterns with 
greater social equity. Another key requirement is 
the reform of public policies and fiscal tools to 
enhance the State's ability to effectively promote 
such strategies. 
Although considerable, the progress made in 
1991 was not definitive, and it is far from being 
consolidated. Results were obtained largely by 
using temporary, unsustainable mechanisms, 
such as drastically contracting current and capital 
expenditures, or resorting to non-recurrent 
receipts, such as those obtained from 
privatization programmes. Measures to create 
new tax structures are, in many cases, too recent 
to be able to determine what effect they have had. 
Also, in several countries those results will be 
consolidated only if advances are made in 
stabilizing and reactivating the economy and in 
securing access to stable external financing, as 
well as in reducing external debt servicing to 
fiscally tolerable levels. 
financing and regain the confidence of economic 
agents in the future of the economy. 
The debt crisis took away government access 
to external credit in the early 1980s. Some 
countries turned to domestic credit to cover their 
deficits, already bloated by external debt service 
payments. Only in the early stages, and in a 
limited number of cases, was domestic credit able 
to offset the lack of external resources. But even 
in those cases, the steady growth of the deficit in 
1. Fiscal adjustment programmes 
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nominal terms quickly put an end to that 
alternative. Inflation, fueled by the need to 
finance growing public deficits by issuing 
currency, made it increasingly difficult to resort 
to seigniorage, bank reserve requirements and the 
sale of domestic debt paper. Governments were 
therefore faced with an unavoidable choice: 
either put government spending back on a sound 
financial basis or watch inflation spiral upwards, 
in some cases leading to hyperinflation. 
After focusing on external accounts in the 
early 1980s, adjustment programmes entered a 
new phase, oriented towards stabilization and 
domestic adjustments, of which the elimination 
of the fiscal gap gradually became the most 
important. Virtually all the adjustment processes 
were having some effect, and by 1991 more 
concrete results were achieved. In 1989 and 
1990, most of the countries of the region carried 
out sizeable fiscal adjustments entailing a radical 
restructuring of government, although in some 
cases this led to a deterioration of services. 
During those years, a considerable number of 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama and Venezuela) adjusted their fiscal 
deficit by more than 3% of gross domestic 
product. Other countries reduced their deficit 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic and 
Uruguay) or increased their surplus (Chile and 
Paraguay) by about 2% of GDP. Only Costa Rica 
expanded its fiscal imbalance during those years. 
During 1991, the process of adjusting fiscal 
accounts intensified in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, 
and was reinitiated in Costa Rica, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. 
Bolivia was the first country to attempt to 
achieve broad-based fiscal stabilization, when in 
the fourth quarter of 1985 the new Government 
was forced to take drastic measures -in respect 
of exchange policy, taxes and public rates- to 
combat a hyperinflation on the order of 22,000% 
in the 12-month period ending in September of 
that year. That programme achieved immediate 
results, both reducing the fiscal deficit and 
bringing down inflation, and consolidated these 
results in subsequent years. 
For an analysis of the sequences of adjustments and disequ 
the 1980s, see ECLAC, "Public finances in Latin America in the 
¿990 (LC/G.1676-P), vol.1, part three, Santiago, Chile, 1992, U 
Mexico began a new stage of fiscal 
adjustment in 1988 to control inflation that had 
reached 150% a year and was spinning out of 
control. That adjustment was part of a concerted 
stabilization programme that gave positive 
results: the fiscal deficit was steadily reduced, 
owing to an increase in the primary surplus and 
lower interest rates, and inflation declined 
considerably. The adjustment process continued 
with no major changes until 1991, when public 
accounts showed a surplus. Ecuador also 
undertook an adjustment programme in 1988, 
since the fiscal deficit had reached almost 10% 
of GDP in 1987 because of problems with 
petroleum production and exports. The 
public-sector deficit was reduced significantly in 
subsequent years but began to rise again in 1991, 
while inflation remained around 50% a year. 
By the end of 1988 and early 1989, Venezuela 
was in a bind because of imbalances in the 
external sector and in public finances, which led 
the Government to take drastic steps to correct 
these severe macroeconomic disequilibria. The 
results obtained that year were spectacular, but 
control over public accounts was slackened in 
1990 because of the huge jump in oil revenues 
stemming from the rise in the price of crude on 
the international market provoked by the Gulf 
crisis. Argentina had to launch a severe fiscal 
adjustment programme in mid-1989 because of 
bouts of hyperinflation during the first half of that 
year. Results were meager at the outset, and 
inflation re-emerged from time to time in the 
following years. But the adjustment process 
deepened enough in 1991 to significantly reduce 
the disequilibrium. 
Several sweeping fiscal adjustment processes 
were carried out in 1990. One of these, in Brazil, 
was unusual because of the tools it used. Inflation 
was running over 50% a month during the first 
quarter of 1990, and the fiscal deficit, which was 
approaching 80% of GDP in nominal terms, was 
being financed with extremely short-term 
-practically one-day- credits. The main 
mechanism of the adjustment programme was the 
freezing of financial assets, which corresponded 
almost exclusively of federal Government debt. 
ilibria of the public finances of the countries of the region during 
1980s", Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
nited Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.G.2. 
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Initial results were good, but inflation returned, 
since the problem of permanent financing of the 
public sector remained unsolved, and market 
inertia persisted. In Nicaragua, the Government 
that took office in April 1990 began a new period 
of fiscal adjustment as part of a restructuring of 
the economy, and also with the aim of curbing 
runaway inflation. The country's dramatic 
political problems made it very difficult to carry 
out the programme. However, in 1991, after 
adjustment measures were strengthened, the 
fiscal deficit began to narrow and inflation was 
virtually eliminated. Peru's new Government 
also launched a stringent adjustment process, 
since inflation was reaching almost 8,000% per 
year and current government income was 
plummeting. Despite some obstacles, the 
programme achieved important advances, 
although the serious problems relating to public 
finances are still far from being corrected, since 
government income and spending are still very 
low. Uruguay also had to apply a new adjustment 
programme because of the structural imbalance 
in public finances, mainly caused by the 
enormous deficit in the social security system. A 
sharp rise in the tax burden and controls over 
spending made it possible to meaningfully reduce 
the deficit of the whole public sector, which 
virtually balanced out by 1991. 
During 1990 and 1991, fiscal adjustment 
programmes were initiated by countries whose 
public sectors had begun to record considerable 
imbalances, but which traditionally had 
maintained balanced fiscal accounts. Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Paraguay endured bouts of inflation several 
times since 1988, something that had happened 
Most Latin American countries consolidated the 
adjustment of their public accounts in 1991 and 
substantially narrowed their deficits. Some 
countries even achieved a surplus, and those in 
an already solid position were able to reinforce it. 
Argentina brought the deficit of the non-financial 
public sector down from more than 5% of GDP in 
1990 to 2.2%; Bolivia from nearly 4% to 3%; 
Colombia from 0.4% to 0.1%, and Costa Rica 
from 2.5% to virtual equilibrium. Guatemala 
converted the central government deficit from 
only sporadically in the past. That imbalance was 
largely due to problems related to public 
finances, but also somewhat to difficulties in the 
external sector. Thus, fiscal adjustment 
programmes in most of those countries were 
successful. Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras 
lowered their fiscal deficits between 2% and 3% 
of GDP. 
Other countries of the region had different 
kinds of fiscal problems. Chile had basically 
adjusted its public accounts already by the late 
1970s and had begun to produce fiscal surpluses. 
But the external debt crisis slowed down this 
process, since the Government assumed 
responsibility for private debt, resulting in a huge 
deficit in the accounts of the Central Bank. 
However, the problem gradually diminished over 
the following years, to the point where, for the 
last three years, the non-financial public sector 
showed a surplus and public finances achieved a 
solid equilibrium. Colombia, which was not 
affected by the debt crisis, was able to correct its 
fiscal imbalance through a tax reform in 1983 and 
strict control over its public accounts since that 
time. El Salvador dealt differently with its fiscal 
problems because of the political situation that 
has existed since the late 1970s, when the country 
suffered from an all-out armed conflict. Huge 
expenditures for the war were covered by the 
United States, meaning that the large deficit was 
offset by external financing, and the Government 
was able to keep the fiscal situation relatively 
under control. Panama's fiscal problem had a 
different origin, namely, the blockade imposed 
by the United States in 1987. Once the blockade 
was lifted, however, the country quickly 
corrected the public-sector deficit. 
2.3% of GDP in 1990 into a surplus of 0.4%. 
Panama also changed the sign of its fiscal balance 
(-2.2%) to 1.4%). The central government of 
Honduras lowered its deficit from somewhat 
more than 6% to 3%; Nicaragua from 26% to 7%; 
and Peru from 2.5% to 0.6%. The slight central 
government surplus of the Dominican Republic 
rose from 0.3% of GDP to 0.8%. Uruguay 
consolidated its public sector and eliminated the 
deficit, which had been 2.5% of GDP the year 
before. Mexico's central government 
2. Widespread reduction of fiscal deficits in 1991 
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transformed its deficit of almost 3% of GDP into 
a notable surplus of 3.4%. Chile continued to 
achieve a surplus in its non-financial public 
sector accounts, as it had since 1986, although in 
1990 and 1991 it fell to less than 2% of GDP. The 
surplus of the non-financial public sector in 
Paraguay dropped from 3.3% of GDP to 1.5%. 
Venezuela also raised the surplus in the 
non-financial public sector from 0.2% of GDP in 
1990 to 1.2%, but this was solely due to revenues 
from privatizing government enterprises. 
Without that non-recurrent income, the deficit 
would have risen to 3% of GDP (see table VI-1). 
The deficit of the central government in El 
Salvador rose from 3% to 5% of GDP, partly due 
to a change in accounting procedures and, to the 
constant inflow of external resources, which 
financed a strong rise in public investment. In 
Ecuador, the positive balance of 0.6% became a 
deficit of 1.2%, which, together with the 
quasi-fiscal deficit, left an aggregate deficit of 
close to 4% of GDP. Finally, Brazil was barely 
able to maintain the gains from its adjustment in 
1990, which had sharply reduced the fiscal 
deficit; by year end the financial pressures on the 
Treasury were becoming more and more intense, 
The fiscal adjustments in 1991 produced 
favourable results because most of the economies 
of the region enjoyed higher revenues, while they 
cut spending or increased it only slightly. 
Conversely, almost all the countries whose fiscal 
accounts worsened were those whose income fell 
by more than they were able to cut spending. In 
14 Latin American countries, fiscal revenues 
increased both as percentage of GDP and at 
constant prices. Seven of those countries (Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Venezuela) also reduced spending, 
which helped consolidate the adjustment. 
Expenditures rose in six other countries of this 
group with increased income (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Panama and Uruguay), 
but fiscal revenues rose even more, which 
allowed them to also improve their financial 
position. In the remaining country (El Salvador), 
the deficit grew, since expenditures increased 
considerably more than revenues. In the 
Dominican Republic, one of the countries in 
which fiscal revenues declined, the surplus 
increased because expenditures contracted more 
than revenue. Finally, in three countries (Brazil, 
Ecuador and Paraguay), income dropped more 
than spending was cut, which made the situation 
worse than the year before. 
The substantial improvement in the public 
accounts of most countries of the region resulted 
from an enormous effort to put their finances in 
order. That effort began years ago in some 
countries; in others it is more recent. In the early 
group, which includes Bolivia, Colombia, Chile 
and Mexico, fiscal management continued to 
follow the same policies as in previous years, 
which had provided a certain control over public 
finances. All these countries had better financial 
results in 1991 than in 1990, enabling them to 
consolidate the trends of recent years. Chile 
maintained a surplus in the non-financial public 
sector, thanks to a considerable rise in revenue, 
making it possible to significantly increase social 
expenditures without reducing the fiscal surplus. 
Mexico made remarkable progress in its public 
accounts, which went from a negative to a large 
positive balance. The main contributing factor 
was non-recurrent income from the privatization 
of State-owned enterprises, but even without that 
income, the deficit would have been virtually 
eliminated. In Bolivia, the deficit of its 
non-financial public sector was reduced, owing 
to a sizeable expansion of income with only a 
moderate rise in spending. Colombia's relatively 
small non-financial public-sector deficit was 
wiped out, thanks to a slight increase in income 
that was larger than the increase in spending. El 
Salvador has also been adjusting public spending 
since 1988. Even though the government deficit 
rose in 1991, the fiscal situation remained 
relatively stable, since expenditures rose, owing 
to a change in accounting procedures, which 
transferred the debt of public enterprises to 
government accounts starting in 1991, and an 
expansion of investment, financed mostly by 
external resources. 
Most of the countries, however, only recently 
(1989-1990) began to implement strong fiscal 
adjustment programmes to reduce government 
deficits, which had grown worse in previous 
years. The most sweeping programmes were 
undoubtedly those of Argentina, Nicaragua and 
Peru, since all these economies were practically 
on the threshold of hyperinflation, and 
public-sector financing had plummeted. All three 
countries attempted to increase tax receipts, since 
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they could not contract expenditure by much: 
high inflation rates and previous attempts to cut 
spending for the sake of stabilization had left real 
expenditure levels extremely low. Results were 
spectacular: inflation was brought under control 
and public financing was re-established. 
However, the fiscal situation of all three countries 
is still in transition, although for different 
reasons. Almost half the reduction of Argentina's 
deficit was made possible by non-recurrent income 
from privatizations. Further advances will depend 
on whether a new tax structure can be consolidated 
on a more permanent basis; important steps have 
been taken in that direction. Peru almost balanced 
its budget by raising tax receipts, but these 
remained too low to increase spending enough to 
make the public sector, which had deteriorated 
markedly in recent years, function once again. 
Nicaragua narrowed its deficit considerably by 
placing severe constraints on spending, in an 
extensive institutional restructuring. 
Other countries, such as Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic 
and Uruguay, saw their fiscal imbalances and 
inflation worsen, but theirs was not the explosive 
situation of the three countries mentioned above. 
All these countries narrowed their deficit in 1991, 
the first three by increasing income and 
simultaneously reducing expenditures. Uruguay 
augmented both income and expenditures, but 
the latter at a much lower rate. In the Dominican 
Republic, on the contrary, the contraction of 
spending was greater than that of income. 
Panama, having normalized its economy, was 
able to expand capital expenditures and still 
convert its fiscal deficit into a surplus. 
Venezuela, on the other hand, reversed to a 
certain extent its adjustment policy of previous 
The fiscal adjustment measures taken by some 
countries allowed them to cover all public 
expenditures in 1991, including interest 
payments on the external and domestic debt, 
which had been a large part of fiscal imbalance 
in previous years. In other countries, however, 
fiscal adjustments only allowed for covering 
basic expenditures (which do not include interest 
payments on the debt); therefore, the debt burden 
continues to be one of the main structural causes 
years. The healthy surplus earned from oil 
exports during the Gulf crisis mitigated the 
harsher effects of adjustment measures. 
Therefore, spending was raised considerably to 
carry out the petroleum industry expansion 
programme, to continue investments in 
infrastructure and upgrade social programmes for 
low-income sectors. Even so, non-recurrent 
income from the privatization of public 
enterprises (close to 4% of GDP) amounted to 
enough to close the year with a positive financial 
balance. Paraguay also made its adjustment 
policies more flexible and increased government 
spending in a framework of virtually stagnant 
revenues, which reduced the surplus, Ecuador 
had difficulty in continuing its adjustment 
programme, raising spending while resources 
declined because of a drop in income from the 
petroleum sector. 
Brazil was once again unable to stabilize its 
economy when inflation rose sharply during a 
deep recession. That situation especially affected 
fiscal revenue, which contracted severely in real 
terms. However, spending was cut by a similar 
amount, although a large part of the cuts were 
suspended interest payments on federal bonds, 
which were largely frozen during the year. That 
led to a temporary slack in the public sector's 
financial needs. But in August, when the first of 
12 monthly installments was made to release the 
resources -equivalent to 6% of GDP- previously 
frozen by the first Collor Plan, the Government 
had to raise interest rates considerably, even in 
real terms, to attract those resources. Therefore, 
spending to meet interest payments and financial 
needs once again came together in an upward 
spiral. 
of the persistence of fiscal disequilibria. Finally, 
a third group of countries had already 
restructured public finances in order to service 
public debt, and hence fiscal revenues were 
sufficient to cover all outlays. 
The first group of countries is comprised of 
Costa Rica, which balanced its non-financial 
public accounts in 1991 ; Guatemala and Panama, 
which also balanced their central government 
accounts; Mexico, which in 1991 also converted 
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its overall deficit into a surplus and covered all 
government outlays; and Uruguay, whose 
non-financial public sector has covered all its 
expenditures since 1990, but where the 
quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank persists, 
in order to cover interest on the external debt. 
The members of the second group of countries 
are Argentina, where the revenues of the national 
non-financial public sector (including income 
from privatizations) was only enough to cover 
basic expenditures in 1991; Honduras, where the 
central government accounts were also able to 
cover only basic expenditures; Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua, whose revenues 
still did not cover even basic expenditures; 
Ecuador, which only in 1990 was able to cover 
all the expenditures of the non-financial public 
sector, but which ran another deficit in 1991; and 
Peru, which also in 1991 easily covered its scant 
basic outlays. In recent years, Brazil has been 
covering the expenditures of the non-financial 
Fiscal revenues rose in 16 countries of Latin 
America during 1991, and declined in only three 
(Brazil, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic). 
The overall rise in fiscal revenues was due to 
higher tax receipts and greater profits by 
government enterprises, and, in some cases, to 
non-recurrent income from privatizations. On the 
other hand, export earnings, especially from 
petroleum and metals, had no major impact in 
1991, owing to the drop in their international 
prices. However, certain countries that were 
affected by this adverse situation, like Chile and 
Mexico, were easily able to com pensate for lower 
export earnings by expanding tax receipts from 
other sources (see tables VI-2 and VI-3). 
a) General upswing in tax receipts 
Tax receipts rose in general, owing to a 
number of factors, such as the slow-down in 
inflation, expansion of economic activity and 
imports, tax reforms, more efficient tax 
collection and the climate of confidence that has 
spread to several countries in the region. The 
decline in tax receipts in some countries was also 
caused by different factors, as the rise of inflation 
and the deep economic crisis in Brazil, the 
public sector, but also in this case, interest 
payments were of the same magnitude as the 
fiscal imbalance (see figure VI-2). 
In the third group of countries, Colombia had 
gradually been able to amass enough revenue to 
cover the basic expenditures of its non-financial 
public sector and part of its interest payments; in 
1991 the country was able to make all interest 
payments. Chile has had a surplus in the 
non-financial public sector and has serviced the 
debt on a regular basis since 1986. Paraguay has 
maintained a variable surplus in recent years, 
after covering both basic expenditures and 
interest payments. By 1989, the Dominican 
Republic was covering all the outlays of the 
central government. Venezuela, which had been 
unable to cover the basic expenditures of the 
non-financial public sector in 1987-1988, has 
been doing so comfortably since 1989, and even 
achieved a surplus in 1991 (see figure VI-2). 
economic recession in the Dominican Republic 
and lower oil earnings in Ecuador. 
Despite some progress, the effects of the 
1980s crisis continued to affect tax collection in 
1991. It is still too early for negative factors such 
as rising tax evasion resulting from a loss of 
administrative efficiency in collection agencies, 
capital flight and the noteworthy growth of the 
informal sector in many economies to have been 
corrected. That is especially true in Peru, where 
tax receipts continue to be much lower than in the 
past. In Argentina, despite the recovery in 1991, 
the ratio of tax receipts to GDP remained below 
the level of the late 1970s. In Brazil, after a 
temporary recovery in 1990, the tax burden 
represented approximately 20%, between two 
and four percentage points lower than those 
recorded during the previous decade (see table 
VI-2). 
Formerly high inflation rates nosedived in 
1991 in several countries of the region, leading 
to a significant increase in tax revenues. Receipts 
had declined in almost all the countries because 
of spiralling inflation, owing to the time lag 
between the time when the tax obligation was 
generated and the time when the State actually 
collected (the "Olivera-Tanzi effect"). A 
4. Trends in fiscal revenues 
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slow-down in inflation produced the opposite 
effect, since tax obligations lost less of their value 
by the time they were paid. The effect was more 
pronounced in countries with no tradition of 
inflation (like Nicaragua and Peru); huge price 
rises had severely limited their fiscal revenues 
because there were no mechanisms for indexing 
amounts to be taxed or sums entitled to be 
collected under the various types of taxes. On the 
other hand, in countries accustomed to inflation 
(like Argentina or Uruguay), which do have 
mechanisms to limit inflation-led losses of fiscal 
revenues, there was less of an effect, since the 
decline in receipts was not very large, except 
during relatively brief periods when prices were 
soaring. Lower inflation rates had the same effect 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Mexico, although it was much less pronounced 
than in the aforementioned cases, since their 
inflation rates were considerably more moderate. 
The reactivation of the economy also helped 
raise tax receipts by broadening the tax base in 
most of the countries of the region, owing to the 
high elasticity generally shown by tax receipts 
when GDP rises. The notable increase in imports 
in most countries was also a tremendous help in 
expanding tax receipts, since imports are subject 
to high taxes, import duties and specific levies, 
value-added tax (VAT) and other similar taxes on 
products once they are in the country. This was 
especially true in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, where 
the level of activity rose by between 4% and 9%, 
imports increased rapidly and tax revenues grew 
at a considerably higher rate than GDP. Tax 
receipts also increased in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, but owing to a 
greater extent to the sharp rise in the value of 
imports than to the growth of GDP, which was 
only moderate (see figure VI-4). 
Tax reforms also contributed somewhat to 
raising fiscal receipts. Extensive reforms were 
carried out in eight countries of the region 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay), consisting 
of raising tax rates, broadening the tax base and 
adjusting collection mechanisms. The purpose of 
the reform in practically all these countries was 
to correct severe disequilibria in public finances. 
Chile was an exception to that rule, since it had 
balanced its accounts several years earlier. The 
objective of the reform carried out by the 
Government that came to power in 1990 was to 
increase revenues in order to finance a 
considerable expansion of social expenditures 
and thereby contribute to greater social equity. 
Several countries also im proved the efficiency 
of their collection agencies and gave more 
confidence to taxpayers, which definitely helped 
expand tax receipts. That was the case especially 
in Argentina, Colombia and El Salvador, where 
tax revenues displayed high elasticity in relation 
to variations in GDP (more than 2.5%), which 
would indicate that factors such as greater 
efficiency in collection systems and higher 
credibility made significant contributions to 
expanding tax receipts. Such was also the case in 
Nicaragua, probably even more intensely than in 
the countries just mentioned, since receipts grew 
considerably despite the fact that GDP declined, 
although imports did rise spectacularly. 
In some countries of the region (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama), tax receipts 
grew from 10% to slightly more than 20%. In 
Venezuela, moreover, non-petroleum tax 
receipts increased by more than 20%. Tax 
revenues grew by more than 20% in real terms in 
Argentina, owing to the combined effect of the 
factors mentioned above. The economy 
reactivated significantly, imports expanded 
spectacularly and the inflation rate dropped 
sharply, while sweeping tax reforms were 
introduced and collection agencies became more 
efficient. Economic agents also showed more 
confidence in the future of the economy, based 
on the favourable results of 1991. Collection 
agencies tightened their procedures, which seems 
to be quickly changing people's attitudes about 
paying their taxes. That new attitude, higher VAT 
receipts and payments into the social security 
system amply compensated for the decline in 
resources from duties on foreign trade and 
specific taxes, such as fuel taxes, whose rates 
were reduced (see table VI-4). 
Tax receipts of the non-financial public sector 
increased by 19% in real terms in Bolivia, owing 
not only to the rise in the level of activity and the 
considerable increase in imports, but also to the 
enhancement of administrative efficiency. 
People also began to have more confidence in the 
economy because of faster growth, more 
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investment and greater macroeconomic control. 
The rise in government income in Colombia was 
due to the satisfactory level of income-tax and 
VAT receipts, thanks mainly to the Government's 
efforts to improve collection systems and curb 
evasion. The tax base was also broadened, along 
with that of the VAT, which rose from 10% to 
12%. The increase in income-tax and VAT 
receipts more than offset the decline in income 
from import duties, which fell because of trade 
liberalization. The significant rise in tax receipts 
in Chile, despite lower copper earnings, can be 
attributed to high growth, more efficient tax 
administration and the tax reform carried out in 
mid-1990 to finance social expenditures, which 
generated additional revenues equivalent to 9% 
of tax receipts in 1990. 
The increase in fiscal revenue in El Salvador 
(by 10%, for the second year in a row) came 
mainly from economic growth, reduced inflation 
and greater confidence in the country's peace 
process. Several laws were also promulgated in 
1991 that modified taxes on transactions 
(agricultural exemptions were eliminated and the 
tax base for imported products was broadened), 
extended the tax base on net worth and simplified 
income taxes. The authorities also adopted 
several administrative measures to reduce tax 
evasion and facilitate the payment of delinquent 
taxes. Despite administrative problems that 
hindered the application of those reforms, 
income-tax receipts rose considerably. In 
Guatemala, tax revenue, especially direct taxes, 
rose by 11 % in real terms, owing to the combined 
effect of a slow-down in inflation and greater 
compliance with tax obligations. An important 
role was also played by the "compensation fund" 
provided by the differential between the 
international and domestic prices of petroleum 
and its by-products (approximately 12% of the 
Government's aggregate income). Tax revenue 
in Nicaragua grew by more than 11% in real 
terms, thanks to successful stabilization and 
taxpayer confidence in the major changes being 
made in economic policy. Tax reforms adopted 
in 1990, lower duties on foreign trade and 
administrative improvements also contributed 
considerably to tax receipts, by discouraging 
evasion and contraband. Panama's government 
income rose spectacularly because of a sustained 
recovery after the international blockade was 
ended. The Government also improved its tax 
administration and received more non-tax 
resources, owing to the fact that several activities 
which had suffered the effects of the political 
crisis in previous years returned to normal (see 
table VI-4). 
Current income of the non-financial public 
sector in Venezuela was affected when petroleum 
revenues dropped along with international 
hydrocarbon prices at the end of the Gulf war. 
The contraction was not very significant; it was 
partially offset by increasing the volume of 
petroleum exported, by virtue of the reallocation 
of production quotas by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to 
compensate for the paralysation of exports from 
Iraq and Kuwait. Non-petroleum earnings, on the 
contrary, rose very nicely (29%), especially 
income from customs duties, since imports 
increased sufficiently to overcome the negative 
impact of lower tariff rates. Nevertheless, despite 
its magnitude, that expansion was not able to 
offset the reduction of petroleum earnings, since 
non-petroleum income provides less than 25% of 
the revenue of the non-financial public sector. 
Tax receipts rose more moderately in another 
group of countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay). In Costa 
Rica, tax revenues rose because of higher taxes 
on banana exports, an increase in the sales tax 
from 10% to 13% (in late 1990) and the addition 
of new products liable to sales tax, among others, 
gasoline. Higher surcharges on imports collected 
by the Central Bank also helped reduce the losses 
of that institution and the fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
deficit of the public sector. In Haiti, despite the 
recession and political crisis, tax revenues rose 
by almost 3% in real terms, partly because of a 
marked reduction of inflation in 1991. In 
Ecuador, declining petroleum income led to 
lower public sector receipts, despite the fact that 
non-petroleum tax revenues increased by 7%, 
especially due to the rise in the level of economic 
activity and a notable increase in imports. 
Mexico's current revenues, with the exception 
of petroleum income, rose by more than 6%, 
owing to an expansion of the economy, 
particularly imports, which led to an increase in 
direct and indirect taxes. The gradual 
consolidation of tax reforms also contributed to 
that increase, especially the broader tax base. 
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Direct taxes also rose by 6% in real terms, despite 
a lower maximum income tax rate and the 
exemption of up to 40% for individuals whose 
income was below four times the minimum wage 
(see table VI-4). 
Tax receipts in Peru increased by 6%, thanks 
to a lower inflation rate and measures taken to 
raise taxes. A tax package was put into effect in 
June 1991, including non-recurrent levies on net 
personal worth and on shares of stock; the 
extension of a selective consumption tax on bank 
operations dealing with capital gains, bills of 
exchange and promissory notes; a rise in the VAT 
from 14% to 16% and the elimination of 
exemptions for goods and services, and a rise in 
the special tax on water supply services. The 
measures, however, had limited effects, given the 
persistence of macroeconomic instability and the 
recession, as well as the inefficiency of collection 
agencies. Tax revenues rose by 6% in Uruguay, 
especially because of the tax reform carried out 
in 1990, which raised several types of taxes, in 
order to eliminate the large deficit in central 
government accounts. Above all, the reform was 
reflected in higher VAT receipts; this tax had been 
raised to 22% during the second half of 1990. The 
reason receipts did not rise even more was the 
negative effect of factors such as lower tariffs and 
a drop in the real exchange rate, which reduced 
the tax base in national currency and was not 
counterbalanced by the higher dollar value of 
imports. 
Tax revenues declined in 1991 in Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic and Paraguay. In Brazil, 
revenue contracted mostly because the special 
taxes established by the first Collor Plan in March 
1990 (taxes on financial assets) were suspended. 
Also, an upsurge in inflation (with monthly rates 
above 20% by the end of the year) led to a 
contraction of receipts, in view of the lag in the 
actual payment of taxes. Likewise, the severe 
economic crisis reduced the tax base, owing to 
the poor performance of enterprises, which led to 
more evasion (see table VI-4). 
Tax receipts declined by almost 4% in real 
terms in Paraguay because of lower indirect tax 
receipts, partially due to a slow-down in 
economic activity. Receipts remained low in the 
Dominican Republic, owing to the deep 
recession that has affected the country since the 
adjustment programme was put into effect. 
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Controls were strengthened in response to that 
situation, in order to raise income-tax receipts, 
and changes were made in the methods of 
calculating levies on foreign trade, producing 
much higher receipts. 
b) Income from public enterprises 
Rate adjustments for public services 
significantly raised public sector revenues, 
making it possible to reduce the deficit of 
government enterprises and even, in some cases, 
generate a surplus that helped finance the central 
government. Public rates were adjusted 
drastically in Argentina in early 1991, when the 
fiscal situation was difficult. The result was that 
government enterprises were able to make some 
contribution to an expansion of current 
public-sector income, but not as much as taxes 
did. In Bolivia, transfers from the Bolivian Oil 
Company (YPFB) grew by more than 16% in real 
terms because of the rise in January in the 
domestic prices of hydrocarbons and petroleum 
products; that was responsible for more than half 
of the increase in fiscal revenues (see table VI-2). 
In Brazil, the rates and prices charged by public 
enterprises rose sharply, offsetting to some extent 
the effect of the collapse of the tax collection 
system on the aggregate income of the public 
sector. In Costa Rica, most of the increase in 
public sector income came from a rate 
adjustment. In Honduras, rate adjustments made 
by decentralized agencies, especially the 
National Electric Power Com pany (ENEE) and the 
Honduran Telecommunications Company 
(HONDUTEL) made it possible to reverse the 
direction of financial transfers, with the 
enterprises contributing to the central 
government instead of vice versa. In Nicaragua, 
the change in rates for public services provided 
by government enterprises improved the 
Government's financial position, which showed 
serious imbalances. Public enterprises in Peru 
practically balanced their budgets, thanks to an 
ongoing readjustment of their rates (between 7% 
and 12% monthly). Public rates rose in the 
Dominican Republic, which reduced implicit 
subsidies, particularly in the price of energy, 
which had been established in response to higher 
petroleum prices on the world market. Given the 
deterioration of public-sector current income in 
Venezuela, incremental price hikes for gasoline 
and petroleum products were reintroduced after 
having been suspended because of the rise in 
petroleum income during the Gulf crisis. Rates 
and prices for other goods and services produced 
by public enterprises continued to be adjusted. 
c) Capital earnings and income from the sale 
of public assets 
A new element of public finances in 1991 was 
the huge sums obtained from the sale of 
enterprises and other public assets in certain 
countries of the region. Privatization had been 
only sporadic and of limited scope in the past. 
Previously, the sole example of widespread 
privatization was that of Chile throughout the 
1980s, a process which ended with the arrival of 
the new Government in 1990. In the last few 
years, several countries, including some of the 
largest ones in the region, launched extensive 
privatization programmes. Those programmes 
provided an important source of income for the 
public sector, capable of financing for a limited 
time appreciable resources and generating a 
climate of favourable opinion among some 
economic agents. Privatizations, in practice, 
replaced financing by selling securities. 
Income from privatization was extraordinarily 
high in 1991 in three countries (Mexico, 
Venezuela and Argentina), which helped finance 
the public sector and even produce a surplus in 
fiscal accounts. Such was the case in Mexico, 
where income from the sale of enterprises to the 
private sector -among them, two important 
commercial banks that had previously been 
nationalized- represented more than 3% of GDP. 
Non-revenues significantly increased the surplus 
of the consolidated public sector and contributed 
greatly to reducing domestic debt. During 1991, 
Venezuela sold government-held stock to private 
investors and transferred administrative control 
of the national telecommunications enterprise, 
the international flagship airline (VIASA), two 
commercial banks, a shipyard and a sugar mill. 
These operations contributed non-recurrent 
income to the national treasury, equivalent to 4% 
of GDP. Privatization was also one of the tools 
used to restructure the productive public sector, 
since advances were made in rationalizing several 
State agencies and the operational administration of 
the ports began to be transferred to State port 
authorities. Revenues from privatizations in 
Argentina in 1991, mainly from the transfer of 
petroleum areas and advances on the sale of 
telephone company stock, attained a considerable 
volume, more than 1.5% of GDP (see table VI-2). 
Brazil also began a privatization process by 
selling four public enterprises for around US$2 
billion. However, that was not an important 
factor in financing the public sector in 1991, since 
the process only began in September and the total 
payment was made through public debt 
conversion. Privatization is still just beginning in 
other countries; only the legal framework has 
been approved and the enterprises to be sold 
identified; sales already made to the private 
sector have been negligible. This is the case in 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay. 
5. Trends in public expenditure 
In 1991, public expenditures rose in real terms 
in 10 of the countries for which information is 
available and declined in nine others. The 
largest increases in aggregate spending took 
place in El Salvador, Panama and Paraguay, 
with variations between 12% and 34%. They 
also rose significantly in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela, with 
increments of between 6% and 10%. In 
Colombia, on the contrary, aggregate 
non-financial public sector outlays expanded 
slightly. They nosedived in Brazil and 
Nicaragua, contracting by 29% and 39%, 
respectively. There were also sizeable declines 
in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico and Peru, and a moderate 
one in Costa Rica (see table VI-5). 
In almost all 19 countries for which up-to-date information on public finances is available, data on expenditures referred to 
the central government (and generally included transfers to local governments, although not their total expenditures). However, 
information about the non-financial public sector is available for only a subgroup of countries. 
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Distinct components of expenditures evolved 
unevenly. In some countries, both current and 
capital expenditures had the same sign but 
different rates, whereas in others they had 
opposite signs. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador and Paraguay were among the countries 
in which aggregate spending rose, with both 
current and capital expenditures rising. In three 
other countries (Ecuador, Panama and 
Venezuela), only capital expenditures increased 
or remained virtually stable. The rise in 
non-financial public sector expenditure in 
Argentina can be attributed exclusively to current 
expenditures, since capital expenditures dropped 
considerably (-7%). In Uruguay, the expansion 
of central government spending was also a result 
of current expenditures, since capital 
expenditures dropped significantly (-8%), 
although real public investment by the public 
sector as a whole soared (23%). In all the 
countries where aggregate spending declined 
-with the exception of Nicaragua, which greatly 
expanded investment- both current and capital 
expenditures fell. 
Current expenditures rose in only seven 
countries and fell in 12. The biggest increases 
(between 8% and 16%) were recorded in 
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, while the largest declines (between 
10% and 40%) occurred in Brazil, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. The 
various components of current expenditure also 
evolved differently, although most contracted, 
reflecting widespread adjustment policies. In 
turn, increases in current expenditures in almost 
all cases responded to a slackening of budget 
constraints, allowing for greater spending in 
areas that had previously been severely affected 
by contractionary measures. The exception was 
Uruguay, a country in which spending rose on the 
basis of higher transfers from the central 
government to social security to cover the 
automatic indexing of retirement payments and 
pensions established by the constitutional 
reform. 
Interest on both the external and domestic debt 
declined, for different reasons. In the case of the 
external debt, international interest rates fell, and 
in some cases the debt itself was reduced, mainly 
under Brady-style agreements. Interest payments 
on domestic debt declined in some countries 
because nominal interest rates fell, generally 
owing to lower inflation, although the reduction 
was notably smaller in real terms. Still, 
reductions in the nominal amount of interest 
payments helped improve public finances, since 
even though the amount corresponded to the 
monetary correction component of the debt 
principal, which had deteriorated because of 
inflation and which therefore had to be accounted 
for as a capital outlay, it also represented a 
significant contraction of short-term obligations, 
which created a good deal of instability because 
of their magnitude. That was precisely what 
happened in Mexico, and it is what explains the 
change of sign recorded in total public 
expenditure (see table VI-5). 
Consumer spending plummeted in several 
countries of the region, generally because wages 
were not adjusted to price hikes. The most 
dramatic cases were Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru. 
In those countries, wages were not adjusted 
frequently enough to keep up with monthly 
inflation rates, which brought down the real level 
of wages significantly. A similar situation was 
produced in Argentina in the first months of the 
year, as a result of an upsurge of inflation. The 
decline eased in subsequent months, although it 
did not cease, since prices continued to rise, albeit 
more moderately. The same took place in other 
countries, but to a lesser extent, and hence the 
inflation rate was much lower. Such was the case 
in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Uruguay. In Chile, on 
the other hand, consumer spending rose, 
basically because of an increase in social 
expenditures, making that country one of the 
exceptions in the region. Paraguay was the other 
exception, since adjustments of nominal wages 
substantially raised wages in real terms, given the 
sharp drop in inflation. 
Unlike what happened during the 1980s, 
capital expenditures in 1991 were less affected 
by adjustment policies than current expenditures, 
and they even expanded in some countries. This 
happened in Panama, which returned to its 1987 
levels, i.e., before the outbreak of the political 
crisis. Capital expenditures also rose by more 
than 20% in Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. In several of those 
countries, the recovery was due to the availability 
of external financing, while in Venezuela it was 
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linked to the expansion of petroleum activity and 
was financed mainly by surpluses obtained 
during the Gulf crisis (see table VI-5). 
Argentina was among the countries that 
increased public sector spending; aggregate 
outlays expanded by slightly more than 9% in 
real terms. Although government employment 
declined, current expenditures of the national 
non-financial public sector -which had been 
severely constrained in recent years- rose by 
more than 11%, especially because of the 
increase in transfers to the provinces and in 
outlays in the form of pensions. Capital 
expenditures continued to fall (-7%), adding to a 
sharp decline during the two previous years, 
bringing the 1991 level down to 60% below that 
of 1988. Investment fell because of serious 
problems in public financing, but also, more 
recently, because of advances in privatization. 
Expenditures rose in Bolivia, thanks to a 
generous increase in capital expenditures. 
Current expenditures also expanded, as a result 
of rising interest payments on the domestic debt 
and the considerable increment in transfers and 
contributions to social security (see table VI-5). 
Aggregate spending of the non-financial public 
sector in Chile increased by 10% in real terms, with 
current expenditures rising by 12%. Outlays in local 
currency from the Treasury increased by 5%, a 
figure which includes increments in social 
spending. In fact, fiscal contributions to the 
ministries in the social area represented real 
increases that exceeded those that could have 
been financed solely by the results of the tax 
reform. Expenditures denominated in foreign 
currency rose by 20%, owing to an increase in 
servicing the public sector's external debt, 
mainly for the payments and pre-payments it had 
to make to the Central Bank. In Colombia, 
expenditures of the non-financial public sector 
rose moderately, but those of the central 
government increased by 8% in real terms, as a 
result of considerable investment spending. The 
non-financial public sector rose by close to 6% in 
Ecuador, thanks to a vigorous expansion of 
investment, which increased by 30%. Investment 
recovered well from the decline of the previous 
year, as a result of the increase in petroleum 
revenues recorded in the second half of 1990 and 
early 1991. Current expenditure continued to 
decline at the same rate as it had since 1987. 
Expenditures rose noticeably in El Salvador, 
especially because of higher interest payments 
and an upsurge in public investment. Interest 
payments rose in part because of a transfer made 
to the Central Reserve Bank to consolidate the 
public domestic debt. Within the category of 
capital expenditures, transfers and loans more 
than doubled, owing to payments made to the 
electric company to deal with the country's 
energy problems during the year. Meanwhile, 
real investment completely recovered from its 
collapse of the year before, after having been 
concentrated in telecommunications and water 
and sewerage, although the transport and energy 
sectors also benefited from investments. 
Expenditures increased considerably in Panama, 
by virtue of a huge expansion of capital 
expenditures, which almost doubled. This growth 
was made possible by a financial contribution 
from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) of some US$220 million, 
which allowed for a substantial increase in capital 
transfers, while real investment also soared 
(142%), reaching its 1987 levels. Current 
expenditures, conversely, declined (-14%), 
owing to a large reduction in operating costs. 
Wages increased despite the reduction in public 
employment, owing to raises given to upper-level 
employees (see table VI-5). 
Current expenditures in Paraguay increased as 
a result of wage hikes and bonuses in the public 
sector and a rise in transfers made to the private 
sector. Capital expenditures also rose, although 
they remained at low levels. In Uruguay, after 
two years of decline in real expenditures, 
spending recovered its 1989 share of GDP (19%). 
The rise in central government spending (7%) 
was based on higher purchases of goods and 
non-personal services, and on greater transfers to 
the social security system. Other expenditures 
declined again, particularly wages -for the third 
consecutive year-, interest payments on the 
public debt and another drop in investment by the 
central administration, which accumulated a real 
decline of 20% over the last two years. Aggregate 
public investment, on the other hand, rose 
significantly, thanks to an increase in capital 
expenditures by State enterprises, especially for 
the installation of a new thermoelectric plant. 
Aggregate spending increased considerably 
(9%) in Venezuela, although its ratio to GDP 
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remained the same. Despite a large increase in 
outlays for transfers and social subsidies, current 
public expenditures declined from 20.8% to 
19.3% of GDP. An important factor in that decline 
was the drop in the relative weight of interest 
payments on the domestic and external debt. 
There was also a notable decline in indirect 
subsidies implicit in preferential exchange rates 
given to the private sector to make certain 
payments. The decline in current expenditures 
was offset by a comparable increase in capital 
expenditures. This expansion was due to a rapid 
growth of capital formation and a large increase 
in investments in the petroleum industry. On the 
other hand, capital formation in non-petroleum 
public enterprises declined in real terms by more 
than 30%, owing to the privatization and 
restructuring processes initiated in several of 
them. 
Spending plummeted in Brazil. Wages 
contracted significantly; they were no longer 
adjusted monthly, whereas inflation accelerated. 
In order to control spending, the Federal 
Government froze the investment and current 
expenditure items of the fiscal budget and social 
security, and postponed payments. The objective 
was to limit spending to the amount of cash 
available. Government enterprises were also 
placed on a stricter austerity programme, 
consisting of a freeze on new contracts and a 
reduction of 10% in current expenditures (see 
table VI-5). 
Expenditures in Costa Rica fell by more than 
3% in real terms, which was less than what was 
programmed. One of the major impediments to 
controlling the level of spending was the large 
increase in interest payments on the domestic 
debt (76%) by the central government, owing to 
greater indebtedness and higher interest rates. In 
fact, interest payments on the domestic debt rose 
from 13% of total central government 
expenditures in 1990 to 23% in 1991. Consumer 
spending, however, fell by almost 6%, mainly 
because wages were not readjusted. Public 
investment was the component most affected by 
the adjustment programme, contracting by 17%. 
Current expenditures in Guatemala fell by 13% 
in real terms, owing to a drop in consumer 
spending and a lower level of transfers. Public 
investment, on the other hand, increased on the 
basis of investments by autonomous agencies and 
enterprises, since central government investment 
declined. Aggregate spending fell by 8% in Haiti, 
with capital expenditures declining more than the 
rest. The emergency situation facing the country 
was one of the major causes for the decline. The 
crisis deepened when the constitutional 
Government fell in late September, after only 
eight months in office. Real current expenditures 
contracted in Honduras, despite a rise in interest 
payments. Financial transfers from the central 
government to the rest of the public sector and 
government capital expenditures also declined. 
However, real investment by the public sector 
rose considerably in real terms, financed 
exclusively by external resources. 
The decline in spending by the federal 
Government in Mexico was due to a drop in 
interest payments, which fell by 40% in real 
terms. However, some of those outlays were 
really amortizations of the domestic debt, once 
the principal was adjusted for inflation. Capital 
expenditures also declined significantly as a 
result of privatization, since investments made by 
the enterprises that were sold were no longer 
counted as public expenditures. Consumer 
spending and transfers from the federal 
Government, however, rose by close to 20% in 
real terms. 
Nicaragua was another country where 
aggregate government spending -almost 
exclusively current expenditures- fell sharply. 
This was the result of a reduction in personnel 
who entered a job- retraining programme. 
Central government purchases and current 
transfers also contracted, affecting the quality of 
services provided, especially health care and 
education. The real level of central government 
outlays fell by 11% in Peru, in the context of a 
policy to reduce public spending. Wages fell by 
0.6% of GDP and domestic debt servicing 
declined, although capital expenditures 
increased by 16%. Real investment by the 
public sector, in turn, which represented 1.8% 
of GDP, remained at the same level as that of 
the previous year. Aggregate spending in the 
Dominican Republic declined by 8%, although 
current expenditures fell by less than that. 
Some items were especially controlled in order 
to avoid significant rises -in nominal terms- in 
such outlays as wages and payments for goods 
and services. But the strictest control over 
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spending was still on government fixed 
investment, which in 1991 was kept to 60%, in 
real terms, of the 1989 level. Among the expenses 
that expanded the most were interest payments 
Since the fiscal deficit shrank in most of the 
countries of the region, it was easier to finance 
than it had been for several years. Throughout the 
1980s, imbalances in public accounts and the 
sharp drop in external financing created serious 
obstacles to the management of monetary and 
fiscal policies, since several governments in the 
region had to issue currency in order to cover 
their deficits. Important changes in the 
magnitude of public sector domestic financing 
took place in 1991. Domestic financing was 
negative in eight of the 16 countries of the region 
for which information was available. In four 
others it declined in relation to the previous year, 
and only in four was it higher than in 1990. 
External financing increased in nine countries, 
although they are all among those with the 
smallest economies in the region. The Central 
American countries received the most external 
financing, especially Nicaragua, Honduras and 
El Salvador. However, the flow of external credit 
to meet the needs of the public sector generally 
remained at the same low level as in previous 
years, and in some cases net outflows were 
recorded, since amortizations outpaced loans 
received from abroad. On the other hand, less 
need for external financing meant less credit from 
central banks to governments, a flow which had 
been the main -and at times the only- source of 
domestic financing for governments in the region 
during the 1980s. Resources from the sales of 
public debt securities or income from other forms 
of indebtedness with the private sector were 
scarce in most of the countries, except for a few 
that had more highly developed capital markets 
or financial systems. 
Brazil ran one of the highest deficits, owing to 
the magnitude of its financial needs. The flow of 
external resources was negative, since 
amortizations by the non-financial public sector 
exceeded new credits by almost 1% of GDP. 
Domestic financing climbed to 28% of GDP, but 
once the monetary correction implicit in the 
interest rates was discounted, the real flow turned 
on the external and domestic debt, owing to a 
rescheduling of the latter, and transfers to the 
Dominican Electricity Corporation for fuel 
purchases (see table VI-5). 
out to be close to 1 % of GDP, since the major part 
of the interest payments was amortization of the 
principal, given the high inflation in the Brazilian 
economy (see table VI-6). Argentina's external 
financing was also negative, although only 
slightly so, while its domestic financial needs 
were slightly above 2% of GDP, which, in any 
case, was an improvement over previous years, 
especially the period 1988-1989, when it was 
more than 6%. 
A number of countries with deficits on their 
fiscal accounts in 1990 received external 
financing. The Government of Nicaragua 
received decisive support from the United States 
after the new authorities came to power in April 
1990. The amount of external resources received 
by the central Government represented more than 
9% of GDP, whereas the year before it had been 
only 2%. In any case, that figure was high in 
comparison with income from other external 
sources received by most Latin American 
governments. Because of that flow, the domestic 
financing needs of the public sector were 
negative (by almost 3% of GDP), which helped 
reduce the monetary base and became an 
important factor in bringing down inflation (see 
table VI-6). Honduras also received a flow of 
resources from abroad for a sum equivalent to 
more than 6% of GDP, which, although large, was 
somewhat lower than the year before. Those 
resources were used to support an adjustment 
programme begun in 1990, since they made it 
possible for the Government to reduce its debt to 
the Central Bank by an amount equivalent to 
more than 3% of GDP, which was an important 
element in the contraction of the monetary base. 
El Salvador once again received external 
resources for almost 4% of GDP, since the war 
continued throughout the year, despite progress 
in the peace negotiations. However, domestic 
resources were also needed to overcome the 
deficit. Costa Rica received much less external 
assistance than the other Central American 
countries, but what was received made it possible 
6. Financing of the deficit 
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to reduce the Government's domestic 
indebtedness by more than 1% of GDP, since the 
deficit on fiscal accounts was small. Haiti 
received close to 3% of GDP in external resources 
to finance the Government, which was less than 
in 1990, continuing the downward trend 
observed since 1987, when several sources of 
external financing were cut off. Once non-
voluntary credits corresponding to unpaid 
interests were discounted, Bolivia recorded an 
inflow of voluntary external resources for the 
non-financial public sector equivalent to more 
than 1% of GDP, thus consolidating its return to 
voluntary financing in 1990, after an external 
debt moratorium in the mid-1980s. The 
non-financial public sector of Ecuador had a net 
inflow of external resources in an amount of close 
to 1% of GDP, which was not enough to close the 
deficit. The central government of Paraguay 
recorded a small deficit, but the net inflow of 
external resources, though less than 1% of GDP, 
made it possible to achieve negative domestic 
financing. 
Among the countries with a surplus in their 
fiscal accounts, the non-financial public sector of 
Chile acquired external financial resources for 
almost 1% of GDP, allowing it to transfer to the 
Central Bank more than 2% of GDP, thus helping 
to alleviate the quasi-fiscal deficit. Mexico, in 
turn, had a net outflow of external resources 
equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, but since the fiscal 
accounts showed an even larger surplus, it was 
able to reduce domestic debt by almost a half of 
a point of GDP. External financing of the public 
sector was also negative in Colombia, after 
reaching close to 1% of GDP, making it necessary 
to seek domestic financing to cover that amount, 
since the surplus on non-financial public 
accounts was very small. The Government of 
Venezuela, thanks to a surplus on the fiscal 
accounts and a small inflow of capital, was able 
to reduce its domestic financial needs by almost 
3% of GDP. That would indicate that most of the 
revenues from privatizations were used to reduce 
the domestic debt of the central Government. In 
Uruguay, domestic financing of the central 
Government was negative, representing an 
improvement over the result of the previous year, 
when it was slightly positive. Thus the 
adjustment following the huge financial deficit 
recorded in 1989 was consolidated. 
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Table VI-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT (-) OR SURPLUS 
AT CURRENT PRICES a 
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Key: CG= Central Government, CPS = Consolidated public sector. NFPS= Financial needs of the public sector. NFPS= 
public sector. NNFPS= National non-financial public sector, 
* Calculated on the basis of figures in national 
excluding! 
currency at current prices. 

































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FISCAL INCOME AT CURRENT PRICES a 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Key: CG= Central Government. PEMEX= Mexican National Oil Corporation. 
PVDSA= Venezuelan National Oil Corporation. NFPS= Non-financial public sector. NNFPS= National non-financial public 
sector, excluding provinces and municipalities. TRE& ET= Treasury and excise tax. 
"Calculated on the basis of figures in national currency at current prices. Preliminary figures. c Includes saving of public 
enterprises. Includes income from sales of public enterprises and autonomous agencies. 
income from public enterprises, but not their saving after transfers. 
Includes taxes and operating 
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Table VI-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT 
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public sector, excluding 
c Index 198Ç » = 100. 
' Index 1988 = 100. 
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Table VI-4 

























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: BCG= Budgeted central Government. CG= Central Government. NFPS= Non-financial public sector. 
NNFPS= National non-financial public sector, excluding provinces and municipalities, TRE * ET= Treasury and excise tax. 
a Calculated on the basis of figures in constant 1980 dollars. Preliminary figures. c Index 1989 = 100. Index 
1988 = 100. 
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Table VI-5 
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Table VI-5 (concluded) 
Country Coverage Item 
1988 
Index 1987=100 
1989 1990 1991c 
Percentage of annual variation 
1988 1989 1990 1991c 1987 
Percentage of GDP 






CG Total expenditure 66.6 59.1 54.1 48.0 -33.4 -11.3 -8.5 -11.3 14.7 10.7 10.7 10.3 9.0 
CG Current expenditures 68.8 56.4 56.9 48.4 -31.2 -18.1 0.9 -14.8 12.3 9.3 8.6 9.1 7.6 
CG Capital expenditures 55.1 73.7 39.6 45.8 -44.9 33.7 -46.2 15.7 2.3 1.4 2.1 1.2 1.4 
CG Total expenditure 102.2 84.8 64.3 59.2 2.2 -17.0 -24.2 -8.0 16.8 17.0 13.5 10.8 10.0 
CG Current expenditures 100.2 94.2 77.4 73.9 0.2 -6.0 -17.9 -4.5 7.5 7.5 6.7 5.8 5.6 
CG Capital expenditures 103.8 77.2 53.7 47.3 3.8 -25.7 -30.4 -12.0 9.3 9.5 6.8 5.0 4.4 
NFPS Total expenditure 1026 106.5 ... ... 2.6 3.8 ... ... 30.3 31.2 31.9 
NFPS Currentexpenditures 102.8 105.9 ... ... 2.8 3.0 ... ... 26.3 27.1 27.5 
NFPS Real investment 101.1 110.5 101.3 124.5 1.1 9.3 -8.3 22.9 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.0 4.8 
CG Total expenditure 106.3 109.2 104.4 111.9 6.3 2.7 -4.3 7.2 17.6 18.7 19.0 18.0 19.0 
CG Currentexpenditures 105.6 107.3 104.0 113.3 5.6 1.6 -3.1 8.9 15.7 16.7 16.7 16.0 17.2 
CG Capital expenditures 111.7 124.8 108.1 99.7 11.7 11.7 -13.4 -7.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 
NFPS Total expenditure 107.4 91.3 107.6 117.2 7.4 -15.0 17.8 9.0 32.0 32.5 29.9 33.3 33.3 
NFPS Currentexpenditures 110.3 95.0 112.8 114.1 10.3 -13.9 18.7 1.1 19.0 19.8 18.5 20.8 19.3 
NFPS Capital expenditures 103.1 85.8 99.8 121.7 3.1 -16.8 16.3 22.0 13.0 12.6 11.4 12.6 14.0 
CG Total expenditure 111.5 85.6 111.4 120.1 11.5 -23.2 30.2 7.8 23.1 24.4 20.3 25.0 24.7 
CG Currentexpenditures 111.7 95.0 113.9 114.6 11.7 -14.9 19.9 0.5 17.6 18.5 17.1 19.4 17.9 
CG Capital expenditures 110.7 55.6 103.3 137.4 10.7 -49.7 85.7 32.9 5.6 5.8 3.2 5.6 6.8 
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: CG = Central Government. NFPS = Non-financial public sector. NNFPS 
a Calculated on the basis of figures in constant 1980 dollars, 
costs of public enterprises and autonomous agencies. 
National non-financial public sector, excluding provinces and municipalities. TRE 4 ET = Treasury and excise tax. 
b Calculated on the basis of figures in national currency at current prices. c Preliminary figures. Includes operating 
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Table VI-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING NEEDS 
AT CURRENT PRICES a 
(Percentage of GDP) 
















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: CG= Central Government. cre= Consolidated public sector. FNPS= Financial needs of the public sector. NFPS= Non-financial 
public sector. NNFPS= National non-financial public sector, excluding provinces and municipalities, TRE & ET= Treasury and 
excise tax. 
" Calculated on the basis of figures in 1980 dollars. Preliminary figures. 
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Vn. THE EXl'ERNAL SECTOR 
In 1991 the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies were influenced by events in the 
international economy which had differing 
impacts on their export markets and on the cost 
and volume of external credit. 
The developed market economies' growth 
rates continued to slacken. The recession into 
which Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States had slipped in the second half of 
1990 deepened during the early months of 1991 
and later spread to Germany and Japan, without 
any notable recovery being made by the United 
States economy. Consequently, the 
industrialized countries' growth rate slowed for 
the third year running, falling to an annual rate of 
1%, as compared to 2.6% for 1990,3.3% in 1989 
and 4.4% in 1988. In fact, the industrialized 
countries' 1991 growth rate was the lowest since 
the 1982 recession. 
The sluggishness of the industrialized 
economies, and particularly the recession in the 
United States, had a more harmful effect on Latin 
American and Caribbean exports than it had the 
year before, as the growth rate for the industrial 
countries' imports, by volume, slid from 4.5% in 
1990 to around 3% in 1991, which was the lowest 
level since 1983. 
This downturn in the industrialized economies 
was reflected in a further slowdown (to 3.4%) 
in world trade, which was also hurt by the 
collapse of the European economies now in the 
midst of a transition to market-based systems. 
One of the consequences of this slump in world 
demand was the prolongation of commodity 
prices' persistent downward slide. The average 
prices of many of the region's main export 
products fell (sugar, bananas, cocoa, coffee, soya, 
wheat, cotton, wool, copper, tin, lead, zinc and 
petroleum), and in some cases the declines were 
quite steep. In contrast, only a few prices rose 
For more detailed information, see part II. 
(beef, fish meal, maize and iron ore) (see table 
vn-6). 
These variations caused the index of average 
world prices for commodities other than 
petroleum to drop once again in 1991 (by over 
6%) in dollar terms. The largest decrease was in 
minerals and metals (-10%) owing both to their 
sensitivity to the recession in the industrial 
countries and to the expansion of the exportable 
supply from the former republics of the Soviet 
Union. Edible oils and oilseeds were the only 
category of commodities whose prices climbed 
(by 8%). Oil prices, which had skyrocketed 
between August and October 1990 as a result of 
the Persian Gulf crisis, tumbled in mid-January 
1991 when the war broke out. By February, oil 
prices had nearly returned to their pre-crisis 
levels, but they then rose gradually in the course 
of the year. The net result was that the average 
price of crude oil for 1991 was 16% below the 
1990 average (see figure VIM). 
The international financial market saw a 
drop in nominal interest rates as a consequence 
of the recession in most of the industrialized 
countries and the slowing of inflation, and this 
trend strengthened with the normalization of 
the oil market early in the year. It was led, 
however, by the sharp decrease in short-term 
interest rates in the United States and the 
resulting drop in these rates in Japan, since 
European interest rates -which were propped 
up by the increase in the German central bank's 
discount rate- held more or less steady. As of 
December 1991, the 180-day LIBOR stood at an 
annual rate of less than 5% (the lowest since 
1965), as compared to a level of 7.8% one year 
earlier. As a result, the average rate for 1991 
was 6.1%, which was 2.3 points lower than the 
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Figure Vil—2 
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Nevertheless, the import capacity of most of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries was 
not hurt by the external sector's performance in 
1991 thanks, in large part, to a heavy inflow of 
private capital. The drop in commodity export 
prices -which was more widespread than the year 
before- did, however, undermine the region's 
export drive and seriously eroded its terms of 
trade. Imports, on the other hand, grew more 
rapidly, thereby causing the large trade surplus 
maintained by the region since the outbreak of the 
a) Exports 
The value of the region's merchandise exports 
held virtually steady at US$121 billion in 1991, 
thereby putting an end to a growth spurt (starting 
in 1987) during which such exports had expanded 
at an average annual rate of 12%. The flattening out 
of this growth curve was attributable to a nearly 5% 
drop in unit value, since export volumes continued 
to rise at a rate of slightly over 4% (see table VII-1). 
The export performance of the countries of the 
region was quite mixed. The value of exports 
jumped in Panama (by almost 27%, chiefly as a 
result of an increase in re-exports), was up 
sharply in Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile and 
Ecuador (by between 5% and 9%) and expanded 
moderately in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Peru (by 3% or less). However, it fell 
by between -3% and -5% in Argentina, Honduras 
and Uruguay and by between -7% and -20% in 
Bolivia, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela. In the oil-exporting 
countries, the value of exports slipped by 
somewhat more than 2% as the net result of a 
decrease of nearly 10% in unit value -chiefly 
owing to the slump in average hydrocarbon 
prices- and an 8% expansion in volume. In the 
non-oil-exporting countries, in contrast, the value 
of exports rose moderately (by less than 2%), 
partly because unit-value increases slightly 
outnumbered decreases and partly because of a 
rise in Chile's and some Central American 
countries' export volumes. Within this group, the 
value of the South American countries' exports 
showed little change, whereas that of the Central 
American and Caribbean countries showed 
significant growth (10%) (see table VII-2). 
economic crisis of the 1980s to plunge to just 8% 
of exports. Meanwhile, the outflow of profits and 
interest payments decreased once again owing to 
the drop in international interest rates. This 
mitigated the impact of the decline in the trade 
surplus on the current account deficit, but the 
latter climbed to its highest level since 1932 none 
the less. The already considerable inflow of 
capital doubled, however, and was more than 
enough to cover this deficit; in fact, the region's 
overall payments surplus rose to US$20.4 billion. 
The oil-exporting countries' external sales fell 
from US$58.2 billion in 1990 to US$56.7 billion 
in 1991. Venezuela registered a 13% decrease 
due to the steep drop in the price brought by its 
oil and a downturn in non-oil exports. The 
expansion in the volume of oil shipments (2.1 
million barrels per day in 1991 as compared to 
1.9 million in 1990) was not enough to make up 
for the 18% decline in average export prices. 
Consequently, the value of Venezuelan oil 
exports plunged by approximately US$1.6 
billion. Non-oil exports were also down (after 
three years of strong growth) owing to a rollback 
of tax incentives, the lower real exchange rate, 
the shift in sales towards the growing domestic 
market and plummeting world aluminium prices. 
In Bolivia, the value of traditional exports fell 
primarily because of a decrease in their average 
unit value, which was in turn chiefly due to lower 
zinc, tin and other mineral prices on the 
international market. The value of non-traditional 
exports was also down (see table VTI-2). 
In contrast, higher export values were recorded 
(in descending order of magnitude) by Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. Colombia's exports 
jumped by nearly 7% (thanks to an increase of over 
30% in non-traditional exports) despite the fact that 
hydrocarbon exports plunged (-25%) as a 
consequence of the drop in oil prices and the 
problems caused by repeated attempts to 
sabotage the country's oil pipeline. Coffee 
exports remained depressed -amounting to about 
US$1.4 billion- due to the international market 
situation. Ecuador's exports rose by 5% as the 
net result of a 10% increase in volume and a 5% 
decrease in unit value. The significant 
downswing in oil prices pushed the value of 
1. Foreign trade and the terms of trade 
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hydrocarbon exports back down to their 1989 
level. Hence, the bulk of the increase in 
merchandise exports was attributable to soaring 
external sales of bananas and shrimp. Banana 
shipments jumped by 23% (much the same as the 
year before) in terms of volume; this four-year 
boom in banana exports was buttressed by the 
opening up of the Eastern European market and 
stronger demand from South-East Asia, as well 
as weaker competition from some Asian 
exporters. Shrimp exports also skyrocketed; in 
fact, they rose so swiftly that in 1991 they 
accounted for one-sixth of the country's total 
external sales, while sales of coffee and cocoa 
dipped. In Mexico the value of merchandise 
exports grew by only 1 % owing to the drop in the 
average price of oil. The resulting US$2 billion 
decline in the value of external sales of 
hydrocarbons brought such exports back down to 
their pre-Gulf war levels. Non-oil exports 
continued to exhibit strong growth (13%) 
however, thanks to the expansion seen in 
manufactures and in fruits and vegetables, which 
offset the drop in mineral sales. Maquiladora 
(inbond assembly) activity -which is, however, 
recorded on the services account- again 
exhibited a high growth rate (16%), climbing to 
over US$4 billion. The value of Peru's exports 
remained flat. The increases in its exports of fish 
meal, cotton and coffee were almost entirely 
cancelled out by the reduction -for the second 
year running- in non-traditional exports and, 
especially, the drop in the value of oil and metal 
exports. The sharp downswings in metal prices 
were, in most cases, partially offset by larger 
export volumes despite the further difficulties 
caused during the second half of the year by the 
low exchange rate and the reappearance of labour 
disputes in the mining sector. The situation in the 
oil industry was quite different: the slackening of 
domestic demand opened up the possibility of 
selling a larger portion of output on the external 
market, but output fell, and this opportunity to 
substantially increase exportable surpluses was 
therefore wasted; consequently, virtually the 
whole of the price decrease was translated into a 
reduction in export value. 
Of all the South American non-oil-exporting 
countries, only Chile was able to boost the value 
of its exports, while Brazil's exports held just 
about steady and Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay saw decreases. Chile's exports 
expanded at a considerable rate (over 7%) 
entirely as a result of an upturn in volume, since 
the average unit value remained virtually 
constant. This constituted the seventh year of 
uninterrupted export growth, with an average 
increase in volume of 9% per year. The decline 
in copper prices on the international market was 
not entirely offset by the larger volume of these 
exports, whose total value thus diminished by 
almost 5%. Exports other than copper climbed by 
nearly 18%, however, thanks primarily to the 
expansion of external sales of fruit (which verged 
on US$1 billion), packaged food products and 
fish meal. In Brazil, exports remained at much 
the same level as the year before despite a slightly 
higher average unit value, which meant that they 
remained 8% below the high point reached in 
1989. The trend in exports was quite uneven 
during the year, with a 20% growth rate during 
the first four months giving way to a considerable 
decline thereafter. In the category of 
commodities, the lower value of exports of soya 
and soya products was made up for by the higher 
value of external sales of coffee beans and iron 
ore. Semi-manufactures also exhibited moderate 
growth (5%), but manufactures were virtually 
unchanged despite an increase in exports of iron 
and steel and mechanical products. In Argentina, 
exports were down by 3% mainly as a result of a 
drop in unit value, since the decrease in the 
volume of exports was quite small. Increased 
exports of oilseeds (16%) and, to a lesser extent, 
of fishery products (29%) offset part of the 
downturn in grains (-10%) and livestock products 
(-15%). Exports of fuel and manufactures 
slackened (-5%) as these sales lost the buoyancy 
they had displayed in recent years, when the 
country was in a recession and had a high real 
exchange rate. Paraguay experienced an export 
slump (-7%) due to a decline in soya shipments 
(as soya prices remained soft) and in sales of 
livestock products to Brazil, while cotton exports 
were affected by a weakening of the international 
price. The value of Uruguay's external sales fell 
by over 5% due to the performance of its 
traditional exports. The drop in wool exports was 
a consequence of lower international prices, 
whereas the decrease in meat sales was 
attributable to a decline in volume as the 
livestock sector strove to rebuild its herds in the 
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wake of a severe drought that had cut sharply into 
its inventories. The value of non-traditional 
exports, on the other hand, continued to rise (6%), 
particularly in the case of rice (see table VII-2). 
The Central American and Caribbean 
countries for which information is available saw 
an increase of nearly 10% in the value of their 
exports. This overall result was made possible by 
strong growth in Panama (consisting chiefly of 
re-exports from the Colón Free Zone) and, to a 
lesser degree, in Costa Rica, since the remaining 
countries either recorded moderate growth rates 
or outright declines. In Costa Rica, the value of 
exports climbed by 9% thanks, in particular, to 
the higher prices brought by bananas, which 
moved up into first place among the country's 
export products. Exports of coffee, meat and 
sugar also rose, as did sales to Central America. 
Guatemala's slow rate of export growth was a 
consequence of the downturn in its traditional 
exports (-8%), since non-traditional exports were 
up by almost 14%, largely as a result of expanded 
trade with Central America. The poor showing 
turned in by traditional exports was attributable 
to sizeable decreases in the volume of coffee, 
cotton and banana exports, as well as to a nearly 
30% drop in world sugar prices. In El Salvador, 
the export sector registered a quite modest 
growth rate (3%) because the strong performance 
of non-traditional exports (12%), particularly to 
other Central American countries, was largely 
neutralized by the decline in traditional exports. 
Among the latter, the decrease in coffee sales was 
especially steep as exporters reduced their 
shipments in order to hold back part of the 
harvest. Sugar sales, in contrast, were up sharply, 
since the doubling of export volumes more than 
covered the severe downswing in sugar prices. 
Nicaragua's exports plunged by 20%, bringing 
their total value down to just 60% of what it had 
been in 1980 and further deepening the slump 
which has been affecting the country in recent 
years. The emergence of domestic supply 
problems in the midst of the country's 
restructuring process and unfavourable trends in 
the prices of its traditional export products were 
responsible for the decrease. The value of 
Honduras' exports slipped by nearly 5% for the 
second year in a row because the 13% expansion 
in other export products was not enough to 
entirely offset the declines in the volumes of its 
main exports (bananas and coffee). The volume 
of banana exports fell for the fourth consecutive 
year due to bad weather and labour problems; 
coffee exports were also affected by bad weather, 
as well as by sagging international prices. The 
strong upward trend in Panama's exports 
continued with an increase of 27%, which put 
them almost 80% above their 1980 level. 
Nevertheless, this rise was almost wholly 
attributable to an US$800 million increase in 
re-exports from the Colón Free Zone. In the 
Dominican Republic, exports were down (by 
10%) for the second year running as the result of 
a further decrease in external sales of ferronickel 
and, to a lesser degree, of other traditional 
exports. Meanwhile, the serious political 
problems which arose in Haiti during the second 
half of the year caused the value of its exports to 
slide (-10%) once again (see table VII-2). 
b) Imports 
The value of Latin American and Caribbean 
merchandise imports climbed by 19% to over 
US$111 billion. This expansion, which carried 
the region's accelerating growth trend into its 
second year, was almost entirely the result of an 
increase in volume, since the average unit value 
of imports was virtually unchanged. Although 
the upswing was quite widespread among the 
region's countries, almost all of the US$17.5 
billion increase was accounted for by just four 
countries: Mexico (US$7.9 billion), Venezuela 
(US$3.6 billion), Argentina (US$3.7 billion) and 
Panama (US$1.2 billion, mainly from 
re-exports). In contrast, imports declined by 
US$550 million in Colombia, by US$150 million 
in Costa Rica and by smaller percentages in Haiti, 
Honduras and the Dominican Republic (see table 
VII-3). 
For the oil-exporting countries as a group, 
imports swelled by 27%, from US$48 billion to 
nearly US$60 billion. Although unit values rose 
by almost 5%, the bulk of the increase was 
attributable to an expansion of import volumes. 
In Venezuela, imports soared by 56% to 
US$10.2 billion mainly because domestic 
demand strengthened notably as the process of 
drawing down stocks ran its course and the real 
exchange rate moved lower. Another factor was 
the trade liberalization programme launched in 
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1989, which entered into its third stage in May 
1991 with a reduction of the tariff ceiling from 
50% to 40%. In Mexico, the steady rise in imports 
continued (22%) in response to the reactivation 
of production and investment. In fact, inputs and 
capital goods were the fastest-growing categories 
of imports, while the growth rate for consumer 
goods slowed to just 10% in comparison to an 
average rate of nearly 90% during the three 
preceding years. Peru's imports were up by 22% 
as a reflection of the country's effort to open up 
its economy to external trade, along with its low 
real exchange rate, but their expansion was 
somewhat dampened by a restrictive policy on 
government spending which lowered 
public-sector imports by 12%. Ecuador's 
imports also rose steeply (29%) thanks to its trade 
liberalization programme and the growth of 
domestic demand, which stimulated imports of 
both capital and consumer goods. In November, 
the country's tariff reform programme moved 
into its second stage, which entailed setting the 
tariff floorat 5% and the tariff ceiling at 35% and 
adopting a series of measures designed to phase 
out quantitative restrictions. In Bolivia, the sharp 
rise in the value of imports (about 30%) was led 
by capital goods and raw materials, which 
reflected the strong recovery being made by 
investment and economic activity as a whole. In 
contrast, Colombia's imports diminished by 
almost 11% owing to a slackening growth rate 
and a drop in investment, as well as to the 
uncertainty sparked by the Government's plans 
to step up the pace of the country's tariff 
reduction programme, which caused many 
importers to postpone their purchases until these 
plans were implemented (see table VII-3). 
Among the non-oil-exporting countries of 
South America, merchandise imports expanded 
by 14% from US$34 billion to US$39 billion, 
even though unit values declined. A considerable 
share of that increase was due to the fact that 
Argentina's imports doubled in value from 
US$3.7 billion to US$7.4 billion thanks to an 
upturn in demand, the implementation of trade 
liberalization measures and the erosion of the real 
exchange rate as capital inflows swelled the 
supply of foreign exchange. The changes made 
in the trade regime included a reduction in the 
number of tariff lines for imports, the lowering of 
the tariff ceiling (except for a few types of goods 
subject to special provisions) to 22%, and the 
elimination of the quantitative restrictions and 
specific duties that had been applied to some 
products. The upsurge in imports was reflected in 
all product categories; imports of consumer 
goods quadrupled in value while capital goods 
jumped from the extremely low level of US$600 
million to US$1.5 billion, which was much the 
same level as the high 1981-1982 average. 
Paraguay and Uruguay saw their imports rise 
substantially as well (by 14% and 22%, 
respectively). This was primarily due to the 
decline in their real exchange rates, which, in 
the case of Paraguay, mainly stimulated 
imports of consumer goods. In Brazil, on the 
other hand, the value of imports held fairly 
steady (moving up by less then 2%) since their 
average unit value slipped by 7% and their 
volume expanded by 9%. Oil imports fell as 
international prices weakened, but non-oil 
imports rose by around 10% owing to 
purchases of farm produce to cover the drop in 
domestic production of some goods and to the 
more open trade policy launched the year 
before. In Chile an increase in volume was 
reflected in an expansion of less than 5% in 
imports. This low rate is accounted for by the 
flat growth of imports of capital goods and by 
the delayed effect of adjustment policies (see 
table VII-3). 
For the Central American and Caribbean 
countries for which information is available, the 
total valueof imports roseby 12%, but the figures 
differed widely from one country to another. 
Panama accounted for the largest portion of the 
increase, as its purchases (mainly for re-export 
through the Colón Free Zone) climbed by nearly 
US$1.2 billion. In Guatemala and El Salvador, 
upturns in economic activity and domestic 
demand boosted imports by 17% and 8%, 
respectively. In both countries intermediate 
goods played a particularly important part in 
these results, along with consumer goods in the 
case of Guatemala, and capital goods in the case 
of El Salvador. Imports were also up sharply in 
N icaragua, thanks to the am pie supply of foreign 
exchange generated by unrequited official 
transfers and the loans granted in connection with 
the country's stabilization and structural 
adjustment programme, as well as by tariff 
reductions (to a maximum of 20%), the 
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streamlining of the government service and the 
nation's exchange policy. In Costa Rica, on the 
other hand, imports slipped by 8% due to some 
of the adjustment measures applied in order to 
deal with the country's balance-of-payments 
problems, such as the levying of a surcharge, the 
hiking of prior-deposit requirements for import 
operations and a steeper rate of devaluation, 
especially during the first half of the year. In 
Honduras, the value of imports remained low 
(following a decrease the year before) owing to 
the combined effect of a high exchange rate and 
lower oil prices. Panama's imports, on the other 
hand, continued to climb briskly (27%) due, in 
particular, to purchases for re-export through the 
Colón Free Zone. Imports intended for 
consumption within the country were also up 
considerably (13%), however, thanks to the 
sustained recovery of economic activity and 
investment. The value of the Dominican 
Republic's imports continued to slide (-4%) as a 
result of its adjustment policies, which led to 
drops in GDP and capital formation, and the slum p 
in oil prices. In Haiti imports were down as a 
consequence of the political problems which 
have plagued the country during the year (see 
table VII-3). 
c) Terms of trade and the purchasing power 
of exports 
The combined impact of a decrease in the 
unit value of exports and a slight rise in the 
unit value of imports occasioned a 6% 
deterioration in the region's terms of trade for 
1991. This further decline, when added to 
earlier downturns (especially those of 
1981-1982 and 1985-1986), pushed the terms 
of trade of Latin America and the Caribbean 
down to 26% below their 1980 level (see table 
VII-4). 
This downturn was most apparent among the 
oil-exporting countries, where, largely as a 
result of the drop in oil prices, the terms of trade 
slipped by nearly 14%, falling to a point 36% 
below their 1980 level. Venezuela was one of the 
hardest-hit countries with a decrease of over 
20%. Colombia had a below-average decline 
(less than 6%), but although the drop was 
smaller, it constitutes the continuation of a trend 
which began back in 1987. 
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In contrast, the terms of trade for the South 
American non-oil-exporting countries as a group 
showed a 4% improvement, although this was 
still 13% below the 1980 figure. Brazil's terms of 
trade jumped by 9%, largely as a result of the 
price decline for oil, which accounts for a 
large share of the country's imports (see 
figure VII-3). Chile and Paraguay also saw 
improvements in their terms of trade (of around 
2%) thanks to decreases in their imports' unit 
values. In Argentina and Uruguay, however, 
sagging export prices were reflected in a 
deterioration in their terms of trade of about 2% 
(see table VII-5). 
Among the Central American and Caribbean 
countries, only Honduras and Haiti bettered their 
terms of trade, with the help of lower oil prices. 
In Costa Rica and Panama, higher unit values for 
imports outweighed the slight increase in export 
prices, while in the remaining countries declines 
in the unit values of exports caused the terms of 
trade to take a definite turn for the worse (see 
table VII-5). 
The overall deterioration in the terms of trade 
eroded the purchasing power of the region's 
exports by nearly 2%. This figure was the net 
result, however, of opposing trends in the 
oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting economies. 
In the former group of countries, the steep drop 
in international oil prices pushed down the 
purchasing power of exports by almost 7%. 
Venezuela was the hardest-hit economy 
(-16%) because its non-oil exports represent a 
much smaller share of total exports than in the 
rest of the countries, whereas in many of the 
other countries in this group, the decline in oil 
prices was partly offset by increases in the 
purchasing power of non-oil exports. In fact, in 
Colombia the purchasing power of total 
exports actually rose by over 4% despite the 
decrease in the value of the country's 
hydrocarbon exports. 
Among the non-oil exporters, noteworthy 
performances were turned in by Chile, where the 
purchasing power of exports climbed by about 
9%, and Brazil, where it rose by 8%. The 
following countries in this group saw 
considerable declines in this indicator, however: 
Nicaragua (-23%), Paraguay (-4%), the 
Dominican Republic (almost-1 l%)and Uruguay 
(over -6%) (see table VII-8). 
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2. The balance-of-payments current account 
With a substantial increase in the valueof imports 
and virtually no change in that of exports, the 
surplus on the region's merchandise trade surplus 
narrowed considerably. Between 1986 and 1989, 
the trade surplus had grown from US$17.9 billion 
to US$27.3 billion; then, after leveling off in 
1990, it dove to less than US$10 billion in 1991, 
the lowest level since 1983. This contraction of 
the region's trade surplus was largely accounted 
for by decreases of almost US$6 billion in 
Venezuela's surplus and of US$4.1 billion in 
Argentina's, together with a US$8 billion 
increase in Mexico's trade deficit. Ecuador's and 
Uruguay's surpluses were also down by sizeable 
amounts, while small surpluses turned into 
deficits of between US$200 million and US$250 
million in Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia. In 
addition, the deficits of the Central American 
countries (except Costa Rica), the Dominican 
Republic, Panama and Haiti deepened. On the 
other hand, increases were seen in the surpluses 
of Colombia (US$1 billion) and Chile (US$300 
million), and Costa Rica's deficit shrank by 60%. 
Brazil, for its part, maintained its large surplus of 
nearly US$11 billion (see table VII-10). 
The trade balance for goods and services 
declined in parallel with the trade balance for 
goods alone, plummeting from US$23.6 billion 
to US$4.6 billion. This was attributable to the fact 
that net payments for non-factor services 
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continued to climb steeply (from US$4.2 billion 
to US$5.4 billion) as the larger net amount of the 
payments made by Argentina, Venezuela and, to 
a lesser extent, Colombia far outweighed the net 
inflow of such payments to Mexico and Uruguay 
and the reduction in the net outflow from Chile 
(see table VII-10). 
In 1991 the region's net payments of profits 
and interest amounted to US$30.9 billion, which 
was US$4 billion less than the year before. The 
lower level of these payments was the result of 
decreases in the net payments made under this 
heading by numerous countries. These reductions 
were as follows: Brazil, US$2 billion; Argentina 
and Colombia, around US$600 million each; 
Mexico, US$500 million; Venezuela, US$200 
million; and Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and 
Uruguay, between US$26 million and US$110 
million each. The net amount of such payments 
held more or less steady in all the other countries 
except Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican 
Republic, where it rose by US$150 million, 
US$40 million and US$65 million, respectively 
(see table VII-11). Because the region's 
merchandise trade surplus was so much smaller 
than the year before, it covered only 32% of its 
net factor payments (as opposed to 83% in 1990). 
The lower net level of payments for factor 
services for the region as a whole was due, in part, 
to the fact that in most of the countries, bank debt 
(at floating interest rates in dollars) accounts for 
a large share of total external obligations (around 
55% for the region taken as a whole); 
consequently, the reduction of approximately 
two percentage points in the average level of the 
dollar-denominated LIBOR worked to their 
advantage. There was also a significant increase 
in the amount of foreign exchange moving into 
the region in the form of incoming interest 
payments, thanks to the substantial expansion of 
almost all the countries' international reserves 
over the past two years. However, the net 
payments of profits and interest made by the 
various Central American and Caribbean 
countries (with the exception of Costa Rica) 
Since the bulk of the region's external assets and 
liabilities are denominated in United States 
dollars, the decrease in the 180-day LIBOR for 
either rose or held steady because the bulk of 
these countries' external debt carries fixed 
interest rates, and they therefore derived little 
benefit from the decline in international interest 
rates. 
Since the region's trade surplus shrank by a 
substantially greater amount than its payments of 
profits and interest did, the deficit on current 
account jumped from US$6.8 billion to US$20.5 
billion, thereby reversing the trend of the 
preceding two years, when a cumulative 
reduction of US$6.4 billion had been made in the 
current account deficit (see table VII-11). 
The larger deficit on current account was the 
result of similar trends in most of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Among the 
oil exporters, Mexico saw its deficit swell from 
US$8.4 billion to US$13.7 billion, which 
represented one-half the value of its merchandise 
exports. Venezuela's surplus tumbled from 
US$8.2 billion in 1990 to just US$1.1 billion in 
1991. Ecuador's and Peru's deficits also grew, 
but Colombia enlarged its current account 
surplus by almost US$2.2 billion. As for the 
non-oil-exporters as a group, between 1990 and 
1991 they saw their deficit on current account 
climb from US$4.8 billion to US$6,6 billion. 
This was chiefly a consequence of Argentina's 
slide from a surplus of US$1.8 billion to a deficit 
of US$2.7 billion. Paraguay, too, exchanged a 
small surplus for a US$200 million deficit, while 
Uruguay's US$200 million surplus practically 
disappeared. Brazil, on the other hand, managed 
to lower its deficit from US$3.5 billion to just 
US$1 billion, and Chile's deficit fell from 
US$900 million to only US$200 million. In 
Central America and the Caribbean, the deficit 
on current account rose slightly, to US$2.6 
billion, as a result of divergent trends: a steep 
drop, on the one hand, in Costa Rica's deficit 
(US$400 million) and, on the other, an increase 
in Nicaragua's (US$340 million), combined with 
a turnaround in Panama, where a small surplus 
gave way to a US$200 million deficit (see table 
VII-11). 
dollar-denominated loans was a significant 
event. The rate slipped to less than 5% in 
December 1991 (as opposed to a level of 7.8% 
3. International interest rates 
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one year earlier), and the average annual rate for 
1991 was therefore 6.1%, which was 2.3 points 
below the 1990 average and one-third lower than 
the 1989 rate. In fact, the December 1991 level 
was the lowest since 1965. 
This sharp decrease was chiefly due to 
plummeting short-term interest rates in the 
United States. Faced with a domestic recession 
and a marked slowdown in the rate of inflation, 
the United States Federal Reserve Bank lowered 
its discount rate on several occasions, bringing it 
down from 6.5% in late 1990 to just 3.5% in 
December 1991 (the lowest level since 1964). 
During the same period, the interbank offer rate 
(an indicator of the cost of short-term credit) was 
moving in the same direction, although more 
slowly, falling from 8.1% to 5.7%. The spread 
between short-term and long-term rates widened 
considerably (from 0.5% in late 1990 to 2.2% in 
December 1991), however, which suggests that 
there may be a large cyclical component in the 
movement of the interbank rate (see table 
VII-15). 
Unlike what occurred in the United States, 
European interbank rates tended to hold steady or 
even to rise. This was primarily due to the two-point 
hike in the German Bundesbank's discount rate, 
which came in response to inflationary pressure 
associated with the unification of the country. 
Consequently, the other members of the European 
Com munity (all of which, with the exception of the 
United Kingdom, have linked their exchange rates 
to one another) had little manoeuvering room in 
which to lower their interest rates even though they 
were faced with downturns in their domestic 
economies. In Japan, on the other hand, interest 
rates moved downward as bankers followed the 
lead of Japan's central bank, which lowered its 
discount rate in response to recessionary signals in 
that country's economy. 
4. Capital flows and international reserves 
The regional's capital account reflected a net 
inflow of US$40.9 billion, which was almost 
double the 1990 figure. While this increase in 
capital flows was a virtually regionwide 
phenomenon, in absolute terms it was chiefly 
accounted for by Mexico and Argentina, whose 
capital inflows jumped by US$10.2 billion and 
US$3.4 billion, respectively, by Venezuela, 
which went from a net outflow of US$4.9 billion 
to a net inflow of US$2.2 billion, and by Peru, 
which recorded an increase of US$1.9 billion (see 
table VII-11). Marked rises were also seen in the 
capital inflows of Guatemala (US$600 million), 
Nicaragua (US$500 million), Bolivia, Paraguay 
and the Dominican Republic (US$350 million 
each), Costa Rica and Ecuador (US$100 million 
each), and Honduras and Uruguay (US$25 
million each). This expansion was partly offset 
by declines in Brazil and Chile. In Brazil, the 
preceding year's net capital inflow of US$4.7 
billion shrank to only US$1.2 billion in 1991, 
while Chile's surplus on capital account 
dwindled from US$3.3 billion to US$1.4 billion. 
Capital flows also ebbed in Panama (by US$200 
million), El Salvador (US$150 million) and Haiti 
(US$30 million), and Colombia's US$200 
million capital-account surplus of 1990 gave way 
to a US$600 million deficit.2 
For the third year in a row, Mexico had an 
extremely large surplus on capital account 
(US$22 billion, which was almost double the 
already large surplus recorded in 1990). The 
increase was generated by foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment (including 
investments made in connection with the 
privatization of State firms) as well as financial 
flows, including capital repatriation. In 1991 
approximately US$15 billion of foreign 
investment flowed into the country; one-third of 
this was direct investment, while the other 
two-thirds took the form of investment in the 
stock market and the purchase of Mexican bonds 
and other financial instruments. Meanwhile, 
even though part of Argentina's capital inflows 
of over US$5 billion were made up of new 
interest arrears on the external debt and bond 
placements in the international market, most of 
the inflow was voluntary short-term financing 
and much of this, in turn, consisted of repatriated 
capital. The turnaround in Venezuela's capital 
However, unrequited private transfers (entered on the current account of the balance of payments), which include incoming 
capital, expanded by a similar amount. 
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account was a reflection of foreign direct 
investment (primarily in connection with the 
privatization of the national telephone company), 
net private-sector short-term borrowing to 
finance imports, and the more favourable balance 
of the public sector's short-term flows made 
possible by a decline in the oil industry's 
accounts receivable. Peru's net capital inflow of 
US$3.8 billion represented the accounting entries 
for interest arrears on the external debt and, 
especially, capital repatriation in response to 
sweeping changes in the country's economic 
policy, high domestic interest rates and the 
ploughing back of profits by private businesses. 
In Chile, net capital inflows remained high 
(US$1.4 billion) but were lower than the year 
before owing to the amortization of a portion of 
the external debt by public-sector bodies, the 
narrowing of the spread between the rate of return 
on domestic deposits and external interest rates, 
and a deliberate move to discourage the entry of 
short-term capital. In Brazil, capital inflows 
slackened off considerably despite an increase in 
interest arrears on the country's international 
The region's net transfer of financial resources 
moved from a net outward flow of US$13 billion 
in 1990 to a net inward flow of nearly US$10 
billion in 1991. This turnaround, which put the 
region in the black for the first time since 1981, 
represented a shift equivalent to US$23 billion 
and to 16% of the value of the region's exports 
of goods and services (see table VII-13). 
Nevertheless, this reversal of the trend was 
actually brought about by just a few countries. 
Almost one-half of the above amount was 
accounted for by the increase in the transfers 
received by Mexico, which climbed from US$3.7 
billion to nearly US$15 billion. Another 30% was 
generated by the about-face in Venezuela's net 
transfers, whichjumped from minusUS$6billion 
to a positive level of over US$1 billion, and 17% 
by Argentina, which reduced its outward transfer 
by US$4 billion. Be that as it may, the favourable 
trend in such transfers was quite widespread; in 
fact, only five countries in the region -Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador and Haiti- saw this 
trend move against them in 1991 (see table 
VII-14). 
bank debt and the entry of voluntary capital in the 
form of bonds and other foreign portfolio 
investments. This was due to the fact that during 
1991 some arrears from earlier years were settled 
and short-term capital flows were down sharply. 
Since the net inflow of capital was almost 
double the size of the deficit on current account, 
the region's overall balance of payments yielded 
a surplus of US$20.4 billion, which was 32% 
higher than the year before. As a result, almost 
all the countries' international reserves climbed 
substantially. The largest increase was clearly in 
Mexico: US$8.1 billion. Strong growth was also 
seen in the reserves of Venezuela (US$3.3 
billion), Argentina (US$2.4 billion), Colombia 
(US$2 billion), Peru (US$1.3 billion), Chile 
(US$1.2 billion), Guatemala (US$600 million), 
the Dominican Republic (US$400 million), 
Costa Rica and Paraguay (US$300 million each) 
and Uruguay and Ecuador (US$150 million 
each), while Brazil's grew by a meagre US$200 
million. Only one country -Panama- recorded a 
sizeable decrease in reserves (where they were 
down by US$120 million) (see table VII-11). 
This sharp turnabout in the net transfer of 
resources was primarily a result of the region's 
increased capital inflows and, secondarily, of the 
decline in the outflow of interest and profits. 
Measured in terms of exports, this was mainly 
accounted for by the oil-exporting countries, 
whose net resource transfers did an about-face 
from one year to the next, shifting from 6% of the 
value of exports and services to 22%, which was 
the first time that this indicator had reached a 
positive level since the outbreak of the debt crisis. 
The net transfer of the non-oil-exporting 
countries as a group, on the other hand, did not 
change direction owing to the enormous impact 
of Brazil's negative transfer. If Brazil is excluded 
from the calculations, however, then it may be 
seen that the other non-oil-exporters did indeed 
have a net inflow of resources equivalent to 5% 
of their exports. The results for the Central 
American and Caribbean countries -which have 
traditionally been recipients of net transfers from 
abroad- were particularly favourable. Unlike the 
situation in 1990, when the reduction in the 
region's outward transfer was chiefly a reflection 
5. Net transfer of resources 
130 
of a large increase in interest arrears on the debt, 
in 1991 the improved position of most of the 
countries in the region was principally due to 
inflows of voluntary non-debt-related capital, 
primarily foreign investment and financial 
placements. It should be noted, however, that a 
sizeable portion of this flow is made up of 
short-term capital, which could change direction 
at any time (see table VII-14 and figure VII-4). 
This turnaround also paved the way for a 
significant increase (about 20%) in the region's 
import capacity. This was the third consecutive 
annual rise in this indicator but, unlike the 
preceding year, in 1991 the improvement was 
entirely due to the reversal of direction in net 
The move to open up the region's economies to 
imports gained considerable momentum irr 1991. 
Many Latin American and Caribbean 
Governments took meaningful steps towards 
carrying forward reforms -some of which had 
been instituted in past years- in their import trade 
regimes. In Argentina, whose trade policy has 
been oriented towards greater liberalization of 
the economy since 1990, efforts were primarily 
aimed at lowering the average level of tariffs and 
reducing the tariff spread. In addition, late in the 
year the authorities had announced that in order 
to facilitate imports, the system of "sworn import 
statements" (which were a type of permit 
application) would be replaced by an import 
registry that was to be maintained for statistical 
purposes. During 1991 the reform process was 
consolidated and import tariffs were established 
for only four categories of products: 0% on raw 
materials and machinery, 11% on intermediate 
goods, 22% on most consumer goods, and 35% 
on just a few types of consumer goods, such as 
electronic equipment. These levels were later 
adjusted to reduce the spread (5%, 13% and 22%, 
respectively). In addition, quantitative 
restrictions were eliminated. A major exception 
to the above, however, was made in the form of 
the establishment of a special regime applying to 
the importation of motor vehicles. 
In July 1986 Bolivia had streamlined its tariff 
system and set a uniform tariff of 20%. Early in 
1988, the tariff on capital goods was lowered to 
10%, and late in the same year, the 20% rate, 
transfers, since the purchasing power of the 
region's exports faltered slightly (with the further 
deterioration in the region's terms of trade 
outweighing the slight increase in export 
volumes) whereas it had grown by somewhat 
more than 5% in 1990 (see figure VII-5). This 
raised the region's import capacity almost all the 
way back up to the real levels it had attained in 
the early 1980s. Import capacity had weakened 
during much of the 1980s because the transfer of 
real resources implicit in the region's 
deteriorating terms of trade and its net transfer of 
financial resources abroad had more than offset 
the steep rise in export volumes witnessed 
between 1980 and 1992. 
which had remained in place for all other goods, 
was lowered to 17%. In 1990, tariffs were 
reduced once again, to 5% for capital goods and 
to 10% for all other products. These rates have 
remained in effect since that time. 
In 1988 Brazil undertook to streamline its 
tariff structure, but since quasi-tariff restrictions 
were not changed, this tariff rationalization effort 
had little effect on the overall level of protection. 
In 1990, however, the Government embarked upon 
a new and much more sweeping programme to 
reform the import trade regime. It eliminated most 
administrative controls on imports and announced 
a tariff reduction schedule designed to lower the 
average tariff to 17% by 1994. Some products, 
especially ones needed to modernize the country's 
industry and ones which do not represent a major 
source of competition in the domestic economy, 
may be eligible for special tariff reductions or 
waivers. In the case of computer equipment, the 
Government limited the number of protected 
products. In February 1991, a new schedule for 
cutting import tariffs was unveiled. During the first 
year of the new schedule's implementation, the 
most frequently-applied tariff was reduced from 
40% to 20% and the average 1990 tariff level of 
32% was brought down to 25%. If the authorities 
continue to pursue this programme as it now stands, 
by 1994 the average tariff will have been lowered 
to 14%. Moreover, the tariffs on imports of 
machinery and equipment not produced in the 
country -which applied to over 2,000 tariff 
items- were eliminated in July. 
6. Import trade reforms 
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Figure Vil—+ 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOW OF 
CAPITAL AND NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Colombia made a great deal of headway in the 
area of import liberalization during 1990. Unlike 
earlier programmes, the liberalization plan which 
was made public in February clearly defined the 
various stages of the process to be used for 
reducing import barriers. This programme was 
explicitly based on a gradual approach, but a 
number of different events soon prompted the 
authorities to speed up the trade liberalization 
process. By means of a series of reforms applied 
during the course of 1990, tariff levels and the 
tariff spread were significantly reduced; in 
November permit requirements were eliminated 
for almost all types of products, and late in the 
year the tariff reduction schedule was defined. 
The reduction of average tariff levels and the 
narrowing of their spread lowered the weighted 
average from 44% to 34%. This tariff-cutting 
programme, which has been designed for 
implementation over a four-year period, will 
ultimately result in an average tariff of 14%, with 
five rates: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15% and 50%, plus an 
8% surcharge. In 1991, demand for imports was 
weak because the uncertainty generated by the 
successive modifications made in the tariff 
reduction schedule caused economic agents to 
defer their purchases. Consequently, the 
Government decided to consolidate the 
reductions which had been scheduled for gradual 
implementation between 1991 and 1994 and to 
apply them at a single stroke. A four-tiered 
structure was established (0%, 5%, 10% and 
15%) with the exception of a 75% tariff on private 
motor vehicles and lower rates for other types of 
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Figure VII-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN* 
FORMATION OF IMPORT CAPACITY 
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Paraguay and Uruguay. f Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. 
motor vehicles. In addition, the 10% surcharge 
-which had been as high as 13% in the past- was 
lowered to 8%. 
In July 1988, Costa Rica made further 
progress in implementing the import 
liberalization programme it had launched in 
1985. It set out a schedule of graduated tariff 
reductions that would lower the tariff ceiling to 
40% within three years' time, except in the cases 
of textiles, wearing apparel and footwear, for 
which a deadline of five years was established. 
Prior-deposit requirements for imports were 
eliminated in 1990, but were reinstated in 
December of that year when the country's rapid 
loss of international reserves made it necessary 
for the authorities to take emergency measures. 
In 1974 Chile embarked upon a sweeping 
trade reform programme under which, within a 
little over five years, it established a uniform 10% 
tariff for all imports and eliminated virtually all 
non-tariff barriers. Then, faced with a 
balance-of-payments crisis which had its origins 
in the 1982 recession, it raised the tariff to 20% 
in March 1983 and to 35% in September 1984, as 
well as establishing countervailing surcharges on 
items classified as vulnerable to dumping. A 
mechanism was also created for offsetting 
external price fluctuations for three major 
agricultural products (wheat, sugar and oilseeds). 
As the external situation returned to normal, the 
uniform tariff was lowered to 30% in March 
1985, to 20% three months later, and then to 15% 
in January 1988. Surcharges on imported 
automobiles were eliminated at the same time. 
Finally, around mid-1991 the tariff was lowered 
to 11%. 
In May 1990 Ecuador made major changes in 
its trade regime which narrowed the range of 
tariffs from 0%-290% to 5%-60%. In November 
1991 it launched a second phase of the 
programme under which the top rate was lowered 
from 60% to 35% except for automobiles, and the 
surcharges which had been levied for monetary 
stabilization purposes were discontinued. 
In an effort to discourage unregistered imports 
(which had risen to a significant level) and boost 
government revenue, in 1988 El Salvador took 
a series of steps towards the gradual liberalization 
of its import trade. When a new administration 
took office the following year, this process 
picked up speed. In 1990, the move to open up 
the economy, which had begun the year before, 
was carried forward with the reduction of the 
tariff ceiling to 35%. In June 1991 this ceiling 
was lowered again, to 30%, except for some 
textiles and footwear. This had the effect of 
reducing the rates applying to consumer goods in 
particular. 
In March 1990, Guatemala lowered the 
tariffs applying to most products and set just six 
tariff levels, ranging from a minimum of 2% to a 
maximum of 37%, with a 4% surcharge. As a 
result of these measures, the average tariff on 
manufactures dropped from 26% in 1987 to 20% 
in 1990. However, the tariff structure was such 
as to maintain a relatively high level of protection 
for consumer goods (26%) as compared to 
intermediate goods (15%) and capital goods 
(19%). In 1991 further headway was made in 
implementing the liberalization programme with 
the elimination of various import permit 
requirements. 
In Honduras, substantial changes were made 
in the Government's trade policy during 1990. In 
addition to a steep devaluation of the currency 
(whose exchange rate had been fixed for the past 
30 years), many tariff waivers and exemptions 
were eliminated, tariff levels and the tariff spread 
were reduced, and a number of specific import 
duties were converted into value-based rates. 
This graduated tariff reduction process was 
carried forward in 1991 as rates were lowered to 
a range of 4%-35%. Administrative import 
permits were also replaced by a statistical 
registry. 
When a new administration took office in 
Nicaragua in 1990, drastic economic reforms 
were undertaken which, inter alia, paved the way 
for the liberalization of imports. 
Most of the measures called for by Mexico's 
trade liberalization programme were adopted 
between July 1985 and December 1987. The first 
step in this process was the elimination -in July 
1985- of import-permit requirements for almost 
all intermediate and many capital goods, 
although the Government restored some of the 
protection thus lost by raising the tariffs on half 
of the affected items and, later on, temporarily 
broadened the coverage of official import prices. 
These measures were accompanied by a 20% 
increase in the nominal exchange rate on the 
regulated exchange market, and from that point 
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on until late 1986, the sliding parity scale was 
kept above the level of inflation. In 1986 the 
100% tariff rate was eliminated and a tariff-
reduction timetable was established. In addition, 
the Government began to dismantle the official 
price structure and continued to elim inate im port-
permit requirements during 1986 and 1987. The 
final major step was taken in December 1987 
when, as part of the stabilization programme 
known as the "Economic Solidarity Pact", a more 
ambitious tariff reduction effort was undertaken 
and a five-level scale, from 0% to 20%, was 
established. Since that time, minor adjustments 
have been made in the tariff structure and some 
quantitative controls have been abolished. 
The new administration that took office in 
Peru in July 1990 embarked upon an effort to 
liberalize its import trade regime as part of a 
broader structural adjustment programme. The 
number of import items on the prohibited list was 
cut from 539 to 25, and the import-permit 
requirement was eliminated. In September, the 
tariff structure was overhauled and just three 
rates (15%, 25% and 50%) were set, along with 
a surcharge applying to the upper two rates; this 
surcharge was done away with in November, 
however. All import bans were lifted, as well as 
a number of specific import duties. These 
modifications brought the average tariff down 
from 66% to 26%. In March 1991, the timetable 
was changed to speed up the pace of tariff 
reductions; rather than taking five years to arrive 
at a uniform tariff of 15%, as previously planned, 
two levels -15% and 25%- were set, thereby 
lowering the effective protection on automobiles 
from 65% to 15%. Furthermore, permit and other 
administrative requirements pertaining to 
imports were discontinued. 
Uruguay began to open up its economy to 
foreign trade in 1974 by liberalizing its 
balance-of-payments capital account and 
consolidating its exchange rates. In 1975 import 
quotas were abolished and a tariff-cutting process 
was begun in which the first step was the 
elimination of the "water" in existing tariffs. 
Requirements regarding the terms of import 
credits and prior deposits were replaced with a 
minimum surcharge. In 1980 a new tariff 
reduction process was initiated, but this time it 
was a programmatic effort involving a simpler 
tariff structure; the objective was to arrive at a 
single tariff rate of 35% by 1985. At the start of 
this phase, the tariff ceiling was 116%. In the 
ensuing years, the tariff spread and levels were 
reduced, although the authorities did not keep to 
the 1980 timetable. In June 1989 tariffs were 
lowered further, to a range of between 10% and 
40%. An across-the-board tariff increase of 5% 
was instituted in June 1985 and again in April 
1990, for fiscal reasons on both occasions. The 
tariff structure was narrowed to four levels in 
1990 and then, in September 1991, to just three 
(10%, 20% and 30%). As a result of this process, 
the average tariff (asimple average, not including 
exemptions) declined from 53% as of late 1979 
to 20% in September 1991. 
In 1989, the newly-elected administration in 
Venezuela put an end to the existing system of 
differentiated exchange rates and started up a 
broad-ranging tariff reform programme. Under 
this programme, volume-based rates were 
converted into ad valorem rates, most non-tariff 
barriers were dismantled, and the tariff ceiling 
was lowered from 135% to 80% for finished 
goods and to 50% for capital goods, intermediate 
products and raw materials. In 1990, the second 
stage of this programme was carried out, which 
involved reducing the tariff ceiling from 80% to 
50% and limiting the number of tariff brackets to 
five. This stage also marked the beginning of the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products, 
starting with the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions. In 1991, the third stage of the 
programme was implemented with the reduction 
of the tariff ceiling for manufactures and 
agricultural goods from 50% to 40%, which 
brought the (unweighted) average tariff to 15% 
(it had been 37% in 1988 and 17% in 1990). The 
import bans on 120 luxury items were also 
eliminated, thereby reducing the coverage of 
quasi-tariff barriers to just 2% of the tariff 
universe (as compared with 38% in 1988 and 5% 
in 1990). The liberalization programme for the 
motor vehicle sector was speeded up as well, with 
tariffs being set at 25% for small-engine 
passenger cars and 40% for higher-priced 
models; consumers were also permitted to import 
models other than those assembled in the country. 
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Table VIM 















































































































































































































































































provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and nationa 



























































c Includes Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Nicaragua and Panama. 
Includes Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
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Table VII-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100 and growth rates) 














































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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Table VII-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
(Indexes.1980 = 100 and growth rates) 














































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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Table VII-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE 
IN GOODS (FOB/FOB) 
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: 96.1 '";.3:4. 
94.9 ^ -1.2 
90.5 -4.6 
91.1 0.7 
Source: BCLAC, on the basis of data provided by the. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.. . Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE 
IN GOODS FOB/CIF 
(Indexes: 1980 - 100 and growth rates) 












































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
* Preliminary figures. 
Table VII-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRICES OF MAIN 
EXPORTPRODUCTS 
(Dollars at current prices and growth rates) 
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Source: WCTAD, Monthly Bulletin of Commodity Prices, 1970-1989 Supplement (TD/B/C.l/CPB/L.101/Add.l), November 1989; 
¡bid. (TD/B/C.1/CPB/L.123) vol. XI, No. 9, September 1991; International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, November 1991; Petroleum Intelligence Group, Petroleum Market Intelligence, New York (various issues); 
and ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: Unrenned sugar, FOB, Caribbean ports, for export to the open market. Central American Bananas, CIF North Sea ports. 
Cocoa beans, average of daily prices (futures), New York/London. Coffe, mild arabica, ex-dock New York. Beef, frozen 
and de-boned, all sources, United States ports. Fish meal, all sources, 64%-65% protein, CIF Hamburg. Maize, Argentina, 
CIF North Sea ports. Soybeans, United States, No. 2, yellow, in bulk, CIF Rotterdam. Wheat, FOB United States, No. 2, Hard 
Red Winter. Cotton, Mexican M 1-3/32", OF northern Europe. Wool, clean, combed, 48"s quality, United Kingdom. 
Copper, tin, lead and zinc, cash quotations on the London Metal Exchange. Iron ore, Liberia, C 61% Fe, OF North Sea 
ports. Oil: IMF average, average of spot prices for Dubai, Brent (United Kingdom) and Alaskan North Slope oil, which 
reflects a fairly balanced mix of medium, light and heavy crude worldwide; Colombia, C. Limón 30 (Gulf Coast, United 
States); Ecuador, Oriente-30 (Gulf Coast, United States); Mexico, Maya Heavy-22(Gulf Coast, United States); Venezuela, 
Tía Juana-22 (Caribbean). 
* Preliminary figures. b US cents per pound.c Dollars per metric ton. d Dollars per pound. ' Dollars per barrel. 
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Table VII-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 






























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
" Includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. c Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic. 
d Preliminary figures. 
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Table VII-8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PURCHASING POWER 
OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100 and growth rates) 






















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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Table VII-9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTSa 
(Indexes: 1985=100) 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
* Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the (main official) real exchange rates between each country's currency and the 
currencies of its main trading partners, weighted by the share of that country's total exports represented by exports to those 
trading partners. These weightings correspond to the averages for the period 1986-1990. For further information about the 
methodology and sources used, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981 (E/CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. The exchange rate used here is as follows: Up to July 1982, the mean 
of the average buying and selling rates as reported to the Banco de México by the main commercial banks; August-November 
1982, preferential rate for essential imports; after November 1982, the mean of the buying and selling rates on the regulated 
market. National-products sub-index of the wholesale price index. 
used. c From 1987 on, the commercial exchange rate was used. 
The unregulated or parallel exchange rate was 
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Table VIl-10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of dollars) 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Excluding net payments of profits and interest. 
Table VII-11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) an 
^ * Excluding labour and ownership. Including net unrequited private transfers. 











































































































































































































































Including long- and short-term capital, unrequited official transfers, and errors and omissions. 
Table VII-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT TO THE VALUE OF 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICESa 
(Percentages) 





























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
* Negative figures indicate a surplus on the balance-of-payments current account. Preliminary figures. 
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Table VH-13 
LATIN AMERICA AND TIIE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL 
AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCESa 
(Billions of dollars and percentages) 
Effective Unre- Net Net pay-
net gistered inflow of -/i mentsof 
inflow of trans- capital profits and 
capital actions0 (1+2) interest 
































































































































Source: 1980-1988: ECLAC on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
1989-1991: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the IMF and national sources. 
'Covers 16 Spanish-speaking countries (Cuba and Panama are not included), plus Brazil and Haiti. Equivalent to net inflow 
of capital minus unregistered transactions. c Corresponds to the errors and omissions entry on the balance of payments. 
Preliminary estimates. 
Transfer of Exports 
resources of goods 
and 6 * ™ 
(1-5) (3-5) services 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCESa 
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Source: 1986-1988: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 1989-1991: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from IMF aid «ational sources. 
' The net transfer of resources is equal to net capital inflow (unrequited official transfer payments, short- and long-term capital, and errors and omissions) minus net payments of profits and 
interest, which include both interest actually paid and interest due but not paid. In this table, negative figures indicate outward transfers of resources. Preliminary figures. 
Table VII-15 





































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Y\ini, International Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., (various issues). 
Symbols: ST = short term; LT = long term. 
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Vni. THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
1. MJ 
At US$439 billion, the region's external debt was 
slightly smallerat the end of 1991 than it had been 
a year earlier (see table V1II-1). There were a 
num ber of reasons for this decrease. Although no 
Brady-style debt reduction agreements were 
signed with private banks during the year, the 
United States Government did decide to cancel 
large amounts of the concessional official 
bilateral debt owed by some countries in the 
region. In addition, some countries made use of 
national conversion mechanisms to further 
reduce their debt. Another influential factor was 
the revaluation of the United States dollar against 
European currencies (l%-5%), since this 
considerably reduced the debts of countries 
which owed large sums in those currencies. The 
large inflows of non-debt-related private funds 
(mainly repatriated capital and foreign 
investment) being received by some countries 
also helped to check any increase in the debt. The 
two percentage-point drop, on average, in 
international interest rates played a role as well, 
since this reduced the need to refinance interest 
payments, whether by securing fresh loans or 
allowing arrears to build up. 
Be that as it may, the accumulation of interest 
arrears continued to be a major source of new 
debt for the region. Interest arrears are estimated 
to have risen by between US$6 billion and US$7 
billion in 1991, as compared to an increase of 
US$9 billion the year before. Thus, total arrears 
(most on debts owed to private banks) amounted 
to about US$30 billion, which was equivalent to 
one third of the total increase recorded in the 
region's debt since 1982. Some countries also 
contracted debts in more conventional ways by 
re-entering international capital markets and 
floating large bond issues. 
All in all, 14 countries reduced their debt in 
1991 (see table VIII-1). In most cases, much of 
trends 
the reduction was achieved through the 
negotiation of debt cancellation agreements, 
while a somewhat smaller portion of the decrease 
was attributable to unilateral payments policies 
regarding the debts owed to some creditors. The 
United States Government agreed to forgive 
more than 90% of the bilateral debt of Guyana, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, around 70% of Haiti's 
and Bolivia's, 25% of Jamaica's debt and 4% of 
Chile's. Under a Paris Club agreement, 
Nicaragua's creditor Governments also forgave 
that country's arrears. In addition, Guatemala, 
Jamaica and Costa Rica retired part of their 
external debt through debt-for-nature swaps. The 
Dominican Republic negotiated a reduction of its 
debt with Mexico, and El Salvador negotiated the 
cancellation of its debt with some official 
bilateral creditors. The Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala also made unilateral moves to settle 
the debts that they had built up with some official 
creditors. 
In the cases of Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Guyana, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Bolivia, debt 
reduction operations were on such a large scale 
that they far outweighed new debt accumulation 
(including interest arrears with private banks) 
and thereby contributed to an absolute decline in 
these countries' stock of foreign obligations (see 
table VIII-1). 
The 7% decrease in Chile's debt was chiefly 
a result of its net amortization of public 
obligations, since the slight reduction made in its 
very small debt with the United States 
Government was of negligible significance. 
Colombia also recorded a net amortization of its 
debt. The 3% decline in Uruguay's external debt 
was attributable to the agreement it signed with 
its creditor banks under the Brady Plan in 1990 
and to the protracted delay in the disbursement of 
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multilateral loans to finance the implementation 
of that agreement. 
The 2% drop seen in Argentina's debt was 
made possible by a series of privatizations that 
were financed with commercial-bank debt paper. 
The effect of these swaps was partially 
counteracted by the accumulation of interest 
arrears on around 60% of that country's 
commercial bank debt, however. Fresh loans also 
offset part of the reduction, since, despite the 
public sector's arrears, the country was able to 
re-enter voluntary international capital markets 
with a nearly US$800 million bond issue. 
Investors were attracted by the relatively high 
yield of these securities, the headway made by 
the Government's structural adjustment 
programme, and anticipation of a Brady 
agreement with the banks some time in 1992. 
Brazil also managed to reduce its debt by 2% 
in 1991. Some of the main factors which helped 
it to do so were the revaluation of the United 
States dollar against European currencies and the 
net amortization of certain obligations by the 
country's public and private sectors, including 
the payment of some of the arrears built up with 
private banks in 1989 and 1990. This more than 
offset the increase in the debt brought about by 
the accumulation of new interest arrears on about 
70% of the public sector's commercial-bank and 
Paris Club obligations in 1991 and the issuance 
of around US$2 billion in new bonds on 
international markets by various Brazilian 
organizations, including some State firms. Bond 
placements, and especially those whose primary 
aim was to cover the public sector's debt service 
arrears, were promoted by a number of factors, 
including a very high initial return (12%-14%), 
the Government's "decentralization" of the debt 
problem -which enabled the private sector and 
solvent public bodies to engage in direct 
negotiations regarding their external 
obligations- and, prior to the initiation of Brady 
Plan negotiations, the signing of an agreement 
with commercial banks to set up a mechanism for 
the cancellation of US$8 billion in interest arrears 
that had been accumulated before the end of 
1990. Under the terms of this accord, Brazil paid 
off US$2 billion of its interest arrears in cash over 
the course of the year and agreed to cover the 
balance with an issue of 10-year bonds upon 
signatureof a Brady Plan deal-probably in 1992. 
Meanwhile, as noted earlier, Brazil continued to 
make only partial service payments on its bank 
debt. 
The increase seen in Mexico's debt (over 4%) 
in 1991 was largely a reflection of that country's 
growing access to international bond markets. In 
fact, Mexico issued over US$2.2 billion in 
internationally-offered bonds in 1991, after 
already having placed more than US$2.7 billion 
of these instruments in 1990. Indeed, Mexico's 
bond-market activity was notable not only for the 
size of its bond issues but also because of the 
steady improvement in credit terms: maturitiesof 
from 7 to 10 years began to be traded and their 
initial yields fell from about 8% over those of 
United States Treasury instruments in 1989 to 
just 3% in 1991. This expansion of the debt was 
restrained, however, by swaps and secondary-
market operations, as well as by Mexico's broad 
access to non-debt-related sources of external 
finance. 
Arrears played an important part in the 
increases seen in the debts of Haiti, Peru, 
Panama, Paraguay and Ecuador. Nevertheless, 
the general trend was towards a regularization of 
the region's payments position. Besides the 
agreement signed by Brazil to eliminate some of 
the payments it owed to various banks, Peru 
arrived at satisfactory refinancing agreements 
with its multilateral creditors which either 
canceled arrears, as in the case of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), or 
established a phased programme to eliminate 
them in due course, as with the new "rights 
approach" refinancing agreements signed with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. In similar negotiations, Nicaragua 
and Panama put together refinancing packages 
designed to normalize their payments positions 
with multilateral agencies. The Dominican 
Republic also became current on its payments 
with multilateral lenders, and Guatemala signed 
agreements with IDB and the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). In 
addition, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic regularized their payments 
to the Paris Club Governments. 
The agreement signed by Nicaragua with the 
Paris Club was especially important because it 
marked the beginning of a new debt relief 
programme under what is often referred to as the 
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"extended" version of the Toronto terms. The 
Toronto terms were originally formulated in 
1988 as a means of affording special relief to 
low-income African countries. These terms 
provided for a reduction of approximately 33% 
in the current value of eligible official debt 
(eligible debts are generally those having 
maturities one or two years after the date of 
submission of a formal rescheduling request). 
Then, in 1990, the scope of this programme was 
expanded to include low-income Latin American 
countries, two of which signed agreements under 
these new terms (see table VIII-2). The 
agreement signed with Nicaragua, which 
received little publicity, follows the general lines 
of the Toronto terms but provides for a greater 
measure of relief. 
The new Paris Club scheme offers creditors 
three options in the case of eligible 
non-concessional debts: i) reducing obligations 
by 50% and rescheduling the balance over a 
repayment period of 23 years (with a six-year 
grace period); ii) lowering interest rates to a point 
where the amount of relief is equivalent to that 
provided by the first option in terms of discounted 
values, together with a rescheduling of the debt 
over a 23-year term (with no grace period); and 
iii) rescheduling over 23 years (with a six-year 
grace period) at a below-market interest rate 
along with cost-free capitalization of interest 
payments during the grace period. The 
The Latin American and Caribbean region's debt 
load has become significantly lighter in recent 
years, as is demonstrated by the fact that the 
regional interest/exports ratio decreased for the 
fifth year in a row, falling to 23% (see table VIII-3 
and figure VIII-1), as compared to 26% in 1990 
and a record 41% in 1982. The drop was wholly 
accounted for by the lower level of interest 
payments falling due (nearly US$5 billion less 
than the year before), which was in turn primarily 
a function of a cyclical reduction in international 
interest rates. Nevertheless, a coefficient of 23% 
is still quite high, since, generally speaking, a 
desirable level for this ratio would be about 10%. 
Hence, the 23% figure indicates that, even with 
the temporary relief afforded by the drop in 
international interest rates, most of the countries 
capitalized interest is to be amortized over a 
three-year period starting at the end of the grace 
period. Concessional debt maturities are to be 
reprogrammed over a 30-year repayment period 
with a 13-year grace period. The interest rate 
agreed to remains unchanged. 
The rescheduling agreement signed with 
Nicaragua covered US$830 million in debt, 
including arrears in payments on principal and 
interest. In the case of non-concessional debt, the 
discounted value of total principal and interest 
arrears and of payments falling due between 31 
December 1991 and 31 March 1993 was reduced 
by 50%. To do so, the debt-reduction option was 
chosen by France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, while Austria, Finland, 
Israel, Italy, Spain and Switzerland decided on 
the interest-rate reduction option. In addition to 
these measures for ...dealing with non-
concessional debt, a number of innovations were 
introduced; these included a decision to 
reschedule the interest payments on the 
restructured debt that were to fall due in 1992 and 
the first half of 1993 and the rescheduling of the 
country's short-term debt. 
Although the United States Government did 
not take part in the Club's new scheme, choosing 
instead to apply the original Toronto terms to 
Nicaragua, it did cancel US$260 million of debt 
under its Enterprise for the Americas initiative. 
in the region continue to suffer from a debt 
overhang. 
In 1991, nine countries had interest/exports 
ratios of between 16% and 10% or even lower, as 
compared to just five countries in 1990. The new 
members of this group were Costa Rica, Chile, 
Colombia and Venezuela (see table VIII-3). In 
the first three of these countries, higher export 
earnings and lower interest payments both played 
a role in lowering the ratio; in Venezuela, the 
decrease was due entirely to the fact that the 
reduction in interest payments proved to be more 
than large enough to make up for a sharp drop in 
export earnings. Five of these nine countries 
-Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Costa 
Rica and Paraguay- continue to have difficulty 
in servicing their external debt, in part because a 
2. The debt burden 
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Figure VIM—1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTEREST PAYMENTS DUE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
D Latin America B Oil-exporting 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures obtained from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
large portion of their debt is owed by their public 
sectors and thus has a heavy impact on their fiscal 
accounts. Other countries continued to exhibit 
extremely high ratios, with the most staggering 
levels being registered by Nicaragua (110%), 
Argentina and Peru (36%), and Bolivia, Brazil 
and Ecuador (25%-27%). Uruguay, Honduras 
and Mexico also had high ratios (21%-22%). 
Mexico's effective debt load was substantially 
lower, however, thanks to its success in regaining 
investor confidence, since this triggered a hefty 
inflow of voluntary finance that far outweighed 
interest payments. 
The debt continued to place a heavy burden on 
many Latin American countries, as was 
illustrated by the fact that the region's 
debt/exports ratio, which expresses its debt as a 
percentage of its exports, has remained very high, 
since it has hovered around 300% for the past 
three years. As of the end of 1991, this ratio was 
284%, as compared to 287% in 1990 (see table 
VIII-4). The situation has, none the less, 
improved, inasmuch as six countries (Colombia, 
Chile, Panama, Paraguay, Guatemala and Costa 
Rica) had ratios of below 200% -a level which in 
some cases is regarded as a critical financial 
threshold- whereas in 1988 there were only two 
such countries (Panama and Paraguay). On the 
other hand, extraordinarily high figures were 
racked up by Nicaragua (3,000%), Argentina, 
Haiti and Peru (400%-500%), and disturbingly 
elevated levels were recorded by Bolivia, Brazil, 
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Ecuador, Honduras and Uruguay (over 300%) as 
well. 
The region's debt/GDP ratio -another 
structural indicator of the external debt burden-
was 43% in 1991, which was similar to the figure 
for the year before but considerably lower than 
the record coefficient registered in 1986 (60%) 
(see table VIII-5). Nevertheless, the ratio was still 
high in comparison to the 28% level registered at 
the start of the 1980s, which might be considered 
a fairly acceptable figure. Substantial decreases 
were observed in Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela 
and Chile as a result of both debt reduction and 
an expansion of economic activity; lower ratios 
were also recorded by Colombia, Honduras and 
Uruguay, but in these cases debt reduction was 
the chief reason. A deterioration in the debt/GDP 
ratio was seen only in Costa Rica, Haiti and Peru, 
where an increase in the debt was coupled with 
very weak growth. The countries with the lowest 
coefficients in 1991 wereBrazil (24%), Paraguay 
(29%) and Guatemala (32%), while those with 
the highest were Nicaragua (620%), Panama 
(133%), Ecuador (113%), Bolivia (102%) and 
Argentina (93%). 
Another very significant indicator of the debt 
burden is the relationship between the countries' 
debt and their fiscal income. In the 1970s, the 
lion's share of external debt was already being 
shouldered by the Governments of the region. 
Then, in the 1980s, this situation was 
compounded by the fact that public debt tended 
to grow much faster than private-sector debt due, 
in large part, to exceptional circumstances, such 
as the public sector's obligatory assumption of 
private obligations and the involuntary rollovers 
associated with the first three stages of the 
international debt strategy. Consequently, the 
Latin American Governments owe at least 80% 
of their countries' total external debt, and this is 
the main factor which is hindering the servicing 
of that debt. 
Some of the countries' debt/fiscal income 
ratios have improved in the past few years thanks 
to progress in tax reform, the positive effects of 
the upturn in tax receipts in some economies and 
debt reduction programmes. Although the data 
given in table VIII-6 are not comparable owing 
to differences in the way the category of 
public-sector income is defined, it is none the less 
clear that a marked improvement was seen in the 
ratios of Peru, Argentina and Guatemala. All the 
countries achieved a notable increase in tax 
revenues and a reduction in public-sector debt 
(except Peru, whose external debt continued to 
climb). Moreover, no country experienced any 
major deterioration in its debt/fiscal income ratio, 
although this coefficient did remain high in 
almost all the countries. Nicaragua represented 
an extreme case, since its external public debt 
was 20 times greater than its fiscal revenues. The 
ratio was slightly under 600% for Honduras, over 
400% in the Dominican Republic, Peru and 
Ecuador, and over 300% in El Salvador and 
Argentina. The only countries where this 
coefficient was around 100% were Colombia, 
Mexico, Brazil and Chile. 
Obviously, from a fiscal standpoint the 
external debt continues to pose a very serious 
problem. Although recent official debt reduction 
programmes have provided some relief for the 
public sector, help has been slow in coming and 
often modest relative to the overall public debt 
burden. Indeed, the most important source of 
relief of late has been the tolerance displayed by 
creditors with regard to the buildup of interest 
arrears, which, in effect, have acted as an "escape 
valve" for overindebted Governments; be that as 
it may, arrears are an uncertain and ineffective 
relief mechanism, and clearly do not offer a 
definitive solution for the debt overhang. Hence 
the need to strengthen and accelerate the debt 
reduction process in respect of private banks and 
the Paris Club, as well as to develop more 
comprehensive and timely means of relieving the 
serious burden represented by multilateral debt. 
Yet another indicator of the debt load is the 
discount given on commercial-bank debt paper in 
the secondary market, and it is therefore 
noteworthy that the average price for Latin 
American debt in secondary markets had climbed 
from US$0.35 on the dollar in late 1990 to 
US$0.45 on the dollar by December 1991 (see 
table VIII-7). This rise was the result of a number 
of factors. One of the main reasons was the 
market's perception that some countries are 
solving their debt problems with the private 
banking system. The most outstanding such case 
is Chile, whose debt was being traded nearly at 
par by the end of 1991 (in December Chilean debt 
paper was going for approximately US$0.90 on 
the dollar, as compared to US$0.75 in December 
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1990). The sharp rise in the price of Mexican, 
Venezuelan and Costa Rican bank debt 
(countries which have reduced their bank debt 
under the Brady Plan) may be interpreted in a 
similar manner. The notable increase in the price 
of Colombia's debt paper (the only country 
which, strictly speaking, has not had a debt 
problem) may be at least partly due to the recent 
turn of events in that country, where the domestic 
situation has settled down considerably. The 
increase in the price of the debt paper of other 
countries which are still having very severe 
problems with their bank debt, on the other hand, 
is partially a reflection of expectations that these 
debtors will eventually negotiate new accords 
with their creditor banks. This development does, 
however, introduce an element of inefficiency 
into debt reduction operations, since it sharply 
raises the public-sector cost of future debt 
reduction agreements with the banks. In fact, in 
view of the severe shortage of public funds 
available for debt-reduction purposes, the higher 
price of loans held by debt-distressed countries 
highlights the problems involved in the voluntary 
sort of debt-reduction negotiations called for by 
the Brady Plan. 
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Table VIII-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBTa 
(Millions of dollars and growth rates) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Preliminary figures. c Public debt. Up to 1984, 
corresponds to World Bank data. Total debt according to official figures and data from international financial agencies. 
World Bank figu res. g As of the end of September. 
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Table VIII-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FIFTH ROUND OF EXTERNAL DEBT 



































































































































14.4 c 7.9 
9.3 4.8 
14.5 c . 5.1 
9.6 5.0 
14.5 c 7.1 
10.0 6.0 
14.3 c 6.1 
"Extended" 
Toronto terms8 
Source: 1989: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures; 1990 and 1991: UNCTAD, Money, Financing and Banking Division. 
* Interest rates were renegotiated bilaterally. Under an agreement reached among creditor countries at the Toronto summit 
meeting of June 1988, special terms and conditions are to be granted to low-income developing countries. In these cases, the 
creditor country may choose among three options: i) forgiveness of one-third of the eligible debt and the rescheduling of the 
remainder over a 14-year period with eight years of grace; ii) the rescheduling of the eligible debt over a 25-year period with 14 
years of grace, or iii) the reduction of the interest rate by 3.5 points or 50%, whichever is less, and the rescheduling of the debt 
over a 14-year period with eight years of grace. For further information see UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1989, 
Geneva, 1989, United Nations publication, Sales No. S.89.II.D.14. c The longer repayment periods are a reflection of the 
new terms (known as the "Houston terms") for lower midlle-income countries which were agreed upon at the Houston summit 
meeting in 1990. d Includes 70% of interest arrears. c An agreement is expected to be signed in December. Includes 
all arrears. In addition, 100% of the interest corresponding to the 15-month consolidation period will be rescheduled as well. 
g The new terms provide for three options: i) reducing obligations by 50% and rescheduling the balance over a repayment period 
of 23 years (with a six-year grace period); ii) lowering interest rates to a point where the amount of relief is equivalent to that 
provided by the first option in terms of discounted values, together with a rescheduling of the debt over a 23-year term (with no 
grace period), and iii) rescheduling over 23 years (with a six-yeargrace period) at a below-market interest rate along with cost-free 
capitalization of interest payments during the grace period. In the case of concessional debt, maturities corresponding to the 
consolidation period are to be reprogrammed over a 30-year repayment period with a 13-year grace period. 
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Table VIII-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL INTERESTAS A PERCENTAGE 
OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICESa 
(Percentages) 

















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from national agencies. 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBT AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES a 
(Percentages) 



























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from national agencies. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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Table VIII-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT8 
(Percentages) 














































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
" Estimates of gross domestic product in current dollars were arrived at on the basis of GDP data expressed in local currency and 
the exchange rate applying to exports of goods and services. Preliminary estimates. 'External public debt as a percentage 
of gross domestic product. 
163 
Table VIII-6 
IATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME3 
(Percentages) 





































































































































































Source: External public debt: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1991-92, Washington, D.C., 1991; current public-sector income: 
ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Abbreviations: 
GG = General Government. 
CCG= Consolidated central Government. 
BCG = Budgeted central Government. 
NFPS = Non-financial public sector. 
a See the definition of public-sector income used in this table. Estimates subject to revision. 
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Table VIII-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRICES OF EXTERNAL DEBT PAPER 
ON THE SECONDARY MARKET 
(As a percentage of face value) 

































































































































































Source: United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, on the basis of asked prices compiled by the 
High Yield Department of Salomon Brothers. 
" Weighted by the amount of bank debt. 
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IX. ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN IN 1991 
1. Main trends 
The economies of the English-spea king countries 
of the Caribbean subregion once again grew 
only modestly (1%) in 1991; hence per capita 
domestic product remained virtually stagnant 
and the declining trend observed in the 1980s 
continued (see table IX-1). This limited 
expansion is attributable to downturns in 
merchandise exports and tourism earnings, 
which resulted in a contraction of the activities 
that depend on those sectors, such as 
construction, commerce and the public sector. 
Major crops declined significantly following an 
exceptional boom in agriculture the year before, 
thus accentuating the subregion's recession. In 
addition, macroeconomic policies, which were 
basically designed to stabilize Caribbean 
economies and to enhance their competitiveness, 
became more rigorous in 1991 as the inflow of 
foreign exchange dwindled, prompting a number 
of countries to tighten fiscal discipline and 
restrict credit. Some countries adjusted by 
liberalizing the exchange rate, while other, 
smaller ones adopted a series of measures to 
balance their budgets in a context of fixed 
exchange rates. Inflation remained low in most 
countries of the subregion, ranging from 5% to 
10%; the exceptions were Guyana and Jamaica, 
where prices increased by over 50%. The 
smallest increases (less than 3%) were observed 
in most of the countries of the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and represented 
a substantial slowdown in inflation. Trinidad and 
Tobago also reduced its rate of inflation 
significantly, from 11% to 4% (see table IX-13). 
A deceleration of the growth rate of gross 
domestic product (GDP) characterized most 
Caribbean countries in 1991, with the exception 
of Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad 
and Tobago. In Barbados, GDP fell for the second 
year in a row (-4.1%) owing to shrinking exports, 
while Jamaica's level of activity remained 
virtually stagnant after five years of considerable 
expansion. The rest of the countries in the 
subregion showed positive growth rates. Guyana 
made a vigorous recovery (6.1%), although this 
did little to offset its steep decline over the 
previous three years (-14%). Trinidad and 
Tobago continued the modest recovery 
(somewhat less than 2%) it had begun the 
preceding year, following the severe contraction 
of its economy during the 1980s (-23%). The 
OECS economies continued to evolve positively, 
although the rate of expansion slowed 
considerably in almost all of them; only Saint 
Kitts and Nevis achieved its usual growth rate of 
over 6% (see table IX-1). 
Agricultural production went down in nearly 
all of the countries in 1991, following the bumper 
crops of 1990, but shrank most notably in Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Trinidad and Tobago, and more moderately in 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Grenada. 
The only countries whose agricultural sector 
expanded were Guyana, Dominica, Jamaica 
The expression "English-speakingcountries of the Caribbean" refers to the following countries and territories in the subregion 
for which data were available: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. Also included 
are some Dutch-speaking countries such as Aruba, Netherlands Antilles and Suriname. Countries for which insufficient information 
was available have been excluded. 
Composed of Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
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(only slightly) and Saint Kitts and Nevis (see 
figure IX-1). 
The agricultural output of banana-producing 
OECS countries either rose slowly, as in the case 
of Dominica, or fell. In all cases, production of 
bananas -the main export crop- was lower than 
in 1990. Export volumes fell 19% and export 
earnings, 16%. This decline was mainly 
attributable to poor weather conditions and to 
uncertainty about the banana market's future. In 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, the only sugar-cane 
producer, output made a robust recovery of 30% 
after the hurricane damage suffered in 1989, 
which had resulted in a 32% decline in 1990. 
The contraction of Barbados's agricultural 
sector reflected decreased production of both 
export crops, such as sugar (-5%) and cotton, and 
crops for domestic consumption. A similar 
phenomenon took place in Belize, where 
agricultural output dropped 4% with decreased 
production of sugar, bananas and citrus fruits and 
increased fishing and forestry activities. Trinidad 
and Tobago followed a similar pattern, with a 
34% drop in export agriculture. Sugar production 
fell 8% and cacao production, 20%, while coffee 
production dropped to less than half its previous 
level. A more moderate contraction (-7%) was 
observed in agricultural products for domestic 
consumption. Jamaica's agricultural sector 
expanded slightly. In general, export agriculture 
tended to shrink, as production of the main crops 
(such as sugar and bananas) and of coffee went 
up, while citrus fruits, allspice and cacao went 
down. In fact, agricultural products for domestic 
consumption rose nearly 3%. In contrast, 
Guyana's agricultural output rose considerably, 
to the point where its contribution to GDP 
increased 10%. The production of sugar and rice 
for domestic consumption rose 23% and 60%, 
while export volume rose 16% and 6%, 
respectively. Moreover, it is estimated that fresh 
and processed agricultural products increased 
significantly and that a considerable proportion 
thereof was exported (see figure IX-1). 
The tourist industry's weak performance 
reflected the economic recession and consumer 
caution in countries from which tourists visiting 
the Caribbean subregion traditionally came. 
However, some Caribbean countries reacted 
better than others to the shrinkage of that market. 
The sector suffered some deterioration in 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas and 
Barbados, but grew slightly in Dominica, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. In contrast, 
most OECS countries experienced an evident 
growth in tourism, which, as one of the most 
important sources (along with bananas) of 
foreign exchange for those countries, partially 
compensated for their poor agricultural 
performance. Nevertheless, the rate of increase 
of tourist activity was less than in 1990. Also, 
income from tourism dwindled as competition 
for the reduced number of tourists forced prices 
down and necessitated special offers. In many 
cases, the average occupancy rate of hotel rooms 
also fell. Cruise tourism, which contributes little 
to GDP, continued to expand in most countries, 
providing a more economical alternative to the 
traditional vacation in times of austerity (see 
figure IX-1). 
Manufacturing took an upward turn, 
especially in Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad 
and Tobago. In the former, sugar refining, which 
had shrunk 40% in 1990, made a partial recovery 
by expanding 28%, thus increasing the sector's 
contribution to total output. In Trinidad and 
Tobago, all branches of manufacturing grew 
except those which produced wood products, 
clothing and textiles. The most dynamic growth 
took place in the assembly industry and in, 
processed foods and non-metallic products (such 
as fertilizer, methanol and cement). In Barbados, 
the sector's decline was generalized, but was 
most pronounced in the manufacture of wood 
furniture, clothing and electronic components, 
which declined 50%, 25% and 24% respectively. 
The production of non-metallic minerals and 
chemicals took a lesser downturn, while food 
production dipped slightly (less than 1%). In 
Belize, manufacturing dropped 5% despite the 
increase in exports of clothing and treated wood, 
mainly because of the slowdown in agro-industry 
and lessened demand for domestically 
manufactured products. In Dominica, the 
downturn was largely a reflection of decreased 
activity in the coconut processing industry. 
Manufacturing in Jamaica, which uses many 
imported inputs and depends heavily on the 
domestic market, was affected by the notable rise 
in the exchange rate and its effects on prices, a 
sharp contraction of domestic demand and high 
interest rates. Consequently, manufacturing's 
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Figure IX—1 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: SECTORAL PRODUCT 
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contribution to employment in Jamaica fell 8% 
(see figure IX-2). 
The construction sector expanded 
considerably in Trinidad and Tobago and Saint 
Lucia, and showed significant increases in Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada, but 
declined in Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the dynamism of 
infrastructure projects was the main stimulus in 
that sector, as capital expenditure more than 
doubled its 1990 level, although the hotel, 
transport and communications industries also 
made important contributions. In Saint Lucia, the 
sector's growth was propelled by government 
spending, especially on infrastructure, and also 
by private-sector activity, though to a lesser 
degree than in 1990. In Jamaica, the growth rate 
of construction was similar to that of GDP, i.e., 
very slight. In Barbados, on the other hand, the 
steep decline in the construction sector for the 
second year in a row was attributable to reduced 
liquidity and economic recession. These factors 
reduced private construction activity, and 
ultimately public activity as well when the 
Government froze capital expenditure in the last 
quarter of 1991 under its adjustment programme. 
In Antigua and Barbuda, the sector was affected 
by a severe drop in residential construction 
within a relatively stagnant economy (see figure 
IX-2). 
Most of the countries did not experience 
serious macroeconomic imbalances; however, 
Guyana and Jamaica had difficulty restoring 
macroeconomic balance. To that end, they 
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Figure I X - 2 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: SECTORAL PRODUCT 
(Growth rate In 1991) 
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established a floating exchange rate and 
liberalized the exchange market. In contrast, 
Barbados used fiscal and monetary tools to 
achieve stabilization with a fixed exchange rate. 
In those countries which had been affected by 
chronic imbalances for over 15 years, the 
exchange market showed some volatility as 
currency depreciated. Such was the case in 
Guyana, where the price of the United States 
dollar rose from 45 to 122 Guyana dollars, 
although the exchange rate stabilized around the 
middle of the year and rose slightly at year's end. 
Substantial growth was achieved (6%) and 
reserves were increased by US$120 million, 
representing nearly four months of imports. 
External debt shrank as the United States forgave 
US$113.5 million in official debt and multilateral 
organizations resumed capital contributions to 
finance infrastructure projects. Despite 
persistently high inflation, the privatization 
policy and improved management increased 
production in some sectors. 
Economic activity grew hardly at all in 
Jamaica, since the slacking-off of exports in the 
tourism and bauxite-aluminium sectors 
translated into a reduction of aggregate demand. 
This phenomenon, along with the currency 
depreciation, affected a number of sectors, 
including manufacturing. The exchange rate rose 
from 8.12 to 16.8 Jamaican dollars per United 
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States dollar, before the authorities let the 
exchange rate float in September, and continued 
to rise until it reached 21 Jamaican dollars per 
United States dollar towards the end of the year. 
Owing to this devaluation, the deficit on current 
account was reduced and prices increased by an 
average of about 50% during the year, and 80% 
between December 1990 and December 1991. 
Trinidad and Tobago's economy grew 1.8%, 
continuing the slow recovery begun in 1990 after 
six years of contraction. Since the economy's 
external performance was lackluster, the 
expansion represented greater internal dynamism, 
achieved at the cost of foreign-exchange reserves, 
the amount of which, expressed in numbers of 
months of imports, fell from 5.8 to 3.4 between 
late 1990 and late 1991. However, the central 
Government's fiscal deficit shrank to 0.4% of 
GDP, although the deficit of State-owned 
enterprises and public services remained very 
high, and measures continued to be adopted to try 
to eliminate it. Inflation and unemployment also 
dropped. The external debt descended to 25% of 
GDP in 1991, but the internal debt climbed during 
the year, amounting to 23% of GDP. 
Barbados, whose macroeconomic imbalances 
have been neither as severe nor as prolonged as 
Bananas 
Banana production in the region as a whole 
suffered a setback in 1991, after sustained growth 
over the previous decade, when the export 
volume rose 58%. Export revenues fell 9% in 
1991 because of an 11% drop in the volume of 
bananas exported. The decline in production was 
generalized, with the exception of Jamaica, 
where the recovery begun in 1988 was sustained, 
and a 20% increase was recorded in 1991. 
Banana exports, which contribute 
significantly to the economic well-being of the 
Windward Islands (in the Spanish m eaning of the 
term), were plagued with drought and pestilence 
in 1991. However, these natural phenomena were 
compounded by other factors that limited 
exports, such as the scarcity of manpower in 
Dominica and Grenada and the decision of 
growers in Grenada and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines to replace bananas with other crops. 
The reduction of exports from these islands 
those of the subregion's three largest countries, 
had to apply a stabilization programme in 1991, 
which cut the fiscal deficit from 9% to 3% of GDP 
by the end of the year, and under which the deficit 
is expected to reach 1% by the end of the 1992 
fiscal year. Interest rates rose 2.5% and net 
domestic credit remained within projected levels 
at the end of the year. The external debt dipped 
slightly, and the Central Bank's net foreign 
exchange reserves increased 48%. The fiscal and 
monetary austerity policies unleashed great 
protest; although prices rose only 8% in 1991, 
this was double the 1990 rate of inflation. 
Moreover, most sectors were hurt by serious 
contractions and a 15% to 17% rise in 
unemployment. 
In Grenada, the drop in agricultural exports 
and in fiscal revenues, owing in part to 
difficulties experienced in collecting the 
value-added tax, obliged the Government to limit 
its operations in a context of growing 
indebtedness and a consequent disquiet among 
creditors. As a result, the economic expansion 
achieved in recent years at the expense of the 
government deficit was halved with respect to the 
preceding year. Even so, fiscal balance has yet to 
be achieved. 
(Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines) was greater than in the Caribbean 
subregion as a whole; their volume fell 19%, 
while the revenues they generated (US$121 
million) were 16% lower than in 1990. The most 
pronounced drop in exports took place in Saint 
Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
while Grenada -a relatively smaller-scale 
exporter- has recorded a steady decline since 
1988 (see table IX-2). 
Banana production in Belize, which had 
suffered various blights in 1990, was beset in 
1991 by a drought, financial problems and 
inadequate irrigation, but the improvement of the 
country's port facilities enabled it to overcome a 
serious obstacle to increased exports. 
Jamaica's banana industry continued to 
expand; its exports reached their highest level 
since 1978. Export volume rose 23% in 1991, 
while export revenues increased 20%. 
Production surpassed the goals established, 
2. Performance of the main sectors 
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despite the adverse weather conditions that 
affected the entire region. This growth reflected 
both an increase in per-hectare yield and the 
expansion of the surface area cultivated, which 
also exceeded the goals set for the year. All of 
these factors enabled Jamaica to boost its 
participation in the United Kingdom's 
preferential market and to export better-quality 
fruit. 
The region's reaction to the uncertainty 
aroused by the United Kingdom's preferential 
market has been mixed: Grenada has gradually 
scaled down its banana industry, while Jamaican 
producers are planning a 46% increase in the 
surface area cultivated in 1993 and an increase in 
the productivity of existing plantations. 
Sugar 
The sugar sector's performance was uneven, 
although the volume and value of exports from 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries3 
rose 5%. Outstanding among this group of 
countries were Guyana and Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
the value of whose exports increased 35% and 
21% respectively, representing a recovery from 
the preceding year. Guyana increased its 
production through soil rehabilitation and 
improved administration, in order to take 
advantage of the preferential quotas which had 
not been used since 1988. In Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, the increase reflected a partial recovery 
from the damage inflicted by the 1989 hurricane, 
which cut the 1990 harvest by 33%. 
Increased output in Jamaica, which brought 
sugar production to its highest level since 1980, 
translated into a 7% rise in export volume. 
Production surpassed targeted levels, despite 
adverse climatic conditions and processing 
problems in the country's largest refinery, owing 
to greater efficiency in both plantations and 
refineries and to the expansion of the area 
cultivated, which reached a level unprecedented 
since 1980. 
In contrast, sugar exports from Barbados, 
Belize and Trinidad and Tobago decreased. 
Sugar production in Barbados has dropped to 
some 66,000 tons, the country's lowest volume 
in 60 years, and a far cry from the levels recorded 
The Caribbean Community consists of the Bahamas, 
countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. 
in the 1950s, which exceeded 200,000 tons. The 
decline in production can be ascribed to poor 
weather conditions and to unsuitable agricultural 
practices, such as the burning of sugar cane 
plantations, insufficient land conservation and, in 
general, the steady decrease in sugar production 
per hectare of sugar cane cultivated. The volume 
and value of exports fell 7% in 1991. In Belize, 
the sugar industry's performance was acceptable; 
production rose nearly 2%, reaching its highest 
level since 1983, as a result of higher crop yields. 
However, the volume and value of exports 
dipped slightly because, even though the price of 
sugar rose in the European Community, the 
preferential quota for sugar exported to the 
United States fell. In consequence, 28% of the 
exports (as opposed to 19% in 1990) had to be 
placed on a world market with low sugar prices. 
Production in Trinidad and Tobago was over 
20% less than the target level, amounting to 
95,000 tons of raw sugar. This decline was 
influenced by unsuitable growing practices, such 
as an increase in sugar-cane burning, no-cutting 
campaigns on the part of growers, the harvesting 
ofunripesugarcane, poor weatherconditionsand 
the use of less efficient processing methods (see 
table IX-3). 
The sugar industry throughout the region was 
hurt by a general reduction of 35% of the 
preferential quota assigned by the United States. 
The exception was Saint Kitts and Nevis, which 
suffered a reduction of only 10%. Although the 
United States market is less important than the 
European Community market for most 
producers, the quota reduction particularly 
affected Belize, which is in a position to meet 
both the European Community and United States 
quotas. In the long term, the measure will affect 
those countries wishing to increase their sugar 
production, since current prices on the world 
market are much lower than on the preferential 
markets. 
Minerals and petroleum 
Regional bauxite and alumina production rose 
some 5%. In Guyana and Jamaica, it was 6% 
higher than in 1990. In Jamaica, bauxite and 
alumina production increased 8.6% and 4.7% 
Jos, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the 
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respectively. The world alumina and aluminium 
market continued to decline in 1991, with a weak 
demand that reflected the stagnation of world 
production, but prices fell owing to a steady 
increase in supply. Ultimately, both countries' 
revenues from bauxite and alumina exports fell 
8%, partly as a consequence of the drop of over 
11% in Jamaica's alumina revenues, which, in 
turn, was attributable to the decline in prices, 
since export volume rose 5% (see table IX-4). 
Trinidad and Tobago's petroleum sector grew 
slightly in 1991, as did its contribution to GDP. 
Crude petroleum production was 4.3% lower 
than in 1990, owing to the natural depletion of the 
wells being exploited, labour problems and 
technical difficulties with vapor-injection 
processes in wells. Drilling operations also 
declined. Gasoline production for motors and 
aircraft decreased, but production of diesel fuel, 
fuel oil and kerosene increased. Fertilizer 
production rose 5%. The production and use of 
natural gas also increased, owing to the more 
efficient use of processed and discharged natural 
gas and the building of a new plant for recovery 
of liquids from natural gas fields. 
In Barbados, crude petroleum production was 
slightly higher than in 1990, when it had risen 
considerably (17%) owing to the authorities' 
effort to take advantage of high international oil 
prices in 1991. Currently, local production 
satisfies 56% of domestic demand. In 1991, new 
wells began to be explored and the amount of the 
country's estimated reserves was revised 
upward. Natural gas production fell 8%, although 
domestic consumption rose 12% as a result of an 
expanded installation programme. 
Tourism 
The steady growth in tourism in recent years 
came to an abrupt halt in 1991, mainly because 
of the Gulf war and its repercussions on tourism 
and consumer confidence, and also the economic 
contraction in the United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom. However, continental 
Europe's solid economic situation offset the drop 
in purchasing power in what had traditionally 
been the main markets. 
Few tourists visited the subregion between 
January and April, but a modest spurt of arrivals 
occurred in the summer. What most worried hotel 
owners was the possibility that the prolonged 
recession would keep the recovery from lasting 
until the end of the year, since the winter months 
are normally the most profitable. 
Despite the widespread contraction, a 
significantly larger number of tourists visited less 
common destinations, especially Aruba and 
Grenada, whose tourist activities had reached a 
satisfactory level the preceding year. Tourism 
also expanded in Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, and grew more moderately in Dominica 
and Jamaica. However, Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and the British Virgin Islands 
experienced a drop of over 5% in the number of 
visitors. In the latter case, this loss was 
attributable to the closing of the airline "Air BVI" 
in the second half of 1991 (see table IX-5). 
Tourism declined less radically in the 
Netherlands Antilles, as the number of visitors to 
Curaçao dipped slightly; however, travel from 
the United States to Saint Maarten was reduced. 
In Barbados, whose recession was particularly 
severe, the added value of tourism fell for the 
second year in a row; following a decline of 
nearly 10% in 1990, it fell nearly 6% in 1991. 
There were8% fewervisitors in 1991, while their 
spending went down 10%. Thus, the steady 
growth observed between 1986 and 1990 was 
reversed. 
The steepest drop in arrivals (-7%) 
corresponded to visitors from the United States. 
Of these, the most severe decreases were 
recorded in Barbados (-17%), the Bahamas 
(-11%) and Antigua and Barbuda (-10%). Aruba 
and Grenada showed the only notable increases 
in arrivals from the United States: 7% and 18% 
respectively. The number of arrivals from 
Canada also declined, by 20% in the cases of 
Barbados and Antigua and Barbuda, and by 17% 
in the case of Jamaica, although Aruba and 
Grenada recorded increases of 29% and 7% 
respectively. European visitors to the subregion 
as a whole increased by over 10%. The main 
increases in the number of European tourists 
were recorded in Aruba (28%), Jamaica (32%), 
Saint Lucia (36%) and Trinidad and Tobago 
(37%). 
Cruise lines were among the main 
beneficiaries of the economic recession in the 
United States and Canada, since a higher 
proportion of visitors preferred to remain on 
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board rather than disembark. Consequently, the 
number of cruise ship passengers has risen 
steadily: in 1991 the total number for the 
subregion increased 10%. This percentage was 
exceeded by Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, followed by Jamaica and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. In contrast, the number of 
cruise ship passengers declined in Saint Maarten 
and the British Virgin Islands (see table IX-6). 
The slowdown in the world economy and the 
fluctuations in export revenues inevitably 
affected the subregion's balance of payments; 
both the merchandise trade deficit and the 
current-account deficit became larger. 
The value of merchandise exports from 
CARicoM countries fell off slightly (by over 2%). 
This decline was somewhat greater in OECS 
countries (nearly 7%), reflecting the disappointing 
performance of the banana industry; the drop in 
exports from Grenada and Saint Lucia (17% and 
14% respectively) was particularly severe. The 
contraction of Trinidad and Tobago's exports 
(nearly 5%) was due above all to lower international 
petroleum prices. In contrast, Guyana and Saint 
Kitts and Nevis recorded increases in their 
merchandise exports as a result of the recovery 
of their agricultural sectors (see table IX-7). 
Imports continued to outpace exports; in the 
CARicoM countries their value exceeded the 1990 
value by almost 6%. In contrast, imports in OECS 
countries grew less than 1 %, though Grenada and 
Saint Lucia imported 9% more than in 1990. 
Belize and Trinidad and Tobago greatly 
expanded their imports, by 25% and 30% 
respectively. In the latter case, the partial 
liberalization of trade and payment agreements 
unleashed the formerly contained demand for 
imports. The value of Jamaica's imports fell by 
over 7% owing to the rise in the exchange rate 
The external debt of the CARICOM countries fell 
5%, mainly because of the reductions achieved in 
Guyana and Jamaica, two of the region's most 
deeply indebted countries (see table IX-11). 
Guyana, whose debt fell 9%, signed a number of 
agreements on the rescheduling or cancellation 
The higher number of cruise ship passengers did 
not offset the drop in the number of visitors who 
stayed on land, since the latter figure not only 
declined but reached its minimum in the winter 
season, normally the most profitable. Nor did the 
recessionary cycle of the final quarter bode well for 
1992. Furthermore, in an attempt to attract tourists 
to the land, hotel owners resorted to discount rates, 
which limited their profits still further. 
and the application of restrictive credit policies. 
Import value also fell, though to a lesser degree, 
in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica 
and Saint Kitts and Nevis (see table IX-8). 
Thus, the Caribbean countries' trade deficit 
mounted. The most dramatic change took place 
in Belize, whose trade deficit increased 70%. 
Grenada and Saint Lucia also recorded higher 
deficits. In contrast, Jamaica's trade deficit 
declined 17% and Guyana's fell to less than a 
third of its 1990 level. In Trinidad and Tobago, 
the only country in the subregion that normally 
runs a surplus in merchandise trade, the surplus 
shrank from over US$800 million to slightly over 
US$300 million, i.e., to a level similar to those 
recorded before 1990 (see table IX-9). 
Because of the poor performance of 
merchandise trade and tourism, the current-
account deficit of the Caribbean countries rose 
considerably (25%). However, in most OECS 
countries the current-account deficit declined, 
with the exception of Saint Lucia, whose deficit 
grew by over 30%, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, whose trade balance went from 
near-zero to a deficit higher than that recorded in 
1989. Trinidad and Tobago's surplus was well 
below the surplus recorded in 1990. The rest of 
the countries in the subregion managed to effect 
acceptable reductions in their current-account 
deficit (see table IX-10). 
of its pending bilateral debt, representing 46% of 
the total, especially with the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada and the Netherlands. 
Despite this relief, it is estimated that the cost of 
debt-servicing represented 40% of the value of 
exports of goods and services in 1991. 
3. External trade and balance of payments 
4. External debt 
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Jamaica's debt, mainly that of the 
Government and of the Central Bank, dropped 
7% as a result of a lower volume of foreign loans, 
debt forgiveness and cancellation (especially by 
the Governments of the United States and the 
Netherlands) and measures for converting the 
debt, which have reduced the amount owed to 
international commercial banks by nearly 
US$100 million. Also, in mid-July 1991 an 
agreement was reached with the Paris Club to 
reschedule US$140 million of the debt. All of 
these measures cut down the burden of debt 
servicing from the 1987 peak level, equivalent to 
64% of exports of goods and services (although 
only 47% of that value was actually disbursed for 
debt-servicing that year), to the 31% recorded in 
1991, when the amount actually disbursed 
equalled 25% of the value of exports. Moreover, 
in an attempt to make debt management more 
Fiscal policy remained one of the primary 
instruments used to adjust Caribbean economies. 
In addition, emphasis continued to be placed on 
achieving current-account surpluses to be used 
for fixed investments. The need to contain the 
overall deficit was recognized, since it could 
adversely affect access to private-sector credit 
and had negative consequences for the balance of 
payments and external debt. Indeed, the burden 
of external government debt was one of the major 
obstacles in the way of improving the fiscal 
balance on current account. Governments 
(particularly those of Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago) continued to resort to 
disinvestment, consisting of the sale of shares, to 
cut down the spectrum of government activities 
to a more manageable size, but they also tried to 
improve the efficiency of public enterprises to 
generate a flow of resources that would balance 
the budget and reduce the debt burden. In some 
countries, the tax burden was increased (see 
figure IX-3). 
Government efforts in 1991 to maintain fiscal 
discipline yielded varying results, in part because 
after 1990 they had to act in a less promising 
economic context. In the OECS countries as a 
whole, the fiscal surplus on current account fell 
19%, owing to poorer performance in that area in 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Kitts and 
flexible, its composition was altered in favour of 
bilateral debt over multilateral and commercial 
debt. 
The other country in the subregion that 
reduced its debt was Barbados, which resorted to 
amortization of the debt corresponding to public 
service enterprises. The external debt, which had 
reached a maximum of 46% of GDP in 1987, 
dropped to 35% in 1991, and its servicing 
absorbed some 16% of the value of exports of 
goods and services. 
The debt of the Bahamas grew 20% in 1991 as 
a consequence of the financing of lumpy investments 
in a small economy, since the electricity enterprise 
and the national airline were responsible for 46% 
of that increment. The Government's direct debt 
rose 4%. At year's end, debt servicing 
represented 11 % of government revenues and 4% 
of exports of goods and services. 
Nevis and Montserrat (see table IX-12). In 
Antigua and Barbuda, the increase in the current 
deficit was attributable to lower revenues 
because of the contraction of trade and higher 
current expenditure. This last factor mainly 
reflected the concession of pay raises to 
government employees. Interest on the public 
debt climbed to 4.6% of GDP, and the 
Government's capital expenditure doubled in 
relation to its 1990 level; consequently, the fiscal 
deficit rose from 1.4% to 4.3% of GDP. In 
Dominica, current expenditure -especially on 
payroll expenses, which rose 27%- grew faster 
than revenues and ultimately reduced the 
current-account surplus. Capital expenditure was 
also reduced, but because of a drop in external 
grants-in-aid, the fiscal deficit grew from 11% to 
nearly 13% of GDP. Grenada achieved a 
current-account surplus by dint of determined 
efforts to raise revenues and cut spending, and 
also reduced its overall deficit. Despite these 
measures, however, revenues fell short of 
projected goals, owing to administrative 
difficulties in collecting the value-added tax. 
After achieving a current-account surplus in 
1990, Saint Kitts and Nevis recorded a deficit in 
1991 as tax revenues from imports and 
consumption contracted. Although current and 
capital expenditures declined, the overall deficit 
5. Fiscal policy 
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Figure IX—3 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: TAX REVENUES, 1991 
(Percentage of GDP) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
increased to 2.7% of GDP in 1991, whereas in 
1990 it had reached only 0.3%. That situation was 
caused by reduced revenues and external 
grants-in-aid. In Saint Lucia, the current-account 
surplus grew, as did revenues and current 
expenditure; capital expenditure also increased, 
although a reduced budget surplus was achieved. 
Tax receipts in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
increased almost on a par with current 
government spending, so that the current-account 
surplus remained unchanged. Capital 
expenditure was higher, but the fiscal deficit fell 
because external grants-in-aid increased. 
In Barbados, the current-account deficit 
recorded in 1990 turned into a surplus in 1991, as 
expenditure dropped and revenues rose. 
Although the economy was in a recessionary 
phase and had a weak tax base, higher taxes on 
consumption and the introduction of a special 
stabilization tax pushed tax revenues up to 32% 
of GDP. Direct taxes rose 17%, excise taxes rose 
4% and capital expenditure was frozen. As a 
result of the stabilization programme, the overall 
fiscal deficit fell from 8.2% to 2.3% of GDP at the 
end of 1991. 
Public-sector performance in Guyana 
improved in general, although fiscal accounts 
deteriorated. Current revenues grew 
considerably as a result of new taxes, a recovery 
in economic growth and better tax 
administration. On the other hand, expenditure 
also increased owing to higher public-employee 
payroll expenses and the transfer of large 
amounts to some State enterprises. Public-sector 
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reform, aimed at reducing the number of 
ministries from 18 to 11, raising user fees so that 
autonomous public-service entities could be 
self-financing and cutting down the number of 
public enterprises, continued. In 1991, 13 of 
those enterprises were eliminated, bringing in 
revenues of about US$2 billion to the country. 
The public investments programme was beset by 
operational problems, constraints on counterpart 
financing and the decision not to apply for large 
loans from national financial institutions. 
One of the Jamaican Government's main 
policy objectives in recent years has been to 
reduce the fiscal deficit, but this goal has been 
somewhat elusive owing to the heavy burden of 
external debt servicing. Nevertheless, in 1991 the 
current-account surplus was increased in nominal 
terms, even though interest payments rose 61% 
and represented 29% of revenues. The authorities 
boosted the current-account surplus by raising 
revenues 50% through sweeping tax reforms, 
under which a number of taxes were replaced by 
a 10% value-added tax, a special excise tax and 
a one-time tax equivalent to 0.5% of bank assets, 
On average, prices rose faster than in the 
industrialized countries, although rates of inflation 
in the subregion were among the lowest recorded 
in developing countries. The smallest increases took 
place in the OECS countries; most of them were 
less than 3%, which represented a significant 
slowdown in inflation for the countries in which 
they occurred (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). 
Price increases (annual averages) ranged from 
5% to 10% in the rest of the Caribbean countries 
except Guyana and Jamaica, where they 
exceeded 50% (see table IX-13). 
The main external factor influencing price 
variations was the Gulf war and, in particular, its 
repercussions on oil prices. In the Bahamas, 
where price increases were evenly distributed 
among the various products, interest rates also 
In general, the employment situation in the 
Caribbean tended to weaken, since employment 
grew more slowly for the second year in a row. 
as well as the adoption of more effective 
tax-collection measures. Expenditure also 
increased (52%), mainly because of higher 
debt-servicing expenses (which nearly doubled), 
since it grew from 15% of GDP in 1990 to 20% in 
1991. Gross investment grew only slightly. 
Consequently, the deficit remained high, 
reaching nearly 7% of GDP. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, a notable change was 
observed in the central Government's current 
accounts, which ran a surplus, above all because 
of a 20% rise in oil earnings owing to the price 
hike for hydrocarbons in the last quarter of 1990 
and the collection of pending payments. Non-oil 
revenues also increased thanks to a series of tax 
reforms and the liberalization of trade and 
payments. The extent of the increase in current 
expenditure was attributable to higher personnel 
expenses, which more than doubled. Transfers to 
public enterprises also increased, and capital 
expenditure doubled. Nevertheless, the overall 
deficit decreased in relation to the preceding year 
(see table IX-12). 
rose. In Belize, the deregulation of prices of a 
number of imported goods and poor weather 
conditions, which adversely affected food 
production, compounded the effects of higher oil 
prices. 
Price increases in Barbados reflected higher 
taxes on consumption, interest rates and public 
service tariffs. Transport charges rose 17%; 
housing, 11%; alcohol, 8%; and food, 5%. 
The most significant price hikes in Guyana 
and Jamaica represented variations in relative 
prices set under adjustment programmes, marked 
devaluations and a tax increase to reduce the 
fiscal deficit. In Trinidad and Tobago, the 
deceleration of the rise in consumer prices (from 
11% to 4%) basically reflected the lowering of 
domestic food prices, although the costs of fuel 
and electricity also fell. 
In Barbados, the rise in unemployment was 
attributable to the decline in economic activity, 




of the public sector. Unemployment increased 
towards the end of the year, as stricter budgetary 
measures began to be implemented, and reached 
20% in the final quarter. The overall 
unemployment rate does not reflect the fact that 
the rate for women was 21.4%, while that for men 
was 13.3%. Some 60% of unemployed persons 
were in the 15-to-29 age group. 
Unemployment in Jamaica ceased to decline 
in 1991, remaining at a rate similar to that of 
1990. The general rate of employment rose 
moderately in the produaion of goods, since the 
elimination of jobs in mining, manufacturing and 
construction was largely offset by the boom in the 
agricultural sector. Employment also rose 
slightly in the service sector as a whole, although 
community, social and personnel services 
employed fewer people at the end of 1991 than at 
the end of 1990. Young people under the age of 
25 made up 56% of the unemployed; of these, 
65% were women. 
The trend towards reduced unemployment 
continued in Trinidad and Tobago, falling from 
20% to less than 19%. The biggest growth in 
employment took place in manufacturing and 
construction, which showed increases of 15% 
and 10%, respectively. Young people between 
the ages of 15 and 19 represented 43.5% of the 
unemployed, a disproportionately high 
percentage. Moreover, 23.7% of the jobless were 
women, compared to 16% of men in the same 
situation (see table IX-14). 
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Table IX-1 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: GROWTH OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) a 
Total subregion 








Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 

























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis oí oííicial figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
' Preliminary figures. 
Table IX-2 
















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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Table IX-3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table IX-4 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: BAUXITE AND ALUMINA EXPORTS 
Value (millions of dollars) Volume (thousands of tons) 















92 1410 1274 1317 1387 1254 
112 3711 3494 4190 3886 4261 
550 1572 1575 2145 2889 3 032 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures, 
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Table IX-5 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: NUMBER OF ARRIVALS 
(Thousands) 











Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 




British Virgin Islands 























































































































Source: Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO). 
Table IX-6 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: NUMBER OF CRUISE-SHIP PASSENGERS 
(Thousands) 






Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Trinidad and Tobago 
British Virgin Islands 












































































Source: Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO). 
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Table IX-7 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Millions of dollars) 









Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Does not include petroleum exports. 
Table IX-8 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: IMPORTS OF GOODS 










Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Does not include petroleum imports. 
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Table IX-9 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: BALANCE OF TRADE IN GOODS 
(Millions of dollars) 









Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Does not include petroleum trading. 
Table IX-10 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Millions of dollars) 









Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 





































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Does not include petroleum trading. 
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Table IX-11 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: EXTERNAL DEBT3 
(Millions of dollars) 









Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 







































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Government or government-guaranteed debt. Includes arrears. 
Tablé IX-12 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: FISCAL BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Millions of units of local currency) 









Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 











































































CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Average annual variations) 










Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table IX-14 
CARIBBEAN SUBREGION: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
(Percentages) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Barbados 18.9 17.3 13.7 14.7 17.2 
Jamaica 21.0 18.9 18.0 15.3 15.4 









































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 

SECOND PART 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY1 
The gross global product -the total world output 
of goods and services- actually dipped in 1991, 
even if only by one half of 1% (see table 1). This 
is a rare occurrence, and the main reason was that 
the economies of eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union plunged even deeper into 
disruption than in 1990, but growth in the big 
industrial economies slowed down too and 
several of them were in recession. World output 
per capita declined by over 2% in 1991, after 
virtually stagnating in 1990. African economies, 
on an average, barely kept up with population 
growth. Latin American economies seemed to 
revive from a decade of stagnation, and in Asia 
growth remained widespread and fast despite the 
slow-down in world trade. 
It was a year of relentless and dramatic 
political and economic events -the military 
operation in the Gulf, major policy reforms in 
many developing countries and political upsets in 
others, the eruption of new regional conflicts, 
slides in some financial markets, the failure to 
complete the Uruguay Round, the ambitious 
Maastricht agreement on European integration, 
the apparent breakthrough towards multiracial 
democracy in South Africa, the coup d'état in 
Moscow and the formal dissolution of the Soviet 
Union at the end of the year. Many of these 
developments were of a positive nature, but 
others added to the uncertainties already 
surrounding the principal markets of the world 
economy. 
1. Trends in global output and policies 
World output declined in 1991 for the first time 
since the Second World War and is expected to 
recover only modestly in 1992 (see table 1). It 
was the world's first global recession of the 
post-war era. 
The economic decline of 1991 was pervasive. 
In the developed market economies, which 
account for over 70% of world output, growth fell 
from 2.6% in 1990 to just under 1% in 1991. 
Several countries slid into outright recession. In 
many of them, unemployment rose to its highest 
level since the early 1980s. Although inflationary 
pressures subsided substantially, Governments 
and central banks responded slowly and 
tentatively, or not at all, to the recession. Their 
policies were premised on the assumption of a 
spontaneous upturn, and the unexpected 
prolongation of the recession created a dilemma. 
A recovery may begin in 1992 but it is generally 
expected to be subdued and not of a nature that 
would give a push to the world economy. 
In eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, output plummeted by around 16% in 
1991, after a 5% fall in 1990. The difficulties of 
enacting a transition of these economies to a 
market system are becoming apparent to all. The 
people in the transition economies will pass 
through yet another very difficult year in 1992. 
The developing countries as a whole grew 
slowly in 1991, as they have for several years, 
mainly following the same pattern of strong 
growth in eastern Asia and virtually no change in 
per capita incomes in Africa. Latin America, 
however, showed the first signs of emerging from 
its decade-long stagnation. Nevertheless, in 
almost half the developing countries, per capita 
output fell or stagnated. In a small number of 
countries, albeit accounting for almost half the 
extract of chapters I, II, III, IV, and V of World Economic Survey 1992 (E/1992/40; ST/ESA/231), New York, 1992. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.C.1. 
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people living in developing countries, per capita 
output grew significantly. 
a) Developed market economies: recession 
and response 
In early 1991, three of the seven major 
industrial economies were in outright 
recession -Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States- while production surged in the 
western part of Germany and in Japan (see table 
2). By the end of the year, Germany and Japan 
were in recession, and the recovery elsewhere 
was weak and fragile. For 1991 as a whole, the 
developed market economies grew by less than 
1%, the slowest rate since the 1982 recession. 
The policy response, analysed below, was 
tentative and weak. 
Three million people were added to the 
unemployment rolls in the developed market 
economies in 1991. In December, the 
unemployment rate in the United States reached 
7%, measured on an internationally standardized 
basis, about a percentage point higher than it had 
been a year before. In Canada and the United 
Kingdom unemployment was above 10% of the 
labour force at year-end and in France and Italy, 
it was almost as high. Only in the western part of 
Germany and in Japan, among the seven major 
economies, were unemployment rates still at 
moderate or low levels relative to industrial 
country averages in recent years. 
Several of the smaller developed market 
economies also were in recession in 1991, 
including Australia, Finland, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Sweden. Unemployment rose 
during the year by 2 percentage points in 
Australia and New Zealand, and about 6 
percentage points in Finland. By December it 
exceeded 10% in all three countries. In Finland, 
the crisis of the Soviet economy, as well as slow 
growth in other major export markets, made for 
great difficulties. Unemployment also rose in 
countries with chronic unemployment problems, 
such as Ireland, where a 2 percentage point 
increase pushed the rate to 16%. 
The recession came after the longest, though 
not the strongest expansion in post-war history. 
Renewed inflationary concerns in the late 1980s 
had led to monetary stringency that weakened 
several of the developed market economies by 
the end of 1990.2 Although inflation was brought 
down in 1991, some countries were pushed into 
recession. For others, the coup de grace was a 
drop in consumer and business sentiment 
associated with the crisis situation between Iraq 
and Kuwait that began in August 1990. 
After the war in the Middle East ended in 
February 1991, consumer confidence rebounded 
in several industrial countries and the spending 
slide eased. Even so, consumers remained 
cautious, especially in Canada, France, Italy and 
the United States. In France, for example, 16% 
more respondents expected their situation to 
deteriorate rather than to improve in March, 
which was the most "optimistic" month of 1991. 
Output began to recover, notably in Canada, 
France and the United States; but the recovery 
never gathered steam (see table 2). 
Why does the United States grow so slowly? 
Since the United States accounts for more than 
a third of the output produced in the developed 
market economies, it is of special concern when 
the economy of that country becomes mired in 
recession. A year ago it was thought that the 
United States downturn had ended and that the 
dip in output had been rather short and mild. But 
since late summer, output has been almost 
stagnant. Moreover, from the second quarter of 
1989 until the recession began at the end of 1990, 
real GDP grew at an annual rate of only 1.25%. If 
the crisis in the Gulf provoked the United States 
recession, the United States economy may have 
returned to the pre-recessionary, nearly stagnant 
growth path. The trend may continue until 
structural imbalances stemming from the 1980s 
are corrected. 
One such imbalance is the high level of debt 
of households and enterprises. After a decade of 
stability, the debt/equity ratio of non-financial 
corporations rose from about 50% in the early 
1980s to82% by 1989. The ratio of consumerand 
mortgage debt to disposable income rose from 
about 70% in the early 1980s to nearly 95% by 
1990. In the light of a disappointing outlook for 
Sources of Che recession were reviewed in WorldEcouomic Survey, 1991 (UniCed NaCions publicación, Sales No. E.91.II.C.1), 
pp. 10-18. 
190 
jobs or sales growth, coupled with widely 
publicized difficulties of some of the most 
prominent United States corporations, it became 
prudent -if not necessary- to use additional cash 
flow to reduce debt. Thus, neither consumer nor 
investment spending grew in 1991. Personal 
consumption expenditures in constant dollars 
rose slightly in the second and third quarters (1.4 
and 2.3%, at annual rates), but then fell in the last 
quarter; non-residential fixed investment 
continued to drop throughout the year. If it is a 
balance-sheet restructuring that is taking place, 
the process may well take longer than the 
inventory adjustments of a few quarters in 
traditional business cycles. 
The one bright spot in the second half of 1991 
in the United States economy was the 10% rise 
in residential construction over the first half of 
the year. This has to be seen, however, against the 
16% decline that took place in the first half. For 
the year as a whole, residential construction was 
down 10%. The country is still in the midst of a 
correction to the building boom in the 1980s that 
had been stimulated by the relaxation of 
regulations in the banking sector and a tax 
structure that is highly favourable to real estate 
investment. Thus, despite the incentive from 
lower interest rates this year, construction is 
unlikely to become a major growth sector until 
high vacancy rates in over-built commercial real 
estate and generally depressed housing prices are 
worked off. 
Government expenditure has not been a 
stimulus to growth. Since the mid-1980s, fiscal 
policy has been restrictive, as the earlier 
uncontrolled growth of Federal deficits had to be 
corrected. In 1990, additional Federal spending 
cuts and tax increases were enacted just as the 
recession was beginning. However, the recession 
made a mockery of deficit-reduction 
commitments, as the consolidated Federal 
Government deficit surged to US$269 billion in 
the year ending 30 September 1991 (5% of GDP). 
The rise in the deficit has mainly been the result 
of passive changes in revenues and expenditures, 
rather than counter-cyclical spending efforts. 
Moreover, in the absence of Federal assistance 
state and local governments have had to cut back 
expenditures as the recession hit their revenues, 
adding a directly contractionary factor. As a 
result, the current recession is the first one in at 
least 30 years in which the fiscal stance was not 
pressing for recovery.4 
The United States Administration and 
Members of Congress proposed several fiscal 
stimulus packages in the early months of this 
year, but they would only have given a small 
fiscal impulse if enacted. On the other hand, 
many calls from outside the Government were 
heard during the winter months for a substantial, 
temporary fiscal impulse. The argument was that 
consolidation of the Federal deficit remained a 
very important medium-term policy goal, but that 
short-term exigencies -social as well as 
economic- required immediate counter-cyclical 
action and that investment in education and 
infrastructure would also improve long-term 
growth prospects. "The nation cannot afford the 
economic waste and human distress of protracted 
high unemployment" stated an open letter to the 
Government from 100 eminent United States 
economists in March 1992. 
The use of monetary policy In the major 
economies 
Though fiscal policy was hamstrung, United 
States monetary authorities had more room to act 
and they did, as did monetary policy makers in 
the other major industrial countries. But policy 
actions were very cautious for fear of setting off 
new inflationary pressures. In the event, repeated 
doses of monetary easing have been applied in 
most of the major countries, as the economies 
failed to respond adequately. 
In fact, inflationary pressures were generally 
weak. The sharp run-up in spot prices on 
international petroleum markets that occurred in 
the last third of 1990 was largely unwound by the 
first quarter of 1991, and the unit values of fuel 
imports of the industrialized countries returned 
Data of the United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, February 1992. 
The "fiscal stance"-as measured by OECD- was essentially zero (neutral) in 1990 and 1991 (it excludes, in particulada large 
contributor to the Federal deficit, i.e., the financing to restructure failed savings institutions and extra support for deposit insurance); 
the same indicator was expected on the basis of existing policies to be a surplus of 1% of GNP in 1992, reducing aggregate demand 
and thus exerting a significant pressure retarding recovery (see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Economic Outlook, No. 50 (December 1991), p. 132). 
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essentially to pre-crisis levels by the second 
quarter. Moreover, if dollar fuel prices are 
deflated by dollar prices of manufactured exports 
of developed market economies -reflecting 
exchange rate changes among other factors- the 
oil-price "shock" in late 1990 is seen to have been 
much smaller than the nominal dollar data 
indicate. In addition, non-fuel commodity prices 
on international markets weakened in 1991 and 
were especially low when measured in terms of 
the volume of manufactured exports of industrial 
countries that they could buy. Coupled with the 
recessionary dampening of wage pressure and an 
attendant slow-down in the growth of labour cost 
per unit of output, fears about inflation and 
inflation itself eased, except in Germany. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve 
reduced its discount rate in several stages from 
7% in December 1990 to 3.5% in December 
1991, the lowest level since 1964. The full range 
of short-term interest rates has fallen 
significantly through 1991; longer-term rates 
declined less. While such reductions in interest 
rates ease the cost of servicing outstanding debt, 
they seem to have provided only a very limited 
stimulus to demand as there has been little 
inclination to borrow -or to lend- in the face of 
lingering recession and high levels of personal 
and corporate debt. Thus, in spite of the easing of 
credit terms, the broad money supply in the 
United States (M2) actually declined in real terms 
in 1991. 
In Ganada, short-term interest rates declined 
substantially in the face of the steep recession 
there. By year-end the prime rate at commercial 
banks was 6.5 percentage points below its 
14.75% peak, reached in summer, 1990. 
British authorities have similarly eased 
monetary conditions: the three-month money 
rate fell from 15% in 1990 to below 12% in 1991. 
As in the United States, however, long-term rates 
have changed less. 
In Japan, economic growth weakened in the 
course of the year. By the summer, the Bank of 
Japan took the opportunity of a calming of 
inflationary concerns to ease monetary policy 
slightly; during the second half of the year it 
See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develo] 
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lowered the official discount rate by 1.5 
percentage points to 4.5%. 
The unification of Germany added 1.5 
percentage points to the growth rate of the 
western part of the country in 1990 and about 1 
percentage point to the growth in 1991. Large 
financial transfers were made by the Federal 
Government to the eastern Lander, which were 
financed by government borrowing. German 
macroeconomic policy in 1991 aimed at easing 
the resulting demand pressures. On the one hand, 
as will be analysed in more detail below, the 
Government imposed a tax increase from 1 July 
along with other measures of fiscal restraint. On 
the other hand, the Bundesbank raised official 
interest rates, first in February by half a 
percentage point and then again in August when 
the discount rate was increased by 1 percentage 
point and the Lombard rate was raised 0.75 
percentage point. Consumer price inflation in 
western Germany rose above 4%, a moderate rate 
in many countries but high by German standards. 
Thus, although the German economy began to 
contract, the Bundesbank remained firm in its 
stance against inflationary pressure and its 
commitment to avoid a wage-price spiral during 
1991. As the year ended, the Bundesbank raised 
interest rates another notch. As a result, German 
interest rates became the highest they have ever 
been in the post-war period. 
Government activism in the 1990s 
Much discussion of economic policy in the 
1980s emphasized the limits to the role of 
government in a market economy. In many 
governmental and academic circles, fiscal policy 
lost favour as a tool for countering the inherent 
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity, let 
alone steering national economies onto adequate 
and sustainable economic growth paths. A 
common theme in national parliaments and 
international policy discussions was the need to 
contain the growth of budgetary expenditure and 
reduce public sector borrowing requirements. 
Official borrowing was considered excessive and 
thought to be less in the national interest than 
private sector borrowing. 
:,EcoiiomlcSurveys:Germmiy (Paris, July 1991), pp. 127-128. 
However, the reality of government policy did 
not match the rhetoric. As the failure to contain 
the United States budget deficit has shown, 
political pressures in a democratic government 
may prevail over economic objectives. Three 
other cases -from Germany, Italy and Japan-
further illustrate this point. 
The unification of Germany 
Towards the end of 1989, the prospect of 
German unification, long dismissed as 
impossible, became all of a sudden a very distinct 
possibility. By early 1990 the question was no 
longer whether or when but how and how soon. 
Proposals for a gradual process of economic 
reintegration seemed reasonable from a purely 
economic point of view, but they did not take 
account of political and social issues, including 
the prospect of a tide of emigration from east to 
west. It also could not be said how long the new 
fluid political situation in eastern Europe would 
remain. The Government believed it to be of 
overriding political importance to create an 
irreversible unification of the country as quickly 
as possible. Thus, on 1 July 1990 the German 
Economic, Monetary and Social Union was 
created and by 3 October the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) became part of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
b) The transition to new market economies 
A revolution is under way in the eastern part 
of Europe and in the former Soviet Union. In its 
economic dimension, it entails a complete 
change of system. Without precedents against 
which to compare national progress, 
Governm ents have been changing policy-m aking 
teams, sometimes frequently. Expectations have 
tended to be over-optimistic and disappointments 
have been sharp. Untried policies and 
considerable "learning by doing" are the order of 
the day. Towards the end of 1991, these 
economies were still in transition: the old order 
of central planning had broken up, but the new 
system had not yet crystallized. 
In such a situation, severe economic 
disruption might be expected; indeed, with 
output falling 16% last year, it was happening. 
Output fell sharply even in the countries that were 
expecting recovery to begin, notably Poland and 
Romania. Activity in the private sector has begun 
to flourish, but, because of its small share in 
overall activity, that could only moderate, not 
arrest, the decline. In the former Soviet Union, 
national income in 1991 was at least 15% less 
than in the previous year. 
By all indicators, the region is in the grip of a 
savage economic contraction. The fall in 
economic activity is without precedent in 
industrialized countries. Levels of output in 1991 
were no higher than ten years ago (see table 3). 
Investment fell to the levels of the middle 1970s. 
The last three years have witnessed such deep 
cuts in investment outlays that even essential 
maintenance has been delayed or neglected, 
threatening much of the viable capital stock. 
In the Soviet Union, practically all of the 
increment in national income in the period 
1986-1990 had been expended on current 
consumption and on non-industrial construction. 
In 1991, the stock of unfinished construction 
grew by 30%; in 1990 it had already amounted to 
17% of investment, compared to 5% in 1985. 
According to estimates of Goskomstat of the 
USSR, the Union ended with two thirds of 
machinery and equipment in industry technically 
obsolete and 42% of fixed assets due for 
replacement. In individual sectors, the situation 
was even worse; e.g., in the Russian Federation's 
oil refining industry, 90% of equipment was 
reported to be due for replacement. 
Industrial production has been especially hard 
hit. Anti-inflationary demand restraints sharply 
cut back domestic purchases in eastern Europe. 
With the collapse of trading relationships under 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), orders from neighbouring CMEA 
countries fell by a half or more, seriously hurting 
production for exports. Exports to hard-currency 
markets have not been able to make up the slack. 
Import restraints in some countries deprived 
Quantitative data from the economies in transition must be interpreted with great caution as national statistical systems and 
data collection are in flux. 
"Ob itogakh funktsionirovaniia narodnogo khozyaistva Rossiiskoy Federatsii v 1991 godu", Gosudarstvennyi komitet 
Rossiiskoy Federatsii po statistike (Moscow), 1992, p. 37. 
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industry of necessary raw materials, equipment 
and replacement parts, in the USSR especially in 
the food, pharmaceuticals, textile, garments and 
footwear sectors. 
The deterioration in the agricultural sector 
became an international focus of attention, 
particularly in the countries that were relatively 
late starters in the transformation to market 
economies, namely Bulgaria, Romania and the 
former Soviet Union. Bulgaria, formerly a food 
exporter to the east and the west, was forced to 
import large quantities of food. In the former 
Soviet Union, the grain harvest dropped 25% in 
1991. The acreage sown fell 3.3 million hectares, 
after having fallen 2.1 million hectares from 
1986 to 1990. 
The rural economy has generally been 
buffeted by inflationary cost increases and heavy 
taxation, making many formerly profitable farms 
unprofitable. The political debates continue 
about new land laws and how to reprivatize the 
agricultural sector. The claims of earlier owners 
of the land largely remain to be settled and some 
unregulated transfers of property have made the 
people working in the still collectivized sector 
uncertain even of their continued habitation on 
those properties. 
At the same time, markets for the agricultural 
output of the countries with more successful 
harvests were not readily found. Thus, while 
Hungarian and Polish exports to western Europe 
increased substantially, they were insufficient to 
offset the steep drop in sales to former CMEA 
partners. Coupled with domestic demand 
constraints, this has led to large unsold supplies 
in those countries. As in the past, farmers 
expected their Governments to provide 
guidelines and intervene to help them. The 
assistance that could be mustered was only 
sufficient to arrest a drastic collapse in 
confidence, but not enough to stop the decline in 
production. 
Inflation, except in Czechoslovakia, exceeded 
by a wide margin what policy makers had 
planned. Czechoslovakia pushed down the 
month-to-month inflation rate from 26% in 
January 1991 to practically nil by September and 
maintained a low rate for the rest of the year. At 
the other extreme, triple-digit inflation became 
the order of the day in Bulgaria, Romania and in 
the disintegrating Soviet Union. In Poland, the 
target had been to reduce inflation to 1 % a month 
before the end of 1991. The actual monthly rate 
declined to virtually zero by July, but theii began 
to rise as macroeconomic policy was eased. For 
the year as a whole, the inflation rate was thus 
70% (it had been 584% in 1990). The 1991 
Hungarian inflation rate, while half that of 
Poland, was nevertheless higher than in 1990. 
Inflation exploded in the USSR: consumer 
prices in October 1991 were 2.1 times and 
wholesale prices 2.7 times higher than a year 
before, in part due to a price rise put into effect 
in April. But the real spurt of inflation occurred 
at the very end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, 
especially after the liberalization of prices on 
2 January. By mid-February, prices had jumped 
at least 350% above the year-end 1991 level. 
A further complication is that the decision 
makers of the newly independent States have to 
reconcile solid national economic interests with 
powerful -if not always rational- sentiments of 
resurrected national identity and State 
independence. This is one area in which 
concessions to symbolism and political posturing 
could entail a high long-term price. In several 
major problem areas, considera tionsof long-term 
economic need have been overruled or hindered 
by political expediency. 
At the same time there are certain encouraging 
signs of cooperation. An inter-State coordinating 
mechanism was created in February 1992 in the 
area of statistics, and a certain level of 
cooperation is maintained in customs services, 
transport and environmental protection. Progress 
lies in building on these successes. 
c) Developing countries: slow growth once more 
In 1991, overall economic growth in 
developing countries remained sluggish. It 
averaged about 3.4% in 1991, about the same as 
in 1989 and 1990. There was also great diversity. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, economic 
*The decline in livestock is worrisome indeed. In Hungary, for example, in the first three quarters of 1991 the stock of hogs 
decreased by more than 20%, that of cattle by 6%, poultry by 18%, sheep by 20% (Sépszabadsâg (Budapest), 22 November 1991, 
p. 5). 
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recovery is taking place in several countries and, 
after a virtual stagnation in 1990, the region 
showed a 2.6% growth in 1991. On the other 
hand, there was not much change in growth in 
Africa. In the Mediterranean region, caught 
between the impact of the Gulf war and the war 
in Yugoslavia, growth collapsed. South and East 
Asia remained the fastest growing region in the 
world, as it was throughout the 1980s, but world 
recession and the consequences of the Gulf crisis 
for labour remittances, tourism and oil imports, 
affected the countries of the region in 1991 in 
various degrees. The result was a deceleration 
from 6.3% in 1990 to 5.4% in 1991. 
There are large differences in the patterns of 
investment and rates of growth within the regions, 
which are highlighted in the analysis that follows, 
but there also is an identifiable convergence of 
growth performances. The deceleration in 1991 
is concentrated in the bracket of high growth. 
While 12 countries had attained growth of over 
7.5% in 1990, only 8 reachedsuch levels in 1991. 
The decline was even sharper in the performance 
bracket of 5 to 7.5%. This reflects developments 
in the newly industrializing countries and in the 
second generation of successful manufacture 
exporters in South and East Asia. At the other 
extreme, there were fewer countries with zero or 
negative growth in 1991 than in 1990. The 
number of countries in the moderate to slow 
growth bracket of 2.5 to 5% increased. 
Africa: broadening the adjustment 
The growth of output in Africa was around 3% 
in 1991, less than population growth. For the 
second consecutive year, the energy-exporting 
countries performed significantly better than the 
energy-importing countries. Growth in the 
energy-importing countries was less than 2% in 
1991, half the rate for the oil-exporting countries. 
Economic performance in 1991 was affected 
by the events in the Gulf which had an impact on 
export and government revenues in oil-exporting 
countries and on tourism and oil import prices in 
oil-importing countries. During the second half 
of 1991, however, the effects of the Gulf crisis 
had subsided. Energy prices fell and tourism 
rebounded in Egypt, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya 
and Mauritius. In Egypt, Suez canal revenues 
almost doubled in 1991 and workers' remittances 
were far higher than expected. In the Sudan, on 
the other hand, the loss of workers' remittances 
continues to be felt. As terms of trade continued 
to deteriorate, Africa's export revenues did not 
increase despite a nearly 10% increase in their 
volume. 
Total food production in Africa increased by 
14% in 1991, although agricultural output was 
curtailed by civil strife, notably in Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan, 
and by drought in some areas in eastern and 
southern Africa. In countries with more normal 
weather, for example, Mozambique, the United 
Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, agricultural 
production continued to suffer from lack of credit, 
poorly developed marketing, distribution, and 
transportation systems, inadequate extension 
services, and untimely delivery of fertilizers and 
seeds. Maize output in Zambia suffered from low 
producer prices, forcing the country to import 
maize. 
A large number of countries continued to pursue 
programmes of economic reform, but their effects 
on investment and growth are still disappointing. 
Despite modest results in some areas, a conclusive 
empirical assessment is not yet available. This is 
partly because the assessments are difficult to 
compare, owing to limited information on the 
methodology. Neither do adjustment programmes 
of individual countries have the same starting 
point. For many countries, too little time has 
elapsed since the adoption of structural 
adjustment measures. Statistical data are 
inadequate in particular in economies in which 
the subsistence factor is still very large. And 
political reform aimed at greater pluralism has 
brought changes to the implementation of 
economic reform programmes. 
'The effects of the Gulf crisis on the economic performance in Africa were analysed in World Economic Survey, 1991 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.C.1). 
See, for instance, Riccardo Faini, Jaime de Melo, Abdelhak Senhadji and Julie Stanton, "Growth-oriented adjustment 
programs: a statistical analysis", World Development, vol. 19, No. 8 (August 1991), pp. 957-967; Carol Lancaster, "The political 
economy of economic reform: focus on sub-Saharan Africa", United Nations Committee for Development Planning, twenty-eighth 
session, November 1991, pp. 14-20; Howard Stein, "Deindustrialization, adjustment, the World Bank and the IMF in Africa", World 
Development, vol. 20, No. 1 (1992). 
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West Asia: the aftermath of war 
The economic situation in the region in 1991 
was marked by the Gulf war. Output plunged 
in the war-devastated economies of Iraq and 
Kuwait but rose in other major 
energy-exporting countries. Loss of trade, 
tourism and workers' remittances in the 
aftermath of the war caused great difficulties 
for energy-importing and poorer countries. The 
combined gross domestic product of the region 
declined. 
Although oil output expanded in 1991, 
output in other sectors declined. Most of the 
decline occurred early in the year and 
economic activities recovered after the end of 
hostilities. In most countries, output was 
affected by the massive departure of foreign 
workers at the outbreak of the crisis. 
Construction slowed down and many projects 
scheduled for 1991 were delayed. Air transport 
and shipping were badly affected by the war. 
In some countries, other services were also 
affected: some banks stopped operation, and 
hotel occupancies and retail sales declined as 
foreigners left the region. 
Almost all countries in the region faced 
increased budget deficits owing to an 
unprecedented rise in government outlays. In 
many countries much of this was war-related 
spending, but others had to cope with rising 
spending on social services, owing to a massive 
influx of returnees or refugees. To finance the 
budget deficits, most countries borrowed 
domestically and externally. The Saudi 
Government, for the first time in 20 years, raised 
a syndicated loan of around US$4.5 billion in the 
international capital market. It also raised a 
US$2.5 billion loan from the local banking 
system. 
Despite increased government spending, 
inflation in energy exporting countries remained 
relatively low, the major exceptions being the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Syrian 
Arab Republic. By contrast, consumer prices 
increased on the average by over 20% in the net 
energy-importing countries. 
The external balance of most countries 
worsened in 1991. The volume of oil exports 
increased with expanded oil production, but 
their value was 11% lower than in 1990. 
Non-oil exports contracted, due partly to the 
importance of aluminium, which fetched lower 
prices. In the major countries of the region, there 
were heavy outflows of official transfers, mostly 
related to war commitments. Private transfer 
payments increased owing to the massive transfer 
of savings by the departing foreign workers. As 
a result, the region's current account deficit 
widened in 1991. 
Soon after the war, most countries turned 
their attention to accelerated implementation 
of infrastructural and industrial projects which 
had been delayed by the Gulf crisis and the war. 
With the oil sector providing only limited 
scope for further expansion, the emphasis was 
on the development of other sectors such as 
aluminium, light industry and services. A 
major aim of long-term policy has been to 
attract foreign investment in these sectors and 
to this end many countries have revised their 
ownership regulations. Wholly foreign-owned 
companies are now allowed in Bahrain. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran passed new legislation 
allowing up to 49% foreign ownership in joint 
ventures. In May 1991, the Syrian Arab 
Republic passed a new investment law to 
promote foreign participation. 
South and East Asia: the best performers slowed 
down 
The region was once more the fastest growing 
in the world, but it slowed down almost a full 
percentage point, to 5.4% in 1991. 
On the whole, economies in South and East 
Asia showed remarkable resilience to the 
unfavourable international environment in 
1991. As in 1990, growth in domestic demand 
rather than exports was the locomotive of 
growth. Fiscal policy was expansionary in 
several of them. In Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Taiwan Province of China and Singapore, 
government investment increased, especially 
in infrastructure projects in the transport 
system. Government expenditures increased 
also in Bangladesh and in the Philippines, as 
they struggled to rebuild after natural 
catastrophes. In Indonesia and in the Republic 
of Korea, on the other hand, public 
expenditures were contained, as inflation rose 
to near double digits. Inflation had accelerated 
across the region from 1989 to 1990, but was 
kept under control in 1991, although it did 
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increase in Hong Kong, Pakistan and more 
markedly in the Philippines. 
Except for the Philippines and India, all 
economies in the region grew much faster than 
their population, but slower than before. Among 
the exceptions are Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Province of China, where higher growth in 1991 
owed much to the boom of the southern provinces 
of China. Other cases of recovery are 
Afghanistan, with hopeful signs of peace after 
more than a decade of civil war and four years of 
steep GDP decline, and Papua New Guinea, going 
through a mining boom after two years of decline. 
In recent years the second generation of newly 
industrialized Asian economies (Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand) had begun to replace the 
original four newly industrialized economies 
(NiEs) as the engine of growth in the region, but 
this trend seemed to halt in 1991. Growth of the 
original NIES outstripped that of the second 
generation. Among the original four, the rate of 
growth was higher than in the previous year in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan Province of China and 
only slightly lower in the Republic of Korea and 
in Singapore. In this group, export growth 
accelerated in 1991 to almost 14% compared to 
around 8% in the previous year, specially due to 
a sharp rise in trade with China, which benefited 
in particular Hong Kong and Taiwan Province of 
China. 
Growth decelerated in the second generation 
of successful exporters of manufactures. In 
Indonesia, the largest of the group, the 
slow-down was due to drought and fiscal and 
monetary austerity measures. In Thailand growth 
slowed from 10 to 8%, as infrastructural 
bottlenecks and shortages of skilled manpower in 
some industries emerged. Exports, on the 
average, grew faster in 1991 than in 1990, despite 
deceleration in Indonesia. Despite some decline 
in the overall flow of foreign direct investment to 
these countries in 1991, the tendency to relocate 
manufactures from Japan and from the first 
generation of NiEs towards Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand continued. The same process is 
continuing in Indochina, as Thai and Taiwanese 
investment is increasing in Viet Nam and its 
See United Nations, Economic andSocial Survey of Asia 
TSee, for instance, M. Shibusawa, Z.H. Ahmad and B. Brit 
Institute of International Affairs, 1992). 
possibilities are being explored in Cambodia. In 
general, economic interlinkages within the 
region, as well as between it and China and Japan 
have been increasing. 
India's economic performance improved in 
the 1980s when growth of output averaged 5.3% 
a year compared to 3.2% in the 1970s. The path 
of the 1980s had been one of "growth-cum-debt". 
Current account deficits in the second half of the 
1980s were on average more than double those 
of the first half, financed by increasing external 
borrowing. Rising from US$2.6 billion at the 
beginning of the decade, the current account 
deficit averaged US$8 billion in the period 
1990-1991. Total external debt, from US$21 
billion in 1980, reached over US$70 billion in 
1990, representing 12% of GNP at the beginning 
of the period and 25% at the end. The debt 
service-exports ratio tripled from 9% in 1980 to 
27% in 1990. 
In 1991, India's growth rate fell to 2.5% from 
over 5% the year before. Restrictions on imports 
and bank credit in the first half of 1991 led to 
sharp deceleration in industry. The country 
suffered from the Gulf crisis: it had to reabsorb 
200 thousand returnees, it had lost US$500 
million in workers' remittances and exports to the 
Gulf area and it had faced a higher oil bill in 1990. 
Furthermore, there was an abrupt halving in trade 
with the rupee payment area including the former 
Soviet Union, which had accounted for about 
20% of the country's trade in 1990. These losses 
compounded the deterioration of the balance of 
payments already in course. 
The external environment was no more 
favourable to the transition economies in Asia, 
such as Mongolia, Viet Nam or the other 
countries in Indochina, which suffered from the 
disruption in trade and other economic links 
resulting from the dismantling of the CMEA and 
the break-up of the Soviet Union. To adjust to the 
new situation, economic and political reforms 
began in Mongolia at the end of 1989. In 1991 
the Mongolian Government embarked on a 
privatization programme. The first step was the 
sell-off of State stores and some food services. To 
prepare for the privatization of larger enterprises, 
ndlhe Pacific (ST/ESCAP/1905, February 1992). 
;es, Pacific Asia in the 1990s (London, Routledge for The Royal 
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two types of "privatization vouchers" were given 
to citizens born before 31 May 1991 entitling 
them to purchase shares of State enterprises and 
other assets. This bold attempt at creating a 
market economy is still to be tested in the next 
years. Until now adjustment and transition have 
been painful: output declined some 10% in 1991, 
industrial production contracted by 12%, 
unemployment has risen almost 50%, the 
Government deficit shot up and inflation 
surpassed 50%. 
Adjustment has been more successful in Viet 
Nam, with better than expected economic 
performance (about 2.5% output growth in 
1991). The country has taken measures to attract 
foreign investment and in 1991 signed projects 
with a total value of US$1.2 billion. To balance 
its hard currency trade accounts, Viet Nam has 
cut back imports and succeeded to increase 
exports in spite of the United States embargo. The 
Government has increased taxes while cutting 
spending in order to slow down inflation, which 
remained, however, at around 60%. 
China: growth accelerates 
Economic growth accelerated in China during 
1991. The gross national product (GNP) is 
estimated to have grown by 7%, two percentage 
points higher than both the rate of 1990 and the 
Government target for 1991. Growth in total 
output was fueled by rapid increases in both 
consumer demand and investment demand. Total 
retail sales rose 10% in real terms while fixed 
investment expanded by 17%. Inflation inched 
up in 1991 but still remained moderate. 
The stabilization programme which was 
launched in late 1988 to combat inflation came 
to an end during 1991, and the Government 
began to follow more expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies. Money supply increased 28% 
during 1991, only slightly less than in 1990. 
Interest rates were lowered. Fiscal spending 
exceeded the government plan, partly due to 
unexpected fiscal outlays to aid victims of the 
summer floods. 
A relatively loose monetary and fiscal policy 
played an important role in boosting investment 
demand. Although a reduction in interest rates by 
itself may have only a small impact on total 
demand for investment in a country like China, 
the general relaxation of macroeconomic policies 
following the end of the stabilization programme 
opened a floodgate that had been holding back 
expenditure. 
Consumer spending also boomed, as reflected 
in a sharp rise in retail sales. Urban real income 
per capita increased close to 8% in 1991 while 
farmers' income per capita grew by 2% in the 
same period. Increased personal income boosted 
consumption spending directly while lower interest 
rates on bank deposits helped shift income from 
savings to consumption. Another factor which 
led to increased retail sales was the Government's 
decision to cut prices of overstocked goods. 
The performance of the agricultural sector 
was unexpectedly good, considering that China 
experienced severe flooding in some of the 
richest agricultural areas of the country during 
the summer of 1991. As floods hit the provinces 
along the Yangtze River, an estimated total of 
68 billion yuan (about US$13 billion) worth of 
properties and output was lost. Flood waters 
destroyed summer crops and delayed the planting 
of autumn crops. Despite this, China harvested 
435 million tons of grain, only 2.5% less than the 
1990 crop and the second highest in history, and 
5 million tons of cotton, which was over 25% 
more than the 1990 record. Total agricultural 
output increased by 3% in 1991. 
Growth of industrial output accelerated. The 
collective and the private enterprises grew by 
18% and 44%, respectively, compared with 8.4% 
in the State sectors. The relative size of the State 
sector has been declining, and in 1991 it fell 
below 45%. 
The State sector continued to be troubled by a 
large inventory of unsold finished products and 
mounting bad debts. Even after extensive 
government rescue operations, total debts of 
these enterprises remained around 300 billion 
yuan at the end of 1991.1 Supporting a State 
sector in which one third of the firms were losing 
money, coupled with aid to flood victims, pushed 
the Government's budget deficit above the 
A comparison between this figure and the total reported pre-tax profits of State-owned enterprises of 142 billion yuan in 
1991 gives an idea of the relative magnitude of the debt problem, although the firms that are in debt are not likely to be generating 
any profits at all. 
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planned figure of 12.3 billion yuan 
(US$2.3 billion) by about 8.8 billion yuan. But 
its inflationary effect will be limited since issue 
of bonds rather than printing money was the 
primary means of financing the deficits, and 
financial institutions were used as underwriters 
selling the bonds on the emerging financial 
markets. 
After a year of relative price stability, the 
acceleration of growth in 1991 was accompanied 
by a modest upturn in inflation as reflected in the 
retail price index, which increased by around 3%. 
The cost of living index in major cities increased 
by 8% in the same period. This difference reflects 
partly the increase in the official prices of 
cooking oil and other staple food items sold to 
urban residents at State stores last May (which 
has a much smaller impact on the first price 
index). The existence of stocks of finished goods 
also cushioned the inflationary pressure brought 
on by looser fiscal and monetary policies. 
During 1991, China was involved in a trade 
dispute with the United States over issues of 
copyright protection and barriers to trade. The 
growth of Chinese foreign trade seems to have 
been little affected by these frictions. 
Foreign investment continued to grow 
following the upward trend set in 1990. 
Contracted projects reached a total value of 
US$17.8 billion in 1991, rising by 47.6% over 
1990. Actual investment totalled US$11.3 billion 
in the same period, or 9.6% higher than in the 
previous year. Rapid growth was seen in 
investment from Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. 
Combined with increased revenues from the 
recovery of tourism in 1991 and the trade surplus, 
these inflows pushed China's foreign reserves to 
about US$40 billion at the end of September of 
1991.15 China, with a debt service ratio less than 
10%, has not encountered any difficulties in 
meeting its external liabilities. 
-16 
Mediterranean: between two wars 
With the war in Yugoslavia " and the 
slow-down in Turkey and Cyprus, the region's 
real GDP declined by 7% in 1991. This reflects the 
collapse of the Yugoslav economy, brought 
about by civil war and ethnic violence. Industrial 
production dropped by more than 20% in 1991. 
Construction declined by about 16% and tourism 
virtually disappeared, with a drop of almost 90%. 
Agriculture seemed to recover precariously. 
Altogether, domestic output declined by more 
than 20% in 1991, after about 9% in 1990. Fueled 
by successive devaluations, falling production 
and increased import prices, inflation reached 
more than 250% for the whole of 1991. 
Unemployment exceeded 20%. There was a 
complete breakdown of inter-republican trade. 
External trade also fell between 20 and 30%. The 
country's political disintegration made 
programmes of economic reform meaningless. 
In Turkey economic growth decelerated 
sharply in 1991, to only about 2%, from over 9% 
in 1990. The sharp economic contraction 
stemmed mainly from the effects of the Gulf 
crisis which led to a collapse of trade with Iraq, 
the country's main trade partner in the area and 
to an erosion of consumer and business 
confidence. The effects were felt in all sectors, 
excepting agriculture. 
Interest rates rose sharply at the outbreak of 
the Gulf war and as banks, in times of uncertainty 
created by the crisis, sharply reduced lending. 
Monetary policy remained restrictive. 
Expansionary fiscal policies, and the end of the 
Gulf war led to a recovery in the second half of 
1991. Industrial production recovered somewhat, 
mainly in consumer durables. The service sector 
also began to grow, albeit slowly, thanks to the 
revival in tourism. 
Government outlays increased sharply to 
accommodate higher wage demands from civil 
servants, a rise in agricultural support prices and 
higher military expenditures. The budget deficit 
widened to 11% of GNP and was financed mainly 
through short-term borrowing from the Central 
Bank, and to a lesser extent through sale of 
treasury bills and external borrowing. Inflation 
accelerated to nearly 70% from 60% in 1990. 
Unemployment rose to over 11%. 
State Statistical Bureau, "Report on the national economic and social development in 1991", in The Economic Dally (Beijing). 
The Economic Daily (Beijing), 1 February 1992. 
1*With the independence of Croatia and Slovenia recognized at the start of 1992, Yugoslavia, as a federation of six constituent 
republics and two provinces, has ceased to exist. 
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2. International trade 
Growth in the volume of world trade slowed for 
the third consecutive year in 1991 to about 3%. 
This constituted the smallest gain since 1985, but 
was none the less remarkable in a year when 
world output declined (see figure 1). In value 
terms, world merchandise exports rose 2% in 
1991 to a record US$3.47 trillion, as prices 
declined on average (see table 4). 
The slow-down in world trade was largely due 
to the recession in the industrial economies and, 
to a lesser extent, to the collapse of the economies 
of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The growth of export volume of the industrial 
countries dropped from 5.7% in 1990 to a little 
under 3% in 1991. Despite the decline, trade 
remained more resilient than output in these 
economies which increased by only 1% in 1991. 
Exports from eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union fell by almost 22% in volume terms 
in 1991, while their imports contracted by 30%. 
Exports of the developing countries, on the other 
hand, increased by about 10% in volume while 
their imports increased by around 9%. 
The revival of world trade will clearly depend 
on the speed of recovery of the industrial 
economies from the current recession. The 
pent-up import demand in eastern Europe and the 
republics of the former Soviet Union both for 
current consumption and reconstruction should 
also lead, if adequately financed, to increased 
imports into that area. Moreover, the present 
efforts at trade liberalization in the developing 
countries should make a modest contribution to 
the resuscitation of world trade. Continuing 
protectionist trends in many parts of the world, 
on the other hand, could dampen these 
possibilities. 
As of May 1992, when this Survey was 
completed, the outcome of the Uruguay Round 
remained uncertain. The biggest sticking point 
continued to be agriculture, but there were other 
important areas where the negotiations were not 
nearly complete. Despite declared commitments 
at the highest political levels among the major 
countries, no breakthrough looked imminent. 
While the Uruguay Round negotiations 
wavered, forces eroding the multilateral trading 
system appeared to gather strength. Among the 
moves towards unilateralism and managed trade 
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was the attempt to re-activate the Super 301 
process in the United States. There was little 
abatement of protectionism among the major 
trading nations. In contrast, a number of 
developing countries -especially in Latin 
America- were undertaking significant 
liberalization of their trade regimes. 
Attempts at forming regional trading 
arrangements continue. Some have viewed these 
arrangements as building blocks, and others as 
stumbling blocks, in the evolution of the trading 
system. In the latter case, the proliferation of 
blocs is seen as inherently likely to impair 
multilateralism. In the former case, trade 
liberalization agreed to in so-called 
"mini-multilaterals" is expected to spread 
throughout the global trading system. 
Among the other long-term issues of special 
concern for developing countries, commodity 
prices, which have been falling since the early 
1980s but recovered slightly in the late 1980s, are 
now at record low levels. Moreover, prices are 
not expected to recover substantially in the near 
future. 
The relationship between development and 
the environment has assumed great importance in 
national and international discussions in recent 
years. Concern with the issues of trade and 
protection of the environment has 
correspondingly increased. 
a) Trade flows in 1991 : salient features 
Developed market economies 
The value of the industrialized economies' 
merchandise exports and imports, which 
represent about 70% of world trade, increased 
about 2% in 1991, the smallest rate of increase 
since 1985. In volume terms, the growth of their 
exports slowed to just under 3% from around 6% 
in 1990, while the growth of their imports slowed 
from about 5% to 3%. This lethargic growth of 
trade in 1991 is largely attributed to the recession 
in both North America and the United Kingdom 
and the consequent decline in their import 
demand. A strong growth of import demand in 
Germany and the continuing strength of United 
States exports were the major factors sustaining 
the growth of industrialized country trade. 
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For the United States, export growth was one 
of the few bright spots in the economy during 
1991. The volume of exports increased by about 
7% in 1991, and although this represented a 
slow-down from an 8% increase in 1990, the 
growth was much higher than that of other major 
developed countries' exports. The growth was 
fueled by the decline in the value of the dollar, 
which reached historic lows against the mark and 
the yen in February 1991. Thereafter, the dollar 
began to rally and economic growth overseas 
began to stall just as the United States economy 
was showing signs of recovery. 
The strength of exports contributed to a further 
reduction of United States merchandise trade 
deficit which shrank by about US$34 billion to 
US$74 billion in 1991. Over the period 
1987-1991 the deficit as a proportion of exports 
declined from over 60% to under 20%, which 
makes the current protectionist sentiments in the 
country incongruous. The focus of protectionism 
has, however, shifted from overall deficit to 
bilateral deficits, some of which remain large. 
Deficits were especially large with China, Japan 
and Taiwan Province of China, which together 
accounted for some four fifths of the United 
States's trade deficit in 1991, up from roughly 
half in 1988. The fact that the United States trade 
deficit with Asia, and particularly Japan, is not 
shrinking fast has put a particular spin on United 
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States trade policy vis-à-vis these countries 
which continued in 1991. 
The Japanese response has been one of 
accommodation. For example, in mid-Match 1992, 
Japan announced that it would reduce its ceiling 
for automobile exports to the United States to 
1.65 million cars per year, down from 2.3 million. 
This gesture is, however, expected to have only 
a limited impact on the American automobile 
industry -in part because of the depressed market 
and in part because of the increasing number of 
cars being manufactured at Japanese "transplant" 
factories in the United States. 
In a further bid to offset trade tensions, Japan's 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MiTi) was said to be considering announcing a 
similar reduction in its exports of cars to Europe 
-though, here too, a 5% quota cut would have 
little effect on total Japanese sales because of the 
existence of Japanese auto plants in Europe. 
Nevertheless, such a move is expected to 
symbolize Japanese auto makers' willingness to 
abide by last summer's Min-European 
Community (EC) accord to limit their European 
market share until the end of the century. 
The growth of Japanese imports slowed in 
1991 in response to the slow-down of the 
economy and was no longer one of the major 
growth poles of world trade that it had been since 
the mid-1980s. Exports also grew only modestly, 
at just about the same rate as imports. 
Nevertheless, the country's trade surplus 
increased by US$40 billion to around US$103 
billion. This was largely due to a 10% 
improvement in the terms of trade of the country, 
partly resulting from an appreciation of the yen 
and a decline in prices of oil imports. The trade 
balance with the United States increased, though 
only by just over 1%, for the first time in four 
years. Much of the increase in overall trade 
surplus in 1991 was due to a sharp switch of the 
trade balance of the country with the EC from a 
deficit to a surplus, and an increase in the surplus 
with South and East Asia. 
Largely as a consequence of unification, German 
imports increased sharply in 1991 while exports 
declined. Total imports in 1991 were some 10% 
higher than in 1990 for Germany and was one of 
the major sources of growth of world trade. 
Developing countries 
In 1991, exports of developing countries 
increased by around 10% in volume and by 5% 
in nominal dollar terms as average prices of 
exports fell. Imports also increased sharply, by 
about 9% in volume and 8% in value. The growth 
of developing country trade was thus much 
higher than the growth of world trade. As with 
economic growth, there were however very large 
differences among countries. 
Developments in 1991 that affected the 
merchandise trade of developing countries 
include the recession in developed market 
economies which reduced demand for their 
exports, the price effects of the unanticipated 
increase of exports of some mineral and metals 
from republics of the former Soviet Union (see 
below), the loss of export markets in eastern 
European countries and republics of the former 
Soviet Union, and the lingering effects of the 
Gulf conflict. The roll-back of oil prices 
benefitted the energy-importing countries. 
Imports of Latin America and the Caribbean 
surged at the highest rate in recent years, 
growing 14% in volume in 1991. On the other 
hand, exports, which had been growing at an 
annual rate of around 6% in volume over 
1987-1990, slowed to under 5%. Export 
revenues declined by 1.4% as export prices 
fell. The terms of trade of the region 
deteriorated by around 6%. 
The volume of Africa's exports increased by 
around 4% but this was more than offset by a 9% 
decline in export unit values, leading to a 6% fall 
in export earnings. Prices of oil, coffee, cocoa, 
copper and other commodities that together 
account for over 80% of Africa's export revenues 
were lower in 1991. The terms of trade of the 
Thus, Japan exported roughly 1.76 mil lion automobiles to the United States in 1991, which was only 110,000 above the new 
ceiling. Moreover, this represented the fifth consecutive year that Japanese car exports to the United States fell below 2.3 million, 
the ceiling in effect since the mid-1980s. 
rational import quotas that have long protected European automobile manufacturers are to disappear next year under the 
European Community's single market. Export ceilings -but only to the year 1999- are to replace these quotas. 
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region worsened by over 7%. The volume of 
imports increased only marginally. 
The volume of exports of South and East Asia 
increased by around 14%, while region's imports 
grew almost as fast, at around 12%. Along with 
the growth of China's trade, it was one of the most 
dynamic elements in world trade in 1991. 
Although the world-wide recession had an 
adverse impact, trade performance remained 
strong because of high rates of economic growth 
in the region and increased trade and investment 
links between developing countries in the region 
and with Japan. Singapore's export growth 
slowed, but was not halted, by recession in the 
United States and other exporters of 
manufactures -Hong Kong, Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China- were also able to 
increase their exports substantially, mainly to 
China and the European Community. Exports 
from Malaysia and Thailand continued to grow 
fast. Indonesia's exports were relatively sluggish 
because of lower oil and commodity prices. On 
the other hand, exports of India and Viet Nam 
stagnated, partly because of reduced import 
demand in eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Trade flows of several countries in South 
Asia were adversely affected by the disruptions 
caused by the Gulf conflict. 
China's trade expanded robustly with the 
value of exports increasing at a rate of about 16%. 
Imports, recovering from a decline of over 15% 
in 1990, increased by almost 20% in 1991. 
China's trade benefitted from strong trade links 
with the United States, Japan and other countries 
in South and East Asia. The rapid expansion of 
exports can be attributed to reforms that allowed 
for increased autonomy in the export sector, an 
overall depreciation of the yuan, and rapid 
industrial growth. The import growth was a result 
of the lifting of austerity measures that had 
restricted imports in the past two years. 
In West Asia lower oil prices led to a 10% fall 
in export revenue despite an increase in the 
volume of oil exports. Much of the increase was 
due to higher levels of production and exports of 
oil in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the United Arab Emirates. The combined 
volume of exports of these three countries, which 
normally account for about two thirds of the 
region's exports earnings, increased by 4.5% in 
1991. 
Economies in transition 
The volume of foreign trade of the economies 
in transition fell sharply in 1991. There were two 
major components of this decline: the sharp 
contraction of intra-CMEA trade and the collapse 
of Soviet foreign trade. 
The value of exports of the five eastern 
European countries declined by about 10% in 
1991, as trade with other eastern European 
economies and the Soviet Union contracted 
sharply. Their exports to the industrial countries, 
on the other hand, increased by about 8%. The 
share of inter-group trade, which had been 
declining recently, plummeted. Imports of these 
countries increased by around 6%.; As with 
exports, there was a substantial increase in 
imports from the market economies, and a very 
sharp decline of imports from other eastern 
European countries, while imports from the 
former Soviet Union increased slightly. Exports 
of the former Soviet Union declined by over 20% 
in value while its imports plunged by almost 
40%. Trade of the country with eastern Europe 
fell even more drastically. 
b) Commodity prices in 1991 
The average price of non-fuel commodities, as 
measured by the combined index of nominal 
dollar prices of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), declined 
by 6.3% in 1991 (see figure 2). Measured in 
special drawing rights (SDRs), the decline was a 
slightly steeper 7.4%, reflecting the slight overall 
depreciation of the dollar. In real terms, i.e. in 
terms of manufactures they would buy, the 
decline in prices was also around 6%, as prices 
of manufactured goods exports of industrialized 
'estimation of the value and volume of trade of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has always presented problems, 
especially those related to prices and exchange rates applied in intraregional trade. Since the break-up of central planning and the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), these problems have been compounded by changing trade and payments patterns, 
remnants of transferable rouble accounting and modified trade reporting. The trade numbers of this group of countries have 
therefore an unknown margin of reliability and error. 
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countries remained practically unchanged. The 
decline was smaller than the 14.9% fall in real 
commodity prices in 1990 that resulted from a 
combination of a 5.9% decrease in nominal dollar 
prices and a 10.6% increase in the average prices 
of manufactured goods (see table 5). 
The continuing fall of commodity prices, 
which started to weaken in 1989, mainly 
reflected demand conditions as a consequence of 
the recession in developed market economies. 
Prices for many commodities had strengthened 
early in the year at the onset of the Gulf war. After 
the conclusion of the war, forecasts of an end to 
the recession in the United States and a 
resumption of growth in other economies spurred 
producers of some commodities to maintain high 
levels of production and exports. These forecasts 
turned out to be overly optimistic, and many 
markets were left with large stocks. Prices of 
many commodities then resumeo their 
downward trend from the second quarter of 1991 
to the end of the year. 
Commodity prices in 1991 were also 
influenced by the supply and demand shocks to 
several markets that resulted from the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and increased participation of 
eastern European economies in western 
commodities markets. On the supply side, 
exports of zinc, aluminium and copper from 
republics of the former Soviet Union increased 
by 92%, 65% and 15.3%, respectively. Prices for 
aluminium and zinc fell almost to the lows of the 
mid 1980s. Copper prices also declined on 
average for the year, but were supported by low 
stockpiles and production shortages stemming 
from political disturbances in Zaire and Zambia. 
The increased com modity exports were driven by 
the need for increased foreign exchange earnings 
and, in the case of the Russian Republic, changes 
in foreign exchange control laws that provided 
incentives for individual companies to increase 
exports rapidly. The flood of exports in 1991 
came largely from stockpiles growing as a 
consequence of reduced domestic demand for 
industrial production. 
Foreign exchange shortages and sharply 
reduced economic activity in these countries 
caused significant reductions of imports. The 
dismantling of the CMEA and other trading 
arrangements between the former Soviet Union 
and several developing countries created other 
types of market dislocations. The Soviet Union 
was the world's biggest importer of tin and 
provided the largest export market for India's tea 
and Cuba's sugar. Commodity imports of the 
Soviet Union from developing countries were 
reportedly cut by half in the first quarter of 1991 
compared with the same period in 1990. Prices of 
these commodities weakened as the excess 
supplies were diverted to world markets. On the 
other hand, prices of certain food items -wheat 
and grain, in particular- strengthened as 
production shortfalls and the threat of famine in 
the new republics led to massive imports of food 
from the United States and the European 
Community. 
Among the major commodity groups, food 
prices declined by 6.6%. Sugar led the decline 
with a loss of 27% of free-market prices although 
the United States import price decreased by only 
7%. The European Community import price for 
sugar actually increased by a slight 3.7%. Wheat 
prices, following a steep decline of 19% in 1990, 
recovered from lows at the beginning of the year 
to almost boom levels in the fourth quarter as a 
result of increased shipments to the former Soviet 
Union, strong demand from China and reports of 
dwindling United States stockpiles. Nevertheless 
1991 prices were on average 12% lower 
compared with 1990. 
Tropical beverage prices declined by 8.1%. 
Increased production, weak demand in western 
countries, and a slum p in purchasing power in the 
former Soviet Union and eastern Europe resulted 
in surpluses of coffee and cocoa that took prices 
to their lowest levels in 16 years. Coffee prices 
fell about 9% in 1991. Prices for robusta coffees, 
exported mainly by African countries, fell by 
9.4%. By comparison, prices of mild arabicas, 
exported mainly by the major Latin American 
producers to North American markets, fell by 
4.6%. Although demand for cocoa outstripped 
production for the first time in eight years, seven 
years of bumper crops have resulted in huge 
stockpiles that further reduced prices by 10% in 
1991 but they had strengthened somewhat 
towards the end of the year on the basis of 
forecasts of lower production in some of the 
major exporting countries. London Auction tea 
prices registered a decline of about 9%. Export 
sales remained depressed because of reduced 
demand in the former Soviet Union and the 
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additional loss of the Iraqi market on account of 
the continuing United Nations trade embargo. 
Increased supplies of lower grade teas accounted 
for much of the price decline. 
Vegetable oils and oilseeds was the only 
commodity group to register an increase in prices 
in 1991. The UNCTAD index for this group 
increased by 8.1% following two successive 
years of steep declines. Coconut oil and copra 
prices increased, by 29.2% and 25.5%, 
respectively, largely because of drought conditions 
and supply problems in the Philippines. Increases 
were also recorded for palm oil (18.4%) and palm 
kernel oil (22.4%). Prices of every other 
commodity in this group fell in 1991. 
Prices of most agricultural raw materials 
declined in 1991 leading to an overall decline in 
the UNCTAD index of these prices of 8.1 %. Cotton 
prices started the year with an increase but fell to 
a cumulative loss of 26% during the second half 
of the year. Bumper harvests in the United States 
and in China, which became a net exporter for the 
first time in 1991, and large quantities of exports 
from the republics of the former Soviet Union 
caused the downturn in prices. Wool prices 
declined by 19% largely because of the ending of 
Australia's 17-year-old price-support scheme. 
Jute prices rose in the fourth quarter of 1991 when 
Bangladesh reintroduced export price controls 
but fell by 16%, on average, for the year because 
of weak export demand. Rubber prices fellby 5% 
mainly because of the world-wide slump in the 
tyre industry. Prices of sisal, hides and skins and 
tropical timber also fell. 
The UNCTAD composite index of minerals, 
ores and metals prices declined by 9.4%, the 
steepest decline of all the commodity groups. 
Aluminium prices in December 1991 were 47% 
lower than their peak in September 1990 and 
were down 20% for the year as a whole. Tight 
stocks on the London Metals Exchange and 
supply problems in Zaire and Zambia held copper 
prices to only a 13% decline for the year. Zinc 
prices declined by 31% mainly because of 
oversupply conditions and reduced demand in 
Following a period of unprecedented price 
volatility, which lasted throughout the Gulf crisis 
from August 1990 to January 1991, the oil market 
construction and automobile industries. Tin 
prices have been depressed since the collapse of 
the International Tin Council price support 
scheme in 1985. Prices fell by a further 10% in 
1991. Small increases were recorded for 
phosphate rock, manganese ore and iron ore. 
Negotiations aimed at reviving stalled price-
stabilization schemes produced no significant 
results in 1991. The major coffee producers, Brazil 
and Colombia, failed to arrive at an agreement to 
withhold a percentage of exports from the market 
in order to strengthen prices, though Brazil actually 
suspended exports briefly in March 1991. The 
International Coffee Organization extended the 
International Coffee Agreement without economic 
clauses. Disagreements remain over export quotas 
between different types of coffee and a retention 
plan that allows for sales to non-members at 
substantial discounts. The buffer stock agreement 
of the International Cocoa Organization remains 
suspended because of disputes between major 
producers and consumers over the price range to 
be defended and over accumulated payment arrears 
of some producers. The International Cocoa 
Agreement is operating without economic 
clauses with an extension to December 1993. The 
most stable commodity agreement, the 
International Rubber Agreement, came under 
pressure in 1991 as major producers and 
consumers in the International Natural Rubber 
Organization failed to agree on whether to start 
negotiations on a new pact. The current 
agreement expires in December 1993 but major 
producers, led by Malaysia, maintain that the 
present agreement only succeeds in stabilizing 
prices at the lower end of the price support band 
of the Agreement. 
The Association of Tin Producing Countries 
(ATPC), formed in 1985 after the collapse of the 
International Tin Council was strengthened in 
1991 when China, the world's second largest 
producer, became a member. The association has 
already agreed on export reductions aimed at 
reducing stockpiles to 20,000 tons from present 
levels of 45,000 tons in order to boost prices. 
in 1991 settled into a period of tranquility, with a 
few gyrations upwards and downwards, despite 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
3. The international oil market 
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uncertainties regarding its ailing oil industry. In 
late 1991, Soviet oil output reached its lowest 
level in 15 years because of technical and 
logistical problems as well as general 
disorganization caused by political instability. 
More than a year has passed since the end of 
the Gulf war, but normalcy has not yet 
completely returned to the oil market. The timing 
and extent of the worldwide oil industry's return 
to normal activities hinge on the magnitude and 
timing of the resumption of oil exports by Iraq 
and Kuwait. 
Although Kuwait's oil exports were resumed 
late last summer and have recently picked up 
some momentum, Iraq's exports are still 
embargoed. Without the oil facilities of Iraq and 
Kuwait, the rest of the world oil industry was in 
1991 operating at a high level of capacity 
utilization in both production and refining. 
However, because of sluggish world oil 
demand and OPEC overproduction, oil prices 
weakened in late 1991, falling to about US$16 a 
barrel, or US$5 below OPEC'S target price of 
US$21 per barrel. Weak oil prices continued 
during the first quarter of 1992, although prices 
then increased somewhat because of 
uncertainties with regard to Libyan oil supplies. 
The evolution of oil prices in the short-term 
will depend on a variety of factors, such as the 
timing and magnitude of the resumption of 
economic growth in industrial countries and 
elsewhere, the volume of oil production in the 
former Soviet Union and the participation of 
international oil companies in the overhaul of its 
oil industry. It will also depend on the 
implementation of ongoing and announced plans 
for expanding oil production capacities in major 
OPEC countries and the resulting margin of spare 
capacity in the world oil supply system. 
In 1991, world oil demand was relatively 
weak due to mild weather conditions, increased 
conservation efforts and low economic growth, 
particularly in the industrial countries. On a 
regional basis, total oil consumption in the 
developed market economies is estimated to have 
remained virtually flat in 1991, with increases in 
western Europe and the Pacific offset by declines 
in North America. In eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, oil 
consumption continued to decline mainly due to 
the adjustment problems of the former centrally 
planned economies. In the developing countries, 
growth in total oil consumption was relatively 
strong, especially in the rapidly growing 
economies of Asia. 
World oil output declined slightly, but OPEC 
production reached its highest level in almost a 
decade. Output in the former Soviet Union 
continued to decline significantly. Elsewhere, 
production increased moderately. 
A factor of paramount importance that helped 
create a rough balance between supply and 
demand in the aftermath of the loss of exports 
from Iraq and Kuwait was the ability of OPEC to 
expand capacity quickly and significantly. This 
decisive expansion of output allayed fears of an 
oil supply shortfall, but it has since prompted new 
concerns of oversupply. It is possible that these 
quick developments on the supply front may have 
delayed the expansion programmes needed to 
meet the substantial growth of oil demand 
expected during the 1990s. 
Most experts agree that in the 1990s demand 
for OPEC oil, especially from the Gulf, will 
increase substantially because of abundant 
reserves and low costs. At present, OPEC produces 
only 40% of the world's output but possesses 
78% of the world's proven reserves of one trillion 
barrels. The Gulf contains two-thirds of these 
reserves and is the most significant source of 
incremental supply in the future. Despite these 
vast oil reserves, raising the required finance to 
expand capacity will be a major challenge to 
OPEC countries, most of which have serious 
financial problems. 
The anticipated resumption of growth in 
world oil demand and the increasing 
concentration of supplies in OPEC countries, 
particularly in the Gulf region, focus attention on 
the need for cooperation between major 
participants in the international oil market to 
insure that incremental production capacities will 
be sufficient to match incremental oil demand in 
an environment of reasonable price stability. 
The uncertainty over OPEC'S ability to expand 
capacity may be allayed by the new reintegration 
of the oil industry, in which the major 
international oil companies are being offered 
joint ventures and partnership in some OPEC 
countries which had previously nationalized their 
oil industries. Similarly, producers are expanding 
investments in the downstream end of consumer 
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markets. These developments may mark the 
beginning of a new era of cooperation among the 
principal participants in the energy market. The 
aim of such cooperation should be to provide 
security of supply to consumers and security of 
markets to producers in a mutually acceptable 
framework beneficial to all. The recent crisis in 
the Gulf brought into sharp focus the need for 
such cooperation and led to preliminary talks and 
exchanges of views between producing and 
consuming countries and international oil 
companies. The continuation of this dialogue will 
be essential in view of the very large investment 
involved; according to an estimate below, they 
may exceed US$1 trillion for the rest of the 
decade. 
Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis in 
August 1990, all OPEC countries have been 
producing at full capacity to meet the loss of 
supply from Iraq and Kuwait. With demand 
relatively weak, surplus production by OPEC 
became evident early in 1991. However, 
uncertainties with regard to declining Soviet oil 
output as well as depressed production in the 
North Sea kept prices fairly buoyant throughout 
mid-1991, the agreement of the OPEC market 
monitoring committee in March 1991 to reduce 
output by 5% to an informal quota of 22.3 million 
barrels per day through voluntary cuts provided 
strong price support. 
Towards the end of the second quarter of 
1991, prices began to weaken, prompting several 
OPEC member countries to voice concern. At the 
OPEC Conference in June 1991, the oil ministers 
tentatively agreed to keep production ceiling at 
22.3 million barrels per day for the third quarter 
of the year despite conflicting views of market 
fundamentals. 
During most of the second half of the year, 
declining Soviet oil production and a steady fall 
in export volumes added to speculations about 
supply tightness in the winter and kept prices 
hovering around US$19 a barrel. 
In anticipation of higher oil demand for the 
winter, OPEC members, at their meeting on 24-25 
September 1991, raised their ceiling to 23.65 
million barrels per day without setting firm 
quotas for individual members. Following that 
meeting, OPEC oil production rose to 23.9 milhon 
barrels per day in October and 24.0 million 
barrels per day in November without any erosion 
of prices. However, as OPEC output continued to 
climb and earlier expectations of an end to 
recession and strong winter demand for oil failed 
to materialize, oil prices dropped to around 
US$17 a barrel in early December. At the same 
time, oil production and exports of the former 
Soviet Union's various republics had stabilized 
despite political disarray there. Moreover, the 
possibility of the resumption of Iraqi exports 
following reports that Iraq was to meet with the 
United Nations representatives in January 
exerted downward pressure on prices. Prices 
remained weak in January 1992 despite voluntary 
production cuts by several OPEC members. The 
agreement reached in the February 1992 OPEC 
Ministerial meeting to reduce production to 22.9 
milhon barrels per day did nothing to shore up oil 
prices. 
The recent declines in oil prices have deeply 
hurt the income of many OPEC countries. Many 
of them have serious financial difficulties, having 
based their economic plans on the basis of a price 
close to the OPEC target of US$21 a barrel. Oil 
revenues for OPEC as a whole are estimated at 
US$134 billion in 1991, as compared to US$147 
billion in 1990. 
Oil consumption remains depressed 
Following the precipitous decline in oil prices 
in early 1986, world oil consumption grew at 
about 2.3% per annum for three years. However, 
in 1990 and 1991, demand for oil remained 
almost stagnant, rising at only 0.3% and 0.2%, 
respectively (see table 6). 
Oil is still the largest source of commercial 
energy world wide despite two decades of efforts 
to change the energy mix in favour of other 
energy sources. In 1990, oil accounted for 
approximately 39% of global commercial 
energy, followed by coal (27%), natural gas 
(22%), and primary electricity (12%). After a 
considerable increase during the 1970s, oil 
demand in the 1980s continued to grow relatively 
fast in developing countries while it declined in 
the developed market economies as well as in 
eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Between 1980 and 1985, demand for oil in the 
developed market economies fell by about 2.0% 
per annum owing to the introduction of energy 
conservation measures, improvements in energy 
efficiency and substitution away from oil in 
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response to the large price increases of the 1970. 
However, lower oil prices since 1986 reversed 
this trend and oil consumption has risen by 2.5 
million barrels per day, or 1.4% per annum. The 
increase was particularly noticeable in the Pacific 
region, where demand rose by 0.9 million barrels 
per day, or 17.3%. In western Europe demand 
increased by 1 million barrels per day, or 8.2%, 
whereas in North America, demand grew by only 
0.5 million barrels per day, or 2.8%. 
In 1991, consumption in the developed 
market economies remained at the 1990 level. 
Small increases in demand in western Europe 
and the Pacific were more than offset by 
declines in North America. The growth of 
demand in western Europe was mainly due to 
German demand for fuel oil, which replaced 
high-sulphur coal for electricity generation in 
the former German Democratic Republic. In 
North America, consumption continued to 
decline for the second year in a row, mainly 
because of mild weather and economic 
recession. Oil consumption in the developed 
market economies in 1991 was still 9% below the 
peak level of 1979. 
In developing countries, oil consumption has 
grown considerably faster than in the developed 
market economies. It rose at an average annual 
rate of 4.2% during the period 1986-1991, 
reflecting rapid urbanization and increasing 
industrialization and also limited possibilities 
for substitution of oil. Much of the growth 
was in Asia, where oil demand increased by 
2.2 million barrels per day, or about 7% per 
year. The surge in demand was most apparent in 
the rapidly industrializing countries of the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province 
of China and Thailand, where demand for oil has 
grown at double-digit annual rates in recent 
years. 
In the other developing countries of Africa 
and Latin America as well as the oil-exporting 
countries, oil demand grew more slowly in 1991, 
and growth in oil demand in the developing 
countries as a group is estimated at 3.3%. 
Following rapid growth in the 1970s, oil 
demand in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
stabilized in the early 1980s and then declined 
through the rest of the decade. It was the only 
region where demand declined during the period 
1986-1991. In 1991, oil consumption in the 
former Soviet Union and in eastern Europe fell 
by a further 4%, as compared to 1990. 
World crude oil production 
OPEC production continued to rise in 1991, 
although at a slower pace than in previous years, 
while total non-opEC production declined, 
mainly because of the sizeable drop in output in 
the former Soviet Union. Production continued 
to rise in a number of other developing countries 
and production from the North Sea reached a 
record level, reflecting a surge in output from the 
Norwegian sector. 
The increase in world oil demand since 1985 
and the virtual stagnation in non-OPEC supplies 
caused by the fall in output in the United States 
and more recently in the former Soviet Union 
have raised the OPEC market share over the past 
six years from 30 to 39%. 
OPEC production patterns and policies during 
1991 have demonstrated a new determination to 
keep and enhance market share by providing 
security of supply to consumers even at the risk 
of somewhat lower prices. Despite the loss of oil 
from Iraq and Kuwait, OPEC output rose over the 
levels in 1990 and 1989. This increase in output, 
however, has led to more concentration of 
supplies, with Saudi Arabia's share rising from 
25% in 1989 to 35% in 1991. 
Output of the non-OPEC oil-exporting 
developing countries continued to grow during 
the second half of the 1980s. The increase output 
from these countries has resulted from expansion 
of existing capacities and development of new 
discoveries in a number of countries, including 
Angola, Colombia, Egypt, Malaysia, Oman, the 
Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. As a result, 
total output has increased by some 3% a year 
between 1985 and 1990. In 1991, it rose by 
another 3% to 10.3 million barrels per day. 
In the oil-importing developing countries, oil 
production decelerated considerably in the send 
half of the 1980s, which reflected slow-down in 
exploration and development. It grew at an 
average annual rate of 1.6% as compared to 12% 
between 1980 and 1985. In 1991, total production 
grew by 3.3% to 2.16 million barrels per day. 
The growth in oil output of the developed 
market economies throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s came to an end with the collapse of 
oil prices in early 1986. Since then, their crude 
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oil production has dropped by 5%. The drop was 
especially significant in the United States, where 
crude oil production in 1991 was 18% below its 
1986 level. 
However, in 1991, total crude oil production 
in the developed market economies rose for the 
first time in six years increasing by 2.7%. 
Although production in the United States 
increased marginally in 1991, the downward 
trend is expected to continue. In Canada, crude 
oil output remained essentially unchanged in 
1991, with a small decline in conventional crude 
production offset by an increase in synthetic 
crude production. However, recent reductions in 
governm ent financial support for exploration and 
development of conventional as well as tar sand 
projects may be expected to result in lower 
production in the near future. 
In the North Sea, crude oil production in the 
United Kingdom recorded a decline of 3.8%, but 
crude oil output in Norway reached record levels. 
The decline in output in the United Kingdom was 
largely due to disruptions from a series of 
shutdowns for repairs and refurbishment in a 
number of platforms. Substantial incremental 
crude oil output from the United Kingdom sector 
of the North Sea is unlikely at current price levels, 
but with the commissioning of new smaller 
fields, total production may, in the absence of 
Recent trends in saving, investment and the net 
international transfer of resources indicate that 
world economic growth is expected to be 
unnecessarily restrained in the medium term, but 
not by a saving shortage in the ordinary sense. 
There is, rather, an inadequate allocation of the 
world's resources to investment projects. 
Developing countries, particularly in Asia, have 
demonstrated the "virtuous cycles" that result 
from a high investment, high growth policy in a 
context of relatively well-managed financial and 
fiscal systems. In other cases, debt overhang and 
fragile economic situations hold back possible 
investment and growth levels. Among the 
formerly centrally planned economies, the 
disruptions of the transition process are deterring 
investment, and medium-term progress requires 
success in implementing new systems of 
platform maintenance problems, rise during the 
next few years. 
In 1991, output in the former Soviet Union 
plunged to its lowest level in more than 15 years, 
as a result of technical problems that have beset 
the oil industry for years. These include declining 
well productivity, reduction in upstream oil 
investments, outdated equipment and shortages 
of materials and technical supplies as well as 
general disorganization. Crude oil outputreached 
an all-time peak of 12.5 million barrels in 1987 
and 1988, but fell to 12.17 million barrels per day 
in 1989 and to 11.4 million barrels per day in 
1990. Afurther decline to 10.3 million barrels per 
day was estimated for 1991. Exports of crude oil 
and petroleum products are estimated to have 
declined to 3.05 million barrels per day in 1990 
from a record of 4.1 million barrels per day in 
1988, and to have fallen another 30%, to 2.1 
million barrels per day in 1991. 
Oil production in all eastern European 
countries declined sharply in 1991. In Romania, 
the only one with significant oil reserves, output 
dropped by 19%. Some of the East European 
countries with favourable geological conditions 
and good exploration potential are promoting 
joint venture participation with international oil 
companies. 
financial intermediation. Among the developed 
market economies, government investment 
needs to be stepped up, international flows need 
to be augmented to support capital formation in 
developing and transition economies, and, 
especially in the United States, private 
investment could be effectively stimulated as 
well. 
In recent years, annual world investment has 
surpassed US$5 trillion. But as a share of gross 
world product it has been on a declining trend for 
decades. From 1950 until the early 1970s, the 
share of world investment in gross world product 
rose almost steadily, reaching a figure of almost 
27% in 1973, from which point it fell to almost 
22% in 1983, before beginning to rebound. 
Changes in the world investment share have 
roughly followed the cycles of growth in world 
4. Saving, investment and the international 
transfer of resources 
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output, generally rising during periods of more 
rapid world growth and declining during periods 
of slowergrowth and recession, as can be seen in 
figure 3. Since producers generally seek to 
expand capacity when sales and profits are rising 
and since investment in the capital stock is the 
major means by which productive capacity is 
augmented, this cyclical relationship is an 
expected one. However, a long-term downward 
trend in the share, extending over several cycles, 
is disturbing since a sustained decline in 
investment effort could translate into slower 
world economic growth in the future. As already 
discussed, world output actually declined in the 
early 1990s, and only a slow recovery is forecast 
for the medium term. In that light, the prospects 
for investment could well be a cause for concern. 
There is no a priori reason that expenditure on 
investment should be a fixed proportion of 
output. Since 1973, the prices of investment 
goods have fallen relative to those of other goods 
and services. The real value of investment as a 
share of output could be maintained with a 
decreasing share of investment expenditure. 
Thus, when measured in constant prices and 
exchange rates, the investment share in global 
output seems to have fallen less than when 
measured in current prices (see figure 3). This 
notwithstanding, the trend is still a declining one. 
The relationship between the investment 
effort, as measured by the share of capital 
formation in gross product, and the growth of 
labour productivity, as measured by the growth 
in output produced per person in the labour force, 
has long been a close one. Thus, average gross 
output per worker in the world economy rose 
rapidly during the 1960s and early 1970s, a 
period when investment effort steadily increased 
in all main regions of the world economy. During 
the period of falling investment share from 1974 
to 1982, the growth of world labour productivity 
also slowed. Indeed, it became negative and 
output per worker fell from 1980 to 1982. When 
the investment share began to recover after 1983, 
so, too, did productivity, at least until the current 
recessionary cycle began (see figure 3). 
T'hese data are based on an analytical reconstruction 
aggregations of data across countries and over time, derived fi 
See the review of investment in eastern Europe and the for 
publication, Sales No. E.86.1I.C.1), pp. 121-134. 
This is not to say that productivity is 
exclusively determined by the investment effort. 
Productivity rises for a variety of reasons and 
even the contribution that investment makes to 
productivity growth is affected by more than the 
volume of resources mobilized for capital 
formation. It depends, in particular, on the 
technology embodied in the investment, the 
flexibility of management and labour in making 
the most efficient use of new capacity, the 
education and skills of the workforce, the level of 
unemployment, and so on. An increasing stock of 
capital per worker is, nevertheless, recognized as 
a fundamental source of productivity growth. 
From the first half of the 1970s to the latter 
half of the 1980s gross output per worker rose 
only about 20% in the world as a whole (see table 
7). Most of the increase took place in the 
developed market economies, where investment 
per worker has been far higher than in the rest of 
the world, even if it grew only in the last half of 
the 1980s. 
Data for the countries of eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union also showed substantial 
productivity gains over two decades, although as 
has subsequently become more clear, the quality 
of their output was frequently inferior. As may 
also be seen in table 7, investment per worker in 
the countries that are now in transition to market 
economies was never as much as half the level of 
the developed market economies, and the 
efficiency of the investment undertaken was 
generally low. 
Productivity growth in the developing 
countries displayed a pattern that has been 
repeated for almost all macroeconomic 
indicators: Latin America and the Caribbean 
experienced a measure of productivity growth in 
the 1970s and stagnation thereafter; Africa has 
enjoyed virtually no growth in average 
productivity in the entire period and Asia's 
productivity has doubled, albeit from a very low 
starting point. Not surprisingly, investment per 
worker barely rose at all in the developing 
countries and in Africa and Latin America it 
actually declined. In these countries, in 
national accounts statistics that allow for highly consistent 
major components of national expenditure and output. 
rSovietUnion in WorldEconomicSurvey, 1986(United Nations 
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Figure 3 
WORLD INVESTMENT AND THE 
GROWTH OF OUTPUT 
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Figure 4 
REAL SWING IN HIGH-INCOME 
DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMIES 
(Percentage of GDP in 1980 prices and exchange rates) 
United States 
1960 1966 1960 1966 1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 
High-income European countries 
1960 1966 1960 1966 1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 
Japan 
1960 1966 1960 1966 1970 1976 1980 1986 1990 
Souroa: UnlUd N»tk>n>. DESD. 
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particular, it is crucial that investment spending 
be raised in a significant and sustained manner. 
Saving and net transfers 
Thus, the shares of world investment and 
saving of the different major country groups 
-developed market, transition and developing 
economies- are not exactly equal, as net transfers 
occur between the groups, but at this level of 
aggregation the transfers are relatively small. In 
other words, the overwhelming majority of 
investments in each group of countries is 
financed out of its own saving. The broad orders 
of magnitude in the late 1980s reflected the great 
weight of the developed market economies in the 
world economy, namely that about two thirds of 
global investment and saving were in those 
countries, about 15% were in eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union and roughly a fifth in the 
developing countries.2 
At a more disaggregated level, the net transfer 
of resources has been economically important 
and politically sensitive. Indeed, the direction 
and composition of the international transfer of 
resources as regards developing countries, which 
will be discussed in some detail below, has been 
a topic of major policy interest in international 
forums.23 The net transfers do not necessarily 
follow economically efficient or politically 
desirable directions. They embody the net result 
of innumerable international trade and financial 
transactions, while also being the net result of all 
the domestic investment and saving decisions. 
Net transfers are, moreover, only partly under the 
influence of Governments. 
If the global investment effort were 
strengthened in the 1990s, most of the saving for 
the investments would be generated within the 
country groups, indeed, within the domestic 
economies of the investing countries. Yet, given 
the economic dominance of the developed 
market economies, a proportionally greater 
increase in their saving than in their investment 
might provide considerable resources for 
investment in the other country groups. 
It appears, however, that the developed 
market economies have been saving less over 
time as a share of total output, as have the 
capital-surplus oil exporters of the Middle East, 
a grouping of developing countries that once had 
been a significant source of net transfers to other 
countries.. Excluding the latter countries, the 
developing countries appear to have significantly 
raised their saving rate, in particular after the 
recession-induced fall that affected all these 
country groups in the early 1980s. This has 
mainly been accounted for by the rapidly 
growing economies of Asia. In countries in which 
per capita income was stagnant or falling, to raise 
the share of income saved would have required 
reducing the level of consumption per head. 
The net transfer of resources in 1991 
Last year the developed market economies 
transferred about US$25 billion to developing 
and transition economies, mainly the former (see 
table 8). Only a year before, the advanced 
industrialized countries had received a transfer of 
US$24 billion and a similar transfer of 
US$25 billion the year before that. The 
developing countries had made transfers abroad 
of US$24 billion to US$36 billion in each of the 
previous four years. 
In much of the 1980s, the major feature of the 
net transfer of financial resources of the 
industrialized countries was the large inflow of 
resources to the United States and to a lesser 
extent the United Kingdom. Although Germany 
TTie differences between the shares of investment and saving of country groups noted here and the output shares of the same 
groups, are accounted for by the lower share of output invested in developed economies as a whole than in the rest of the world. 
Recent examples of resolutions that result from such discussion include General Assembly resolutions 44/232 of 
22 December 1989 and 45/192 of 21 December 1990 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/112 of 28 July 1989, all 
of which pertain to the net transfer of resources between developing and developed countries. 
For most of the formerly centrally planned economies, economic methodologies in the 1970s and 1980s were too different 
from those in the rest of the world for comparison with data on domestic saving elsewhere to be meaningful. They are thus excluded 
from the figure. 
The data in table 8 are derived from balance-of-payments data and are subject to a major weakness from the point of view 
of global analysis; namely, that there isa very large volume of unrecorded transactions. Thus, instead of world trade balances and 
current account balances being equal to zero, as they should in theory, the sum of all country balances runs as high as US$75 billion. 
It is widely believed that most of the difficulty is in the accounts of the developed market economies, and so the size of their net 
transfers -if not the overall thrust of the yearly changes- must be interpreted with special caution. 
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and Japan made large outward transfers, they 
were less than the transfers being absorbed by the 
other countries and thus the developed market 
economies as a whole absorbed resources from 
the rest of the world. The major reason for the 
US$48 billion shift in the net transfers of these 
countries in 1991 was that the net transfer to the 
United States fell by US$44 billion. 
The United States reduced its net intake of 
financial transfers from several sources, but 
especially from the developing countries (see 
table 9). Latin America and the Caribbean, in 
particular, did not make a net transfer to the 
United States in 1991 for the first time in 10 years. 
Japan's net transfer to the United States was 
virtually unchanged, but the United States 
transferred US$18 billion to Europe, probably 
mainly to Germany, which is a sharp departure 
from the relative balance of the United States 
vis-à-vis western Europe in the previous two 
years. Indeed, the world transferred resources on 
a net basis to Germany, instead of Germany 
transferring US$45 billion to US$60 billion abroad 
as it had done each year since 1986 (see table 8). 
The high cost of integrating the eastern Lander 
into the Federal Republic is the main reason for 
Germany's absorption of external transfers. 
The changes in the net transfers of major 
industrialized countries in 1991 were 
accompanied by major changes in the financial 
flows through which the transfers were effected. 
One of those changes was unique, namely the 
US$42 billion net drop in flows of official grants 
from the United States, turning it into a recipient 
country instead of a donor. This reflected the 
official transfers to the United States to help 
finance its participation in the war in the Gulf. 
Germany and Japan were in the past major 
sources of financing of the large net transfer to 
the United States, but the prospects for their 
playing that role again have dimmed. As noted 
above, Germany is now an overall recipient of net 
resource transfers and although Japan's net 
transfer burgeoned once again in 1991, the 
character and direction of its capital flows have 
changed. Although Japan's net outward transfer 
grew by US$40 billion, its net transfer to the 
United States was unchanged. Most likely, a 
significant part of the funds sought the higher 
earnings available in western Europe. 
Moreover, Japan did not supply long-term 
credits on a net basis to the rest of the world in 
1991, as it had for most of the 1980s, but instead 
absorbed them. Foreign purchases of Japanese 
securities outpaced Japanese investment abroad. 
Instead, Japan made its net financial transfer by 
producing a large net outflow of short-term 
capital. This was brought about, in part, through 
a reduction in the large amount of short-term 
foreign borrowing that had been undertaken over 
the previous five years. Thus, at both the short 
and the long end of the financial spectrum, 
Japanese finance seemed to be looking inward to 
a greater degree than before. 
Although involving far smaller flows in dollar 
terms, major changes are also under way in the 
net transfer of eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. Through much of the 1980s, 
several eastern European economies were 
debt-constrained and had to curtail imports and 
push exports -much like the heavily indebted 
developing countries- and the region transferred 
resources to the market economies. Since 1990, 
however, they have been absorbing resource 
transfers, as the international community has 
supplied finance and debt relief to assist their 
transition to market economies. In 1989 and 
1990, the Soviet Union also became a net 
recipient of resource transfers, partly through 
assistance, but mainly through external credits 
and use of official reserves. In 1991, reserves 
were depleted, credit was cut off and the net 
transfer turned negative. But if the financial 
assistance proposals for the successor republics 
are carried out, the net transfer to those countries 
in 1992 will be quite large. 
The developing countries did not all share in 
the US$24 billion inflow shown in table 8. The 
"capital-surplus" exporters of oil received 
US$19 billion of the total, largely financed by the 
sale of official reserves and other assets, as well 
as by capital-market borrowing, mainly to 
finance reconstruction after the cessation of the 
Gulf war. However, the "capital-importing" 
^hort-term foreign liabilities of Japanese foreign exchange banks had risen by from US$140 billion to US$192 billion a year 
from 1986 to 1989; in the first three quarters of 1991, they fell by US$124 billion (data of Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments 
Monthly). 
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countries also shared in the inflow. This was the 
first positive net transfer to that group of 
countries since the developing-country debt 
crisis burst open in 1982 (see table 10). 
Considering the large number of countries 
involved, the size of the transfer was small, only 
US$5 billion, but it represented a swing from a 
net "negative" transfer of US$31 billion in 1990. 
It meant that imports could increase lastyear by 
US$36 billion more than exports grew. 
Most of the change was enjoyed by a group of 
countries that have been making very large net 
resource transfers since 1983, illustrated in table 
10 by a sample of 15 heavily indebted countries 
that were originally associated with a plan for 
debt restructuring proposed by the United States 
in 1985.28 The net transfer of this group improved 
by US$24 billion. It was still negative, however, 
by more than US$11 billion; that is, there was a 
surplus in the balance of trade in goods and 
non-capital services of this amount. Countries 
had received a larger net transfer in financial 
terms -that is, the net inflow of capital minus the 
net payments of income to capital left these 
countries with a surplus of US$8 billion, the first 
surplus on this account since 1981-and they took 
the opportunity to build up their foreign reserves 
by US$20 billion. They thus ended the year with 
reserves sufficient to cover almost four months 
of imports of goods and services. 
Aside from these countries, most changes in the 
net transfer in 1991 were not large. One exception 
was that of the group of "recent surplus countries", 
which was identified as the first generation of 
Asian exporters of manufactures. The growth of 
exports from these countries to the more slowly 
growing world economy did not keep pace with 
the growth of imports, maintained in particular 
for investment purposes, and so the resources 
available for foreign transfer virtually disappeared. 
In fact, exports grew by US$56 billion and imports grew by US$92 billion and the trade balance went from a US$16 billion 
surplus to a US$20 billion deficit. 
Given that 10 of the 15 countries are Latin American, a comparable change is seen in the Latin America grouping in table 10. 
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Table 1 
GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) AND POPULATION 
BY REGION, 1981-1991 
World 
Growth of GDP 
(annual percentage change) 
1981-
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Developing countries 




South and East Asia 
China 
Mediterranean 



















































Soarce: United Natlons/bESp. Data on population are those published by the Department in World Population Prospects, 1990 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.XIII.4). 
* Preliminary Figures. After 1990, the former German Democratic Republic is Included in Germany. 
Union and eastern Europe. 
z The former Soviet 
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Table 2 
OUTPUT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION IN SEVEN MAJOR 














Growth of gross domestic product 
2.1 -0.7 -1.0 -4.7 -4.8 5.8 1.0 -0.8 0.5 -1.5 
4.6 -0.3 3.5 -0.3 0.3 2.8 3.1 - 2.8 1.0 































































7.5 7.4 8.1 9.1 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.3 8.1 10.2 
9.0 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.5 9.7 8.9 
5.3 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.9 































































































7.8 9.6 10.4 9.9 8.6 6.0 4.8 4.2 9.5 5.9 
4.3 
4.8 4.4 4.9 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.0 3.4 4.8 4.2 
Source: United Nations/DESD, based on data of IMF, OECD and national authorities. 
a Partly estimated. b Percentage change in seasonally adjusted data from preceding quarter, expressed at annual rate (total is 
weighted average, with weights being 1990 GDP, valued at 1988 prices and exchange rates). Western Germany only. 
d Gross national product. Percentage of total labour force; seasonally adjusted data as standardized by OECD. Percentage 
change in average consumer price index in quarter relative to same quarter of preceding year (total is weighted average with 
weights being annual consumption valued in 1988 prices and exchange rates). 
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Table 3 
THE LAST YEAR IN WHICH ECONOMIC INDICATORS MATCHED 










































Source: United Natlons/DESD and ECE 
Table 4 
WORLD TRADE, 1982-1991 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and DESD estimates. 
" Preliminary estimates. 
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Table 5 
INDICES OF PRICES OF NON-FUEL PRIMARY COMMODITIES EXPORTED BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1981-1991 

























































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, and United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
" Unit value of exports of manufactures from developed market economies. The base of the original index has been shifted to 1985. 
b Dollar index deflated by unit values of manufactured exports of developed market economies. c OPEC oil price, which is the 




WORLD OIL DEMAND, 1986-1991 ' 
(Millions of barrels per day) 






























































































































Source: United Nations/DESD, based on International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Market Report, April 1991 and January 1992. 
' Including deliveries from refineries/primary stocks, marine bunkers, refinery fuel and non-conventional oils. 
estimates of apparent domestic demand derived from official production figures and quarterly trade data. 
Based on 
Table 7 
PRODUCTIVITY AND INVESTMENT IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1971-1990 
(Thousands of 1980 dollars) 
Gross product per worker 
Developed market economies 




Asia, excluding West Asia 


































5.5 6.0 6.2 6.6 
Investment per worker 
Developed market economies 




Asia, excluding West Asia 


























1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Source: United Nations/DESD. 
Note: Workers include unemployed as well as employed labour force, in accordance with ILO practice. 
221 
Table 8 
WORLD NET TRANSFER OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES, 
BY COUNTRY GROUP, 1981-1991 a 











































































Developing countries 5.3 34.2 18.2 -22.9 -17.9 10.7 -35.1 -24.4 -30.6 -36.4 23.7 
Eastern Europe and 






























Source: United Nations/DESD, based on data of IMF and international sources. 
* Expenditure basis (negative of balance of payments in goods, services and private transfers, excluding investment income). 
Preliminary estimate. c The former German Democratic Republic is included in Eastern Europe until 1990 and as part of 
Germany thereafter. d Indicates break in series. 
Table 9 
NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS TO THE UNITED STATES BY REGION, 1980-1991 













of Africa and Asia 
Other developing countries 
Eastern Europe and USSR 












































































































































Source: United Nations/DESD, based on data of the United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. 
" Preliminary; full country breakdown unavailable at this time. Comprising OPEC member countries, excluding Ecuador and 
Venezuela. c Including net transactions with international organizations and unallocated amounts. 
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Table 10 
NET TRANSFER OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO GROUPS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
1981-1991a 
(Billions of dollars) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991b 
Long-term capital 
importers 51.6 33.7 -4.0 -31.5 -22.3 -12.9 -44.2 -36.3 -38.5 -31.5 4.6 
of which: 
Deficit energy 










All developing countries 5.3 34.2 18.2 -22.9 -17.9 10.7 -35.1 -24.4 -30.6 -36.4 23.7 
Memorandum items 
15 heavily indebted 
countries'1 20.4 9.4 -23.8 -40.6 -40.6 -22.1 -28.4 -31.1 -37.7 -35.2 -11.5 
Africa, 
of which: 15.5 14.7 8.4 2.6 -0.6 
sub-Saharan Africae 9.1 7.4 5.4 2.3 3.1 
Latin America 14.3 3.7 -25.5 -35.5 -30.8 
Source: United Nations/DESD, based on data of IMF, official national and other sources. 
* Expenditure basis (negative of balance of payments in goods, services and private transfers, excluding investment income). 
Preliminary estimate. c Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela and 
Yugoslavia. 












































































AVERAGE SAVING RATES IN THE SEVEN MAJOR DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMIES, 
1951-1990 






















































































Source: United Nations/DESD. 
3 Percentage of GDP in real terms based on components of real GDPas reported to the United Nations by national authorities, rebased 
to 1980=100. Western Germnay only. 
Table 12 
COMPOSITION OF GROSS SAVING IN SEVEN MAJOR ECONOMIES, 1985-1989 





































































Source: United Nations/DESD, based on OECD, National Accounts, Detailed Tables (Paris, 1991). 
8 Including corporate and quasi-corporate enterprises in the private and public sectors. Western Germany only. 
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Table 13 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT NET INVESTMENT IN SEVEN MAJOR ECONOMIES, 1970-1989 










































































Source: United Nations/DESD, based on OECD, National Accounts, Detailed Tables (Paris, 1991). 
* Western Germany only. 

THIRD PART 
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 
IN THE EARLY 1990s 

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 
IN THE EARLY 1990s 
One of the most characteristic trends of the early 
1990s has been the decline in real exchange rates 
in most of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. That was particularly the case in 
1991, when a considerable inflow of resources 
turned the minus sign of the net transfer of 
external resources into a plus sign for the first 
time since the abrupt turnaround in 1982. Ten 
years after the eruption of the external debt crisis, 
the economic context exhibits certain similarities 
and differences with the pre-crisis period. 
The globalization of economic activities and 
increased liberalization in the economies of the 
region give each country greater latitude in 
formulating macroeconomic policies. Thus a 
development strategy oriented towards growth 
of exports, which requires inter alia, relatively 
high, stable real exchange rates, introduces 
economic policy options that must be examined 
against this new national and international 
backdrop. 
Exchange rate policies have generally been 
implemented for two basic reasons: to achieve 
equilibrium in the balance of payments or to 
reduce inflation. These objectives can at times be 
contradictory. Exchange rate systems adopted to 
this end have ranged from a managed exchange 
rate based on fixed parity with one or more strong 
currencies, to a freely floating rate, to 
mini-devaluations (periodic or not) and fixed 
ranges of fluctuation. 
According to the classification established by 
the International Monetary Fund, by 1991 56 out 
of 156 countries had adopted floating regimes 
(either freely floating or with some kind of 
government intervention), while another 80 had 
pegged their currencies to the dollar or another 
strong currency. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean -a region in which the exchange rates 
of most countries (12 of 19) had been tied to the 
dollar in the late 1980s- only three countries were 
using the dollar standard by the early 1990s. The 
others were adjusting the external value of their 
currency according to a basket of indicators (two 
countries) or through flexibly floating or 
managed-floating systems (see table 1). 
1. The role of the exchange rate 
Economic literature has abounded with theories 
about which factors determine exchange rates, 
especially since the disappearance of the fixed 
parities established at Bretton Woods. Over and 
above the traditional external constraints that 
affect Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
volatility of the relative value between the 
currencies of the industrialized countries after 
that agreement collapsed, due to uncoordinated 
national fiscal and monetary policies, has 
introduced yet another factor that must be taken 
into account by the countries of the region in 
formulating economic policy. 
The exchange rate has generally been used as 
a tool to achieve equilibrium over the medium to 
long term in the current account of the balance of 
payments or permanent equilibrium in the 
balance of payments. It has also been used as a 
basic reference point, or as an "anchor" in 
short-term anti-inflationary policy. 
For this point see Changing production patterns with social equity. The first development task in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the 1990s (LC/G.1601-P), Santiago, Chile, March 1990. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.90.II.G.6; and 
Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach (LC/G.1701(SES.24/3) and Corr.l), Santiago, Chile, 
April 1992. 
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Until the early 1970s, theories on exchange 
rate determinants normally held that long-term 
equilibrium in the current account required an 
international context of fixed exchange rates. 
Analyses were done on the basis of trends in real 
variables, with exports and im ports depending on 
price differences between countries and the 
corresponding levels of income. The equilibrium 
exchange rate was the one that allowed for a zero 
balance of foreign exchange or a building of 
"equilibrium" reserves that would leave the 
balance of payments in balance over the short 
term. The flow of international capital was 
reduced under this scheme. 
The evolution of the overall panorama of the 
1970s, a period in which a system of floating 
exchange rates between the currencies of the 
major industrialized countries was adopted and 
the flow of international capital increased 
considerably, clearly showed the influence of 
transactions on the financial markets in 
determining the exchange rate. This new 
situation, in which international movements of 
financial capital far surpassed the value of trade 
in goods and services, made the capital account 
the new focus of analysis. 
The inclusion of capital flows as one of the 
elements determining the exchange rate revealed 
the differences between currency transactions in 
the financial market and transactions in the 
non-financial market for goods and services. 
Because of these differences, the exchange rate 
defined by the financial market may not be the 
same as the one that would allow for equilibrium 
over the medium term in the goods market. If the 
goal is to achieve permanent equilibrium in the 
balance of payments, in which case any 
imbalance on current account is financed 
simultaneously by capital movements, a flexible 
exchange rate is needed, which implies that the 
Central Bank should not intervene and that 
Trends in the real exchange rates of the countries 
of the region have been observed by using 
purchasing-power-parity as an indicator 
despite its known limitations. To that end, the 
exchange rate of a given year (in this case 
1980-1985 were used as reference years) was 
adjusted according to the ratio between the 
international reserves should not be built up or 
drawn down. Contrarily, the adoption of a 
managed exchange rate produces temporary 
movements, not necessarily balanced, between 
the current account and the capital account, and, 
therefore, fluctuations in international reserves. 
Medium-term equilibrium presupposes that these 
variations are compensated for within a 
determinate period. 
Traditionally, the exchange rate has been used 
not only as a tool to obtain a certain result in 
external accounts, but also as a short-term 
anti-inflationary policy instrument. The scope of 
that policy, of course, is limited by the effect of 
the exchange rate, as an inflation-fighting 
mechanism, can have on the medium-term 
equilibrium of the balance of payments through 
its influence on the ratio between the production 
of tradeable and non-tradeable goods. In the 
rather common case of a declining real exchange 
rate -that is, the locai currency appreciates- the 
policy's limit is determined by the flow of capital 
and available international reserves. 
Finally, the proof that with a floating 
exchange rate the independent fiscal and 
monetary policies of the industrialized countries 
introduce a factor of high variability into the 
relative parities of their currencies has brought 
out the need to adopt mechanisms for 
coordinating macroeconomic policies at the 
international level. The exchange rate has played 
a key role in this regard. Indeed, the European 
Monetary System, unlike the dynamics between 
the three major international currencies (dollar, 
mark, yen), can be considered as an example of 
close coordination between the signatories'fiscal 
and monetary policies, based on a mechanism for 
fixing exchange rates. This is particularly 
important for Latin America, at a time when a 
good part of the region is trying to begin the 
process of subregional integration. 
increase or decrease in the domestic prices of 
each country and those of its main trading 
partners. The average was calculated by 
weighting the ratio obtained at the bilateral level 
by the value of trade, including both exports 
and imports, in the 1985-1990 five-year 
period. 
2. Measurement of real exchange rates 
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There is no consensus about which price 
indicator is the most useful for this measurement. 
The consumer price index is generally used. It has 
the advantage of being readily available and is 
calculated by using similar methodologies. The 
wholesale price index, which gives a clearer 
picture of trade in goods, is also used. The 
wholesale price index consists mainly of 
tradeable goods, while the consumer price index 
also includes services, which are generally not 
tradeable. 
Given the tremendous variance between 
exchange rates, the weighted average could be 
significantly different from the bilateral price 
ratio. Therefore, the general index was broken 
down into sub-indexes representing each 
country's trade with four countries or a regional 
group: a) United States; b) the main countries of 
the European Economic Community; c) Japan, 
and d) the main trading partners in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, usually neighbouring 
countries. 
A good deal of trade in goods and services 
between neighbouring countries has taken place 
and is rapidly affecting the dividing line between 
tradeable and non-tradeable output. For all these 
reasons, indicators of bilateral competitiveness, 
broken down by regions, were calculated on the 
basis of ratios between consumer price indexes. 
They were also calculated on the basis of ratios 
between wholesale price indexes (see table 2). 
Even though these indicators describe 
different levels and sometimes show divergent 
trends, they generally move in the same direction. 
Argentina was the most outstanding example in 
1990-1991, when a considerable difference was 
Ever since the outbreak of the regional external 
debt crisis, the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have launched several economic 
programmes of external adjustment and price 
stabilization, in which exchange rate policy 
always figures to some degree. In general, the last 
10 years are divided into three major periods. The 
first runs from the beginning of the external debt 
crisis up to the mid-1980s. During that time, in 
order to deal with the turnaround in external 
transfers, a group of countries made external 
adjustment the priority objective of their 
recorded between rises in consumer and 
wholesale prices. Thus, while the local currency 
had been significantly revalued during that 
period in terms of the consumer price index (the 
respective real exchange rate index plummeted 
by 40%), it was slightly devalued when compared 
to wholesale prices. 
The breakdown into regional sub-indexes 
makes it possible to observe that exchange rate 
fluctuations between strong currencies lead to 
variations quite different from the respective 
bilateral exchange rates. It is also clear that the 
appreciation and depreciation of the currencies of 
the larger-scale economies of the region had 
considerable influence on the average real 
exchange rate of their neighbours. That 
phenomenon was particularly intense in the 
group comprised by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, countries that trade a 
large volume of goods and services with one 
another. 
All the above led to considerable differences 
between the average exchange rate of each 
country and those that measure each bilateral 
ratio. From the mid-1980s onward the countries 
of the region have revalued their currencies 
against the dollar, which has generally been 
adopted as the standard. They greatly increased 
their competitiveness between 1985 and 
1988-1989 in the areas of both the German mark 
and the yen, only to later fall back to levels below 
those recorded in 1985. Exchange rates in 
Argentina and Brazil fluctuated wildly, 
producing significant annual variations in their 
bilateral ratios with neighouring countries (see 
figure 1). 
exchange rate policy, which led to a significant 
rise in their real exchange rates. The second 
period, more or less concurrent with the second 
half of the 1980s, was characterized by the 
widespread adoption of a policy of maintaining 
or raising the real exchange rate; also, the 
dilemma between external adjustment and 
stabilization began to be taken into account. 
Finally, in the late 1980s and even more so in 
1990-1991, stabilization became the top priority 
of exchange rate policy, within the new financial 
context of positive external transfers. These 
3. Trends in exchange rate policies during the 1980s 
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changes were more or less defined in each 
country, depending on the amount of their debt, 
the direction and magnitude of their external 
transfers and the interaction of trends in their 
volume of foreign trade and the terms of trade. 
a) The situation in Latin America in the early 
1980s 
The outbreak of the external debt crisis 
highlighted, with a new sense of urgency, the 
need to deal with the increase in interest 
payments. Since the flow of external financing 
was interrupted, the only possibility of making 
those payments was to achieve a positive balance 
on current account sufficient to compensate for 
the larger outflow of foreign currency. 
The problem manifested itself differently in 
each country. The most indebted, which therefore 
had to use a large portion of their export earnings 
to make interest payments, had a more difficult 
situation to contend with than those with a lower 
debt-servicing burden. In fact, the countries that 
were able to maintain a positive net transfer of 
resources did not experience a debt crisis. 
In this context, the most indebted countries 
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depreciated their currencies, making 
equilibrium of the current account of the balance 
of payments their top priority, on the assumption 
that the capital account would remain neutral in 
the immediate future, which implied an 
automatic renewal of amortizations of the debt. 
In the early 1980s, this was the situation of Brazil, 
whose external interest represented 57% of its 
exports, Argentina (54%), Chile (50%), Mexico 
(47%), Bolivia (43%) and Nicaragua (42%) (see 
table 3). There was an abrupt turnaround in the 
net transfer of external resources in all those 
countries (see table 4). In almost every case, the 
real exchange rate rose sharply between 1981 and 
1983. In some countries it climbed back up to its 
previous levels, after the declines posted in the 
framework of strategies in which exchange rate 
policy played an essentially anti-inflationary role 
(see table 2 and figure 2). 
Nicaragua was a special case in this regard, 
since unlike the other countries in that group, it 
received a large volume of external financing. 
The net transfer of resources to Nicaragua was 
similar to its export pattern in the triennium 
1981-1983 and far surpassed exports between 
1984 and 1989. Although it did not attain those 
levels external transfer was positive in the other 
Central American countries. Since they were less 
indebted, they also had less need for a significant 
real devaluation. Costa Rica, with relatively 
higher indebtedness and a balance-of-payments 
crisis, raised its real exchange rate between 1981 
and 1982. Paraguay and Uruguay did likewise in 
those same years, even though the pressure of 
external debt interest on exports was less than the 
regional average. In Uruguay, this was related to 
the low level of the real exchange rate in 1982. 
Both cases were influenced by the exchange rate 
policies of Argentina and Brazil. The other 
countries of the region were not highly indebted 
and did not noticeably modify their real exchange 
rates at that initial stage. 
b) The second half of the 1980s 
As mentioned above, the first reaction of the 
overindebted countries was to reorient their 
economies towards increasing exports. The rise 
in the real exchange rate and the policy to control 
domestic demand that was implemented in those 
countries in the first half of the 1980s abruptly 
reduced imports, in the midst of successive 
restructurings of the external debt and adjustment 
programmes adopted in the framework of 
agreements with the International Monetary 
Fund. 
The drop in international oil prices in the 
mid-1980s affected those countries of the region 
that export hydrocarbons and introduced 
disequilibria into their balance of payments. It 
also had an impact on their national accounts, 
since the fiscal revenue of those countries 
depends largely on petroleum exports. The 
response to this situation was severe real 
devaluations, which led to a widespread rise in 
the real exchange rate in the region, with some 
major exceptions, especially Brazil and Peru. 
Between 1984 and 1987, Ecuador devalued its 
currency by 23% in real terms (after devaluing by 
37% in 1983), while Venezuela, Bolivia and 
The methods used ranged from considerable devaluations to complete non-intervention by the monetary authority in the 
foreign exchange market, which in practice meant a sharp drop in supply in a high-demand market. 
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Mexico devalued their currencies by 62%, 58% 
and 44%, respectively, in real terms. Therefore, 
the decline in the terms of trade in all the 
petroleum-exporting countries was largely offset 
by the depreciation of theircurrencies. Colombia, 
a country that had large oil surpluses in the 
mid-1980s, also declared a real devaluation of 
70% during that same period in response to 
worsening balance-of-payment problems, which 
began in the early part of the decade, owing to a 
decline in both the price of coffee and the volume 
exported under the new international coffee 
quota regime. The notable depreciation of the 
bolivar coincided with the oil and coffee bonanza 
of 1985-1986, which generated a substantial 
increase in international reserves (see tables 5 
and 6 and figure 2). 
The South American countries that do not 
export petroleum, almost all highly indebted, 
continued to raise the real exchange rate as part 
of their strategies to expand exports, with the 
exception of Brazil, which in a context of overall 
indexation maintained its exchange rate. 
Between 1984 and 1988, Argentina raised its real 
effective exchange rate by 45%, Chile by 76%, 
Paraguay (less indebted) by 48% and Uruguay by 
15%. The Central American countries also 
considerably devalued their currencies in the 
midst of severe economic, and in some cases 
political, crises. The exchange rate corrections 
made by Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
are notable exam pies of that process. 
However, the countries that raised their real 
exchange rates had problems in controlling 
domestic inflation in a context of fiscal 
imbalances (partly due to the burden of interest 
payments on the external public debt) and 
indexation mechanisms. Therefore, during the 
: second half of the decade, when the process of 
restructuring the external debt was further along 
and interest payments were putting less strain on 
export earnings, higher priority began to be given 
to stabilizing prices instead of expanding exports. 
Two examples of this were the "austral plan" in 
Argentina and the "cruzado plan" in Brazil, both 
failures, which after a corrective devaluation 
froze the nominal price of the dollar, a measure 
which eroded the real exchange rate until the 
fixed parity policy was finally replaced by one of 
periodic mini-devaluations. The programme 
launched by Mexico in 1987 -which included a 
considerable fiscal adjustment, tighter monetary 
policies, external financing and elements of 
heterodox income and price policies- also 
contained an important component of 
anti-inflationary policy, namely curbing the slide 
in the exchange rate. The stabilization 
programme that Bolivia launched in 1985 
adopted the nominal exchange rate as an 
"anchor" in early 1986, and then established a 
sliding parity system the following year. In 
Uruguay, the rise in demand from Argentina and 
Brazil due to their respective stabilization 
programmes (austral and cruzado), which 
significantly increased the external purchasing 
power of their economies, confronted the 
economic authorities with an economic policy 
dilemma that would later become common to the 
region: an abundant flow of foreign currency 
considered to be temporary, which tended to 
reduce the real exchange rate in a country that had 
adopted an export strategy. Corrective 
devaluations were made to respond to this 
situation, attempting to prevent deterioration of 
the real exchange rate, which in an economy with 
a high degree of indexation introduced an inertial 
inflationary component. 
Brazil and Peru adopted policies which 
differed from those used in the rest of Latin 
America. Brazil's economic policy was 
characterized by strong fluctuations during the 
1980s, alternating between fixed exchange rates 
with price freezes and liberalization of domestic 
prices combined with exchange rates set by a 
sliding parity system. These latter programmes 
employed indexation mechanisms that prevented 
a "dollarization" of the economy, a very common 
phenomenon in the region. Thus, after the initial 
impact of the external debt crisis, the real 
exchange rate rose slightly between 1984 and 
1987. Peru's moratorium on the external debt, 
together with anti-inflationary mechanisms to 
regulate prices and control exchange rates, led to 
a continuous reduction of the real exchange rate 
from the time the new Government took office in 
1985. 
c) Exchange rate policy in the early 1990s 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, exchange 
rate policy commonly came to be used less to 
shore up the balance of payments and more to 
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achieve stabilization. The rapid rise in prices 
brought on by fiscal and monetary imbalances 
-which in some cases involved hyperinflationary 
episodes that raised the regional annual inflation 
rate of 65% in 1986 to 800% in 1988 and 1,200% 
in the biennium 1989-1990- led most of the 
countries to focus macroeconomic policy on 
stabilization. After Bolivia 's bout with 
hyperinflation in 1985 and the sharp rise in prices 
in Mexico in 1986-1987, inflation sped up rapidly 
in almost every country of the region by the late 
1980s. Thus in 1988 inflation skyrocketed in 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican Republic, a 
phenomenon that in the following two years also 
affected Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay. The gradual 
acceleration of prices in Colombia peaked in 
1990 with the highest rate of the decade. Few 
countries escaped a speed-up of inflation in the 
late 1980s, although there were huge differences 
in both absolute and relative terms. 
Anti-inflationary policies were based on 
rigorous fiscal adjustments and tighter monetary 
programmes. The exchange rate was managed in 
response to two general trends. In some countries 
it was used as an "anchor" in price formation; 
such was the case in Mexico, Bolivia and 
Argentina, which in 1991 established an 
exchange rate at a legally fixed parity with the 
dollar. In other cases, the foreign exchange 
market was liberalized and flexible exchange 
rates were adopted with some degree of 
intervention by monetary authorities. 
Government intervention in the foreign 
exchange market (in conform ity with floating rate 
systems) took on a variety of forms: a managed-
floating rate (Brazil, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela), periodic mini-devaluations within a 
margin of fluctuation (Chile, Guatemala -with 
auctions- Uruguay) and auctions (Bolivia). The 
countries that established systems based on fixed 
parities or with decreasing mini-devaluations 
used this tool as the pivot of their domestic price 
stabilization programmes. Those that opted for a 
floating exchange rate with government 
intervention sought a middle ground that allowed 
for reducing inflation and at the same time avoided 
a sharp drop in international competitiveness, 
within the framework of a strategy that kept real 
exchange rates relatively high and stable. 
Some countries continued to give high priority 
to their balance-of-payments objectives. 
Ecuador, which devalued slightly more every 
week, tried to avoid the erosion of the exchange 
rate by correcting with discrete devaluations the 
differences between the rise in domestic prices 
and the weekly slide of the nominal exchange 
rate, which was announced in advance. Costa 
Rica, Honduras and the Dominican Republic 
maintained exchange rates managed by 
non-periodic devaluations (see table 7). 
4. The new economic and financial situation 
in the region and the world 
a) Main characteristics 
Ten years after the outbreak of the external 
debt crisis, the econom ic situation has changed in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the 
industrialized countries, as well. 
First, most of the countries of the region are in 
a new stage of their fiscal adjustment. The last 
few years have seen an impressive decline in the 
financial needs of the public sector in Nicaragua 
(33% of GDP), Mexico (18%), Brazil (56%), 
Panama (9%), Venezuela (10%), Ecuador (8%), 
Argentina and Uruguay (6%) and Peru (5%), with 
a lesser although sizeable reduction in Bolivia, 
Guatemala and Honduras (4%), the Dominican 
Republic and Costa Rica (3%) and Colombia 
(2%). Many countries converted their fiscal 
deficit into a surplus. Chile and Paraguay also 
deserve special mention, since they have 
achieved a fiscal surplus for several years, 
The chapter on inflation provides a breakdown of price increases in each country. 
The capacity to obtain foreign exchange on the part of a public sector highly indebted in foreign currency is an important 
factor that must be taken into account when formulating economic policy. Thus countries whose public sectors export (Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela) are in a different situation in terms of obtaining the foreign exchange needed to meet 
their external commitments than those in which the public sector has to make payments abroad in foreign exchange but the positive 
international trade balance is essentially achieved by the private sector (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay). 
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especially Chile. In 1991, six of the 18 countries 
for which information is available showed a 
surplus in the non-financial public sector and two 
others were in balance. Moreover, two had 
balanced their central Government finances, 
while five posted a deficit in the non-financial 
public sector of 3% or less of GDP. Only three 
countries (Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua) 
continued to have serious fiscal disequilibria (see 
table 8). 
Declining financial needs of the public sector 
also eased pressure to increase the money supply. 
In turn, private-sector credit became tighter. 
Given this context, with very few exceptions, the 
domestic interest rate in recent years has 
remained positive in real terms. The real rates 
show a marked rise in certain countries that have 
implemented tight monetary policies to fight 
inflation (Mexico in 1988-1989, Chile in 1900, 
Brazil in 1991), but became notably negative 
during periods in which inflation rose abruptly 
(Argentina in 1989, Peru in 1990, Venezuela in 
1989, Guatemala in 1990-1991, Ecuador in 
1988). 
Positive real rates combined with the slower 
depreciation of local currencies led to high 
interest rates in dollars. There were periods in 
1991 during which Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela offered interest rates in 
local currency with equivalent annual rates in 
dollars of more than 10%, which was much 
higher than the rate in the United States market 
(see table 9). 
The rise in interest rates to offset excessive 
monetary expansion caused by an inflow of 
external capital -which transgressed the 
monetary programme and therefore did nothing 
to further anti-inflationary objectives- gave rise 
to a vicious circle. The inflow of capital tended 
to lower the real exchange rate. Monetary 
authorities bought foreign exchange to avoid a 
sizeable exchange rate lag, a measure that led to 
an expansion of the money supply. Then, to 
neutralize excess money in circulation, they sold 
securities on the open market at attractive interest 
rates. The rise in interest rates and the downward 
This group includes Honduras, which provided data only 
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trend of the real exchange rate produced high 
yields in dollars, which in turn stimulated another 
inflow of external capital. Thus the real interest 
rate rose with no particular effect on the money 
supply, so that along with high real interest rates 
the money supply expanded considerably. 
The international interest rate, in turn, showed 
a downward trend, particularly in the United 
States, due to a monetary policy designed to 
mitigate the effects of a domestic recession. In a 
new context of less fiscal and exchange rate 
uncertainty, fewer economic policy regulations 
and a higher degree of openness to the outside 
world, the combination of international real 
interest rates below the long-term trend and 
domestic rates in local currency with high dollar 
yields brought in a large volume of external 
capital. That was accompanied in some cases by 
a reduction in the external debt burden, after 
several agreements to renegotiate the principal 
under new conditions, including the reduction of 
its nominal value. In 1991, for the first time since 
the debt crisis broke out in 1982, the net transfer 
of external resources was positive. In 1990-1991, 
the net transfer of external resources to the region 
as a whole was equal to one sixth of the exports 
of goods and services, since it went from a 
negative transfer of some 9% of exports to a 
positive one of 7% in 1991 (see table 4). 
The flow of external resources in the early 
1990s has been very different from that of the 
1982-1988 period, when the net transfer of 
resources from the region was equivalent to close 
to one fourth of its exports. The rise in external 
financing was particularly high in Mexico, 
Venezuela and Argentina. The turnaround in the 
net transfer of resources over the last three years 
was spectacular in three countries: Mexico after 
sending resources abroad for US$11.3 billion in 
1988, received US$14.7 billion in 1991; 
Venezuela had transferred out resources for 
US$6.1 billion in 1990 but received US$1.2 
billion in 1991; and Argentina's transfer, though 
remained negative, was US$5.8 billion less in 
1991 than it had been in 1989. 
Although no breakdown of figures is available 
for all the countries of the region, close to 25% 
of the US$40 billion in external capital received 
for the central Government. 
in 1991 corresponded to direct investment 
(including privatizations) and some 20% to 
portfolio investment. Short-term private capital, 
entered under "errors and omissions" in the 
balance of payments, and registered short-term 
capital, contributed another 25% of the total. 
Thus, slightly less than half the resources 
received corresponded to portfolio investments 
and short-term capital, which were at times 
highly volatile. 
On the other hand, a large proportion of the 
capital inflow led to a considerable increase in net 
international reserves, which put the monetary 
authorities in a stronger financial position to deal 
with cyclical problems. Some countries that 
rapidly increased their purchases abroad 
maintained or even increased the number of 
months that their imports could be covered by 
their international reserves. For example, 
Argentina, which doubled its imports, had at the 
end of 1991 reserves to cover seven months of 
imports; Venezuela, which increased imports by 
50%, was able to cover more than nine months; 
Mexico, with significant rises in imports for four 
years in a row, had by the end of 1991 reserves 
to cover more months (4.4) than it had had two 
years earlier. A similar situation occurred in 
Chile (reserves to cover almost nine months of 
imports), Colombia (practically a year), and 
Uruguay (which, counting its gold reserves, had 
more than nine months) (see table 10). 
b) The new situation and macroeconomic 
adjustment processes 
Each country has faced the recent changes in 
the capital market under different conditions. In 
general, the economies of the region adjusted 
their external sectors during the second half of the 
1980s, through some mix of increasing exports 
and reducing imports on the basis of rising real 
exchange rates (see table 11). Different methods, 
however, were used to achieve external 
adjustment. In some countries (Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Uruguay), the rise in exports and a more 
relaxed situation of external indebtedness 
increased import and normal debt-servicing 
capacity. Others -for example, Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru- also in a context of falling imports, 
placed a series of moratoria on external debt 
servicing, applicable to payments of both 
principal and interest, which in practice 
amounted to non-voluntary external loans. 
The method used to achieve external 
adjustment made it possible, in some cases, to 
considerably increase the ratio between tradeable 
goods and non-tradeable goods, after a relative 
price adjustment in favour of the former. Other 
countries, however, even though they have less 
of an external imbalance, show no significant 
change in this ratio. 
The abrupt reversal in the flow of external 
capital obliged almost all the countries of the 
region to establish a new relative price scheme 
that was different from the one of the previous 
period. Although this poses a challenge for all of 
them, in so far as it significantly changes the 
strategy aimed at achieving relatively high, stable 
real exchange rates, the problem is more serious 
for those countries that have yet to achieve a 
suitable balance between the production of 
tradeable and non-tradeable goods. In other 
words, a strategy oriented towards integration 
into the international market will place greater 
demands to increase productivity on the 
economies that produce fewer tradeable goods, 
in a context that continues to favour a lower real 
exchange rate. 
The effect of renewing the flow of private 
capital into the region also varies with the internal 
situation in each country and the type and the 
intended use of that capital. The effects are 
different on production and external restrictions 
when external savings are used to produce 
exportable goods -generally linked to the 
exploitation of natural resources (petroleum, 
minerals or industries that process those raw 
materials)- or when they are used for investments 
in public services enterprises (power generation, 
banks, telephone companies), which normally do 
not produce tradeable goods and services. 
On the other hand, the inflow of resources was 
due in part to purchases of government securities 
or shares listed on the stock exchange. The new 
situation in the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean raises less uncertainty about 
economic policy and, in some cases, offers the 
possibility of making attractive profits: in some 
countries, the price-earnings ratio of shares listed 
on the stock exchange was low, while 
government securities offered high interest rates. 
This and the decline in the international interest 
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rate provided incentives for investing in the 
region's main stock exchanges, which produced 
a sharp rise in both the volume traded and total 
market value. This was how financial resources 
poured into Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Private external capital also began to be 
channelled into short-term financial investments. 
One of the more important was the opening of 
time deposits in local or foreign currency in the 
banking system, at a time when the difference 
between the interest rate offered locally and in the 
international market was attractive. The 
asymmetry between the countries of the region in 
the process of reviving production (or 
out-and-out growth, as in the case of Chile) while 
applying stabilization policies and the 
industrialized countries in recession (the 
situation of the United States had serious 
repercussions) laid the groundwork necessary for 
an increase of capital flows, largely the 
repatriation of flight capital. This short-term 
financial flow occurred virtually throughout the 
region. Information is still not available about 
how commercial banks in each country 
channelled those resources into domestic credit 
or into the acquisition of external assets. 
The larger flow of external resources received 
in these two ways (portfolio investment and 
deposits) may well be absorbed more quickly in 
those countries that are still affected by significant 
external constraints. Even so, the move from scarce 
to abundant external financing will introduce 
distortion factors during the transition period until 
such time as capital formation is reactivated. It is 
possible that for a time demand will respond 
slowly to new investment, especially in those 
cases where severe adjustment-related constraints 
on domestic demand deactivated certain 
mechanisms in the investment-production process. 
The volatility implicit in capital flows affects 
an economy differently depending on the degree 
of liberalization of the capital account. While in 
some cases the programme of opening up to the 
outside included broad liberalization of capital 
transactions, in others, rules are still applied that 
are designed to reduce the effects of abrupt inflows 
and outflows of external capital. Experience shows 
During the recent external debt crisis, the public sector, 
(or ex-post guarantor) of the private sector's loan arrears. 
that it is not easy to control capital flows, but the 
fact that capital transactions are sometimes still 
managed (which implies introducing personal 
influence into the speculative management of 
capital in order to obtain arbitrating advantages) 
would indicate that it is still possible to use 
selective instruments to narrow temporary 
differences between an exchange rate that helps 
to achieve short-term equilibrium of the balance 
of payments -determined above all by the 
financial market- and an exchange rate that 
provides medium-term equilibrium in markets 
for goods and financial markets. 
At the domestic level, the economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean also have different 
price stabilization and structural reform programmes. 
In some cases (Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, 
Costa Rica), considerable progress was made on 
both fronts. Tax reforms were introduced and 
expenditures restructured to reduce the financial 
disequilibrium of the public sector; new measures 
were taken to liberalize external transactions, and 
regulations were scaled down in different economic 
and financial spheres. In other cases (Argentina, 
Peru, Venezuela), the new international situation 
coincided with the beginning of their 
stabilization and structural reform programmes, 
in which priority was also given to reducing the 
public sector and liberalizing foreign trade. 
Thus, in varying degrees, all of Latin America 
and the Caribbean had opened up to the outside 
world by the early 1990s. In 1991, most of the 
countries implemented more liberal policies 
concerning transactions on the external current 
account or on the capital account, or both. There 
were fewer regulations, and, in addition, taxes 
were lowered and import duties were made more 
uniform. 
Indeed, after Chile and Uruguay had begun to 
liberalize their foreign trade in the mid-1970s, 
price stabilization programmes around 10 years 
later in Bolivia, Mexico and Costa Rica included 
reducing controls on the import of goods, lowering 
tariffs and applying them to fewer items. Quasi-
tariff barriers were also largely removed. Tariffs 
were subsequently lowered by Argentina (1987), 
Brazil (1988), El Salvador and Venezuela (1989) 
and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (1990). 
Ily through the Central Bank, acted as the lender of last resort 
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In recent years, tariff reduction coincided with 
a drop in the real exchange rate. In those countries 
that began to liberalize years ago, additional declines 
in tariffs were not as steep and thus had no great 
impact on the total cost per import dollar. That 
was the case in Uruguay, where the combined 
effect of the real exchange rate and tariffs was 
practically neutral between 1985 and 1991, whereas 
in Chile the cost per import dollar in 1991 was 
even higher than that of 1985. The countries that 
liberalized their foreign trade more recently behaved 
differently, with few exceptions. In Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela, the cost per import dollar in 1991 was 
considerably lower than it had been before the 
liberalization programme began. On the other 
hand, in Bolivia and Costa Rica, devaluations 
exceeded tariff reductions, although it should be 
remembered that in Bolivia the programme began 
with a lower real exchange rate, in the wake of a 
period of hyperinflation (see tables 12 and 13). 
Another consequence of more abundant external 
financing and a lower cost per import dollar was 
a significant jump in importsof goods and services, 
probably starting at low levels because of the 
process of current account adjustment begun in 
1982. The value of imports doubled in Argentina 
in 1991 and in Mexico between 1988 and 1991, 
and increased by 50% in Peru and Venezuela in 
1991,40% in Brazil in the past three years. Only 
in Colombia did imports fail to respond to the rise, 
although they accounted for a smaller percentage 
of the GDP, due to a tight credit policy and the 
slow-down of domestic activity. Economic 
agents' expectations about the tariff reductions 
scheduled until 1994 and first implemented in 
1991 also influenced this situation. 
c) The current situation: permanent or 
temporary? 
The situation of the early 1990s, both 
domestically and internationally, is somewhat 
uncertain as regards the permanency of some key 
factors. While some current characteristics can 
be considered as determinants of a new context 
that is reasonably long-lasting, others seems to be 
temporary (see table 14). 
In this case, a revaluation of the United States currency agaii 
rates- can be expected. 
From the perspective of the current 
international scene, the current recession in the 
industrialized countries, the level of interest rates 
in dollars, marks and yens and the relative values 
between those currencies seem to be temporary. 
On the one hand, real interest rates on deposits in 
the United States are below the long-term trend 
(and much lower than those of the 1980s); in this 
regard, if the United States economy pulls out of 
the recession, the downward trend of its interest 
rate could be reversed. Contrarily, a gradual 
reduction of Germany's steep public-sector deficit, 
directly linked to the cost of political 
reunification with the former German 
Democratic Republic, would tend to lower its 
interest rate. A higher international interest rate, 
albeit with fewer disparities between the different 
currencies, would reduce one of the factors 
attracting external capital to the region. A 
reactivation of the economies of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
would have the same effect. A faster pace of 
growth in the more industrialized economies 
would increase the external demand for goods 
and services from the countries of the region, 
thereby particularly offsetting through the current 
account a potential decline in the capital account. 
The reduction of the external debt burden of 
the region's economies should be considered, on 
the contrary, as a more lasting positive factor, 
even though a rise in international interest rates 
implies a greater outflow from the current 
account. The current flow of external financing, 
which is based to a lesser extent on indebtedness 
to the international financial system and includes 
a good part of repatriated flight capital, in turn 
represents a significant difference between the 
situation of the 1970s and the present. 
Changes in the terms of trade are essentially a 
temporary factor. What happened in Colombia 
and Chile with the stabilization fund for coffee 
and copper, respectively, offers an alternative 
that should be taken into account when attempting 
to palliate the domestic impact of abrupt changes 
in the relative prices of leading export products. 
In addition, some aspects of the domestic 
situation at the end of 1991 are less temporary 
than others. First, many of the economies of the 
the mark-implicit in the difference between the current interest 
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region are functioning on new bases, which give 
priority to macroeconomic equilibrium in 
fundamental areas. That has considerably reduced 
uncertainty about the likelihood of change in 
medium-term policy guidelines, and greatly 
aided in decision-making about new investments. 
From the fiscal viewpoint, the present context 
is the result of adjustments based on structural 
reforms and provisions that had basically cyclical 
effects. In some economies, the rise in the tax 
burden in real terms, which included the 
well-known "Tanzi-Olivera effect" in cases of 
falling inflation, was achieved in some cases 
through tax reforms, but in others through 
temporary measures. Part of the rise in revenues 
was due to better administrative procedures. A 
rise in public rates also made it possible to 
balance the operational management of those 
enterprises. The sale of public enterprises 
brought in additional income, which in some 
cases (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela) was 
considerable. Public expenditures were also 
reduced, sometimes by eliminating redundant 
expenditures and in others through drastic cuts in 
investment, social spending and the wages of 
government employees. Interest payments were 
also reduced, owing to the decline in external 
indebtedness and in the international interest rate. 
Although many of these cases can be considered 
to be recurring, others take place only once or are 
only temporary. Income from the sale of public 
enterprises is a one-time occurrence. The 
aforementioned decline in the real international 
interest rate to a level below the long-term trend, 
could be quickly reversed. The contraction of 
fiscal spending by cutting back on investment 
and that of expenditures for public services that 
respond to a permanent and growing demand 
(education, public health, urban security) could 
also turn around abruptly. Therefore, those 
countries that achieved fiscal equilibrium 
through procedures that could be considered 
temporary will find themselves in a more fragile 
situation than those who restructured their public 
sector by creating new permanent fiscal 
structures. 
Domestic credit policy, closely linked to the 
change in national accounts, could also have an 
impact on real exchange rate trends. Monetary 
policies designed within the framework of a price 
stabilization programme are normally predicated 
on positive real interest rates. Because of the need 
to offset an expansion of the money supply 
corresponding to public-sector credit, those real 
rates might also have to be high. In that event, 
which generally goes with a high yield in dollars 
once the devaluation rate of the local currency is 
discounted, a significant inflow of external capital 
should be expected, which tends to appreciate the 
local currency in floating exchange rate systems. 
That situation should not last long, since high real 
interest rates discourage investment and 
undermine the solvency of indebted firms, 
including the financial system. In this regard, the 
continuity of the flow of external resources will 
be conditioned by trends in this process and will 
also influence changes in the real exchange rate. 
The policy of openness and liberalization of 
foreign trade should be considered as a new 
permanent element of the economies of the 
region over the medium term, but pressure from 
contained imports will only have a temporary 
effect in those countries that have recently 
liberalized. 
To sum up, an analysis of the economies of 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the early 
1990s, almost 10 years after the outbreak of the 
external debt crisis, clearly reveals, with few 
exceptions, a new context that is more favourable 
from the viewpoint of both the external 
environment and domestic macroeconomic 
equilibria. The degree of consolidation and 
permanency of the external adjustment and the 
stabilization programmes differs from country to 
country. However, there is overall fiscal 
improvement. Permanent and temporary factors 
coexist in this new context, both domestically and 
internationally. In any case, and even taking into 
account the uncertainty that does exist, the 
current situation leads one to believe that the real 
exchange rate of the 1990s in those countries that 
have achieved or are in the process of achieving 
a solid macroeconomic equilibrium will tend to 
be below the high levels recorded in the 
mid-1980s at a time of greater external 
constraints. Even though the real exchange rate 
observed at the beginning of this decade could be 
affected by short-term economic factors that lead 
to an exaggerated appreciation of local currencies 
(owing to overshooting), that factor will have to 
be considered as a part of the basic strategy in 
future export-promotion programmes. 
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Table 1 
EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS 
(End of year) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
World total 136 138 140 143 146 146 147 148 150 150 150 152 152 156 
Currency pegged to: 
U.S. dollar 42 42 39 38 
Other currencies 53 52 55 56 
Cooperative 
arrangements 5 8 8 8 
Limited flexibility 
Adjusted according to 






Currency pegged to: 
U.S. dollar 
Adjusted according to 















































































37 39 - -
 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
11 11 10 10 8 9 9 10 5 3 3 
4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 
4 4 6 5 8 7 7 6 11 14 14 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (\MF) International Financial Statistics, several issues. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
* Corresponds to the average of the real exchange rate indexes (main official) of the currency of each country relative to the 
currencies of its main trading partners, weighted by the rela tive volume of exports to those countries. These weightings correspond 
to the average for the period 1986-1990. For further details on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix 
of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. The exchange rate used was the average of the average buying and selling 
rates reported by the main commercial banks to the Banco de México up till July 1982, the preferential rate for essential imports 
from August to November 1982 and the average of the buying and selling rates in the managed market from that date onwards. 
c The flexible floating or parallel exchange rate was used. The commercial exchange rate was used from 1987 onward. 
Key: CPI = Consumer price index 
WPI = Wholesale price index. 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DEBT SERVICE (INTEREST) 































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and official figures of the countries. 
* Includes interest paid and interest in arrears. Factor services are not included. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCES '' 
(As a percentage of the value of exports of goods and services) 



























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and official figures of the countries. 
* Net transfers of resources abroad are marked by a (-) sign. Refers to the 1982-1987 period. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS FOB/CIF 
(1980=100) 























































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS a 
(Deflated by the consumer price index and adjusted according to the terms of trade) 







































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
" Corresponds to the average of the real exchange rate indexes (main official) of the currency of each country relative to the 
currencies of its main trading partners, weighted by the rela tive volume of exports to those countries. These weightings correspond 
to the average for the period 1986-1990. For further details on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix 
of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. The exchange rate used was the average of the average buying and selling 
reported by the main commercial banks to the Banco de México up till July 1982, the preferential rate for essential imports from 
August to November 1982 and the average of the buying and selling rates in the managed market from that date onwards. 
c The floating or parallel exchange rate was used. The commercial exchange rate was used from 1987 onward. 
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Table 7 































Periodic Within a margin 
of fluctuation 
x a b 
X a 










Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
* Included in the exchange rate adjusted according to indicators in the IMF classification. In 1991 the exchange rate was 
decentralized and was left to be determined to a larger extent by the market. Included in other managed-floating systems 
in the IMF classification. With non-periodic corrections. 
253 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FISCAL ADJUSTMENT 


































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: Key: NFPS = Non-financial public sector; CG = central government; 
TPS = total public sector (fiscal and quasi-fiscal); BCG = budgetary central government;. CPS = consolidated public sector. 
a The minus (-) indicates a deficit and a (+) sign indicates a surplus. The column includes an adjustment made during the 
period referred to. The term NFPS refers to the financial needs of the public sector. The (-) sign indicates a reduction of the deficit. 
In the case of a change from a deficit to a surplus, the difference is computed as a deficit reduction. c In terms of operational 
deficit, the reduction was by 7.2% of GDP, since there was s small surplus in 1981. The NFPS has had a surplus since 1989. 
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Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTEREST RATES ON LOANS IN LOCAL CURRENCY 
(Annual rates in percentages) 
Real rates a Equivalent rates in dollars0 
I 
1990 
II III IV I 
1991 
II III IV I 
1991 































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official and International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures. 
a Nominal rates (quarterly averages) deflated by the respective rates of increase or decrease in the consumer price index (during 
the quarter). Nominal rates (quarterly averages) less their respective rates of devaluation (during the quarter), according to 
data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES AND 
RESERVES (EXCLUDING GOLD) 
(Number of months f 













































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official and International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures. 
a Corresponds to the number of months of imports of goods and services covered by reserves, excluding gold. 
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Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 






































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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Table 12 



























Real exchange rate 
1985 = 100 
Beginning 1991 





































B. Countries with earlier liberalization 
26 11 100 138 
32 22 100 111 
Percentage variation of 


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Combination of variations of the real effective exchange rale and the average tariff in the periods indicated. 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: PROCESS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Begin- Maximum tariff Number of brackets Average tariff 
Country rdngof Non-tariff barriers Notes 
pID" Initial Present Pr°S™m- Initial Present Pr0g^m" initial Present 
gramme med med 
Argentina 1987 115 22 
Bolivia 1985 150 10 
Brazil 1988 105 85 40 
Colombia 1990 100 23 15 
Costa Rica 1986 220 40 20 
Chile 1973 220 11 
4 4 43a 9 a 
1 1 12b 10b 
29 7 7 51 ' 25' 
14 4 4 37b 14b 
27e 20c 
57 1 1 9 4 c I I e 
In 1987-1988, the value of industrial output 
subject to restrictions was reduced from 62% 
tol8%.In 1989-1990, the remaining licensing 
restrictions were eliminated. The 
deregulation decree at the end of 1991 
reduced non-tariff requirements to security 
and sanitary controls and removed the 
restriction known as "buy Argentine". 
All bans and license requirements on 
imports were abolished, with the exception 
of controls on sugar and wheat and goods 
that are a threat to health and State security. 
In 1990, the list of banned imports (annex Q 
was abolished. Nevertheless, 47 
computer-related products will not be allowed 
to be imported until 1992, and local-content 
rules for intermediate and capital goods will be 
maintained. 
Prior-licensing restrictions were almost 
completely eliminated at the end of 1990, 
except for certain products produced by 
State monopolies (arms) or covered by 
international treaties (inputs related to drug 
traffic) and certain agricultural products. 
Gradual elimination of import permits and 
other restrictions in the 1990-1994 period. 
Quantitative import restrictions were 
eliminated in the 1970s, with the exception 
of those on second-hand automotive 
vehicles, and sanitary and phytosanitary 
inspection of a broad range of agricultural 
products. 
Liberalization began in 1987 and was stepped 
up in 1989. Besides tariff reductions, other 
temporary and specific duties were 
eliminated. At the end of 1991, tariffs were 
raised from 0% to 5% on food and raw 
materials, and from 11% to 13% on 
intermediate goods. The initial tariff includes 
the surcharge. 
Before liberalization, quantitative 
restrictions and the differentiated tariff 
structure acted as steep barriers against 
imports. 
Tariffs began tobe restructured in 1988-1989. 
The present programme was introduced in 
1990; it will gradually reduce tariffs until are 
reached a maximum tariff of 40%, a mode of 
20% and a mean of 14% are reached in 1994. 
The process of tariff reduction initially 
scheduled for 1993 was moved up to August 
1991. This tariff includes the surcharge which is 
now 8% (it was formerly 10%) and it will be 
eliminated in 1992. The tariff for automobiles is 
75%. 
Tariffs above 40% are still applied to some 
items (among them, automobiles, with a tariff 
of 100%), but they are a small percentage of 
the total. In 1992, the maximum tariff will be 
reduced to 20% on most products. 
In response to a balance-of-payments crisis, 
the uniform tariff of 10% was raised to 20% 
in 1983 and 35% in 1984. It was then reduced 
by stages to 15% in 1988 and 11% in 1991. 






Maximum tariff Number of brackets Average tariff 
Present P " S " m - l n i t i a l P r e s e n t Program- ¡ ^ p r e s e n ( 
med med 
Non-tariff barriers Notes 
Ecuador 1990 290 35 53' 25 ' 
El Salvador 1989 
Mexico 1985 100 
30 20 20 7 
20 10 5 5 24' 12 ' 
Peru 1990 110 25 15 53 3 1 6 6 c 17 c 
Uruguay 1974 346 
Venezuela 1989 135 
30 >30 3 3 
40 20 41 6 3 35' 
22c 
10 ' 
Quantitative import restrictions are in the 
p r o c e s s of b e i n g e l iminated, w i t h the 
except ion of those on vehicles and on 
chemical substances that can be used to 
produce illegal drugs. Prior deposits on 
imports were abolished. 
Prior deposits on imports and several laws 
promoting certain sectors were abolished. 
Coverage of import licenses was reduced from 
912% of production in June 1985 to 17.9% in 
December 1990, and official import prices were 
eliminated. Import licenses continued to be 
required for some agricultural and food 
products, petroleum and its by-products and 
some products used in industrial development 
programmes. 
Licenses, controls, import permits, quotas 
and bans were eliminated in March 1991. 
Import quotas and licenses were abolished in 
1975 and requirements on terms of financing 
and controls on imports of capital goods, in 
1977. Benchmark prices were maintained for 
some products. 
The n u m b e r of h e a d i n g s subject to 
restriction w a s red uced from 2,204 in 1988 to 
200 at present. 
The tariff on vehicles is40%, but their import 
is still banned. 
The maximum tariff will be gradually reduced 
to 20% in 1994 (with a few exceptions). 
The surcharge of 5% was discontinued in 
December 1987. The customs system was 
reformed. 
The programme began in August 1990when 
the maximum tariff was established at 50%. 
It introduced further cuts in March 1991, 
when trie maximum tariff was reduced to 
25% on consumer goods and 15% on all 
other items (80% of all imports). The initial 
tariff includes the surcharge. 
Tariffs have been slowly coming down since 
1974. This process speeded up in 1979, but was 
suspended between 1982 and 1986. The most 
recent reductions were made in September 
1991. 
Specific duties were eliminated; in some cases 
they brought the maximum tariff up to 940% 
before the liberalization programme was put 
into effect. The tariff reduction programme 
will be completed in 1993. 
Sj Source: ECLAC, Socio/ Equity and ChangingProductbn Patterns: An Integrated Approach (LC/G.1701(SES.24/3and Corr.l), Santiago, Chile, April 1992. 
\D a Weighted by domestic production. Weighted tariff on imports. c Simple average based on tariff items. 
Table 14 







Greater Fiscal equilibrium through: 
Greater fiscal equilibrium through: 
External 
* Overall contraction of spending and 
privatization-
Excessively tight monetary and credit 
policies with high real interest rates. 
Demand for imports following a period of 
lower domestic spending. 
International interest rates. 
Other effects of industrialized nations' 
policies (protectionism, ratio between 
strong currencies). 
* Tax reforms and cuts in excessive 
spending. 
Monetary and credit policies in support of 
stabilization. 
Liberalization of foreign trade and tariff 
reduction. 
Less uncertainty about macroeconomic 
policies. 
Net external debt reduction. 
Real exchange rate of countries with 
which the region has the strongest trade 
ties. 
Terms of trade. 
Recession in the industrialized countries. 
Inflow of external resources attracted by a 
temporarily big difference between 
domestic and international yields. 
Inflow of external resources attracted by 
higher domestic yields and less uncertainty 





ARGENTINA: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES' 
(Indexes 1985 =100) 
c i-aun 
Japan EEC . . d Exports Imports 


























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Argentina in volume II of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. 'Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 2 
BOLIVIA: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES* 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Bolivia in volume II of this publication. 
The consumer price index was used in all the countries. 'Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 3 
BRAZIL: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES' 






























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Brazil in volume II of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. 'Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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COSTA RICA: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES3*5 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Costa Rica in volume II of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. cExports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 6 
CHILE: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 






























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nationspublication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Chile in volume 11 of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. ^Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 


































ru t o 
£* 
< S =3 « S p s 
+>. .p.. U> -P". 
O O -J <Jl 
Ni Ni Ni Ni 
Ni h-» O Ni 
y i K - j y i 
M O O V 
Ni -J ',*> Ni 
W W K ) 
',*> 'v/l } i 
Ni O Ni 
N N N i N ) 
N i h-» O -P". 
7 l O N 1 U \ 
4*. 4^ -P>̂  -P". 
(si 0 \ h-» <J\ 
< a a -
-J -J -J 00 
\ o - J U> 00 
•t.. 'VI .t.. +>. 
0\ O s/» 00 
Ni Ni i-1 Ni 
W K O ^ 
',*> '*/! 00 h-» 
N> N) Ni Ni 
.pi i> Ni U) 
VO Ni 0 \ O 
M W N) W 
W Ni vo Q 
00 O -J 5 
Ni Ni Ni Ni 
<J\ .p- NJ ;*> 
N Ul ÒÕ O 




4>- +>. (*) ',*> 
o \ -P> * « 
N S ) S ) N 
h^ h^ h^ V>> 
VO - J - J N i 
N H H S ) 
l-i VO vo O 
V» 00 Ni Ni 
M ( J W H 
'J l U N Í 
O H u i ¡ 
h^ Ó vo O 
Ni O Ni W 
S 
H O « 
v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o 
o o g o o o o o p o o o p o p o o p o o - j ^ J ai ^ u w p O 00 
. p > . . p > . . p > . U > h - ' O Q Q - 4 - 4 0 \ O v O v O v 
K s i M O i - J U i O O ^ O ^ - J s i O l 
M M N i u œ ^ O O - J - J - J O O O O * 
. j 4 > l - i 4 > 4 > > J O > - ' 4 > 0 4 > 0 - < J & 
K W O H O O ^ O O O O O O O O M K I M 
I O O I P O N O O ^ U I - J S N I S O 
N i N i N i l - ' l - ^ h - ' h - ' h - ' i_» h-» h-» h-» h-» 
^ l O W Ï ^ H O O I S H O O ' j ) * a i o o s i O i M u i õ í v n ^ o o - j o o 
N W O Q - J ' J ) 0 0 » » « H I - ' 
g 2 .p- .p- ',*> ',*> •P^ O VO 00 
4*. -P>. '-/l 
VO -J -J 
'>/» O '>/» '>/» 
VO N Ul 00 
V\ V\ 4^ 4^ 
Ul M Oi 00 
VO vo 00 00 
U> r> v/i VO 
CO N ] Ov v l 
O U v O t v ) 
W ^ O W M O O ^ - J U C O O O W h ' 
U I U I U I ^ W M O O N I N I N I N I N I - J 
M V O O O i U l O O W ^ ^ O l A W ^ 
• J V O - J - J - M ^ O O - J O O N I C Î O O O O 






















EL SALVADOR: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES3'' 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in El Salvador in volume II of this publication. 
The consumer price index was used in all the countries. 'Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 9 
GUATEMALA: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES* 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Guatemala in volume II of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. cExports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 10 
HAITI: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES* 





































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAUG.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Haiti in volume II of this publication. 




HONDURAS: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES* 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248),Santiago,Chile, 1983. United Nations publication,SalesNo.E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Honduras in volume II of this publication. 
The consumer price index was used in all the countries. 'Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 12 
MEXICO: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES*0 

































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAIVG.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.H.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Mexico in volume II of this publication. 
The consumer price index was used in all the countries. ^Theexchange rate used was the average of the average rates of sales 
and purchases reported by the main commercial banks to the Banco de México up till July 1982, the preferential rate for imports 
of primary necessities from August to November 1982 and the average of the rates of purchases and sales in the controlled market 
from that date onwards. Exports to the main trading partners of the European Economic Community. 
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Table 13 
NICARAGUA: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES' 
(Indexes 1985 = 100) 
isb 












































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Nicaragua in volume II of this publication. 
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Table 15 
PARAGUAY: REAL EFFECTIVE (FREE OR PARALLEL) EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES1 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Paraguay in volume II of this publication. 




PERU: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES^ 


































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAUG. 1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Peru in volume II of this publication. 
bThe consumer price index was used in all the countries. cExports to the main trading partners of the European Economic 
Community. Exports to the main trading partners of Latin America. 
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Table 17 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES* 























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E/CEPAL/G. 1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in the Dominican Republic in volume II of this publication. 




URUGUAY: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES3*3 




























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"For further information on the methodology and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1981 (E./CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Also see the table 
on exchange rate trends in Uruguay in volume II of this publication. 
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CE P A L Review 
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Publications Programme of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, its aim being to make 
a contribution to the study of the economic and social 
development problems of the region. The views 
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